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OTTO RANK

Under psychoanalytic problems one can understand problems which have arisen within the psychoanalytic investigation itself and there await solution, as also problems which have arisen from psychoanalysis, but for their complete understanding need in part the addition of another method of investigation and in part other, possibly social, measures for their practical solution.

At first I should like to discuss some fundamental problems of the psychoanalytic investigation itself, that is, attempt to throw light on certain questions of principle which already have arisen within psychoanalysis but are yet problematical or have again become so in the light of newer knowledge.

From the rich problem-sphere which psychoanalysis has opened up for our mental life, I shall try further to put forward the problems which appear to me most essential with the purpose of marking out the limitations of the psychoanalytic theory and therapy. On the other hand, I intend, so far as is possible at the present time, to make the psychoanalytic view fruitful for the understanding of phenomena which already lie beyond the boundaries recognized as constitution and milieu. I think these obvious limitations need special emphasis because I am convinced that much well meant labor is wasted in the well meaning endeavor to apply psychoanalytic points of view to theoretical as well as to practical problems where they are insufficient.

If such problems within psychoanalysis have hitherto never really been raised, it is because of a difficulty which indeed I cannot remove but can only formulate, and with this make the first step to its over-

* This is part of the Introduction to my book entitled "Genetic Psychology," soon to be published in German.

coming. If we now wanted clearly to demonstrate the problematical points of the psychoanalytic doctrine, then the presupposition would be a systematic presentation of psychoanalysis by which one would, so to say, automatically push up against all gaps, obscurities, and uncertainties. But such a systematic presentation with this in view has hitherto not been attempted just because our psychoanalytic knowledge was too incomplete and uncertain. Freud himself has again and again warned us against a too hasty systematization. His and his pupils' work, which helped the psychoanalytic doctrine to further development and elaboration in describing the advancement of the analytic theory and method, was naturally *historical*. That is, they pursued definite themes emerging in the investigation up to a certain point to wait for some further connection which sometimes came quite late, sometimes not at all, sometimes finally from an unexpected direction. This empirical method preferred by Freud himself had the advantage that premature systematic presentations were avoided, but the disadvantage that a number of facts had to remain unexplained and could be made intelligible only relatively late in attempting a systematic presentation. Even Freud's recent systematic works on the ego-psychology are, if we may say so, "empirically" drafted. They fight shy of embracing the whole of the psychoanalytic doctrine; rather, mostly admittedly, they link on to isolated problems which emerged earlier, and since have found no further explanation. In some of these works Freud himself emphasizes this fact by partly wondering that analysis has not earlier set to work on these pressing problems, partly stating that the final solutions lead to simple facts which one could have found in simpler ways.

This general contrast between the *historical* and the *systematic* ways of presentation which is somehow parallel to the contrast between "empirical" and "speculative," leads us into the very midst of one of the chief problems of the psychoanalytic investigation itself. I do not want to approach a psychology of the scholar nor the way in which scientific discoveries are made and developed. But it may be mentioned that a number of resistances arise not only from the inflexibility and incidentalness of the material but also from the intellectual and emotional attitude of the investigator. This seems to be one reason why the empirical development and historical presentation must necessarily alternate from time to time with an attempt at systematic presentation. This has to show not so much

the way in which the results are found as their general and heuristic value with regard to establishing "intelligible connections" ("verständlicher Zusammenhang"). One can certainly have the viewpoint which Freud seems to take, that the empirical presentation is alone adequate to scientific investigation. He submits only unwillingly to a systematic presentation which he then designates somewhat scornfully as "speculation." But first of all there is no scientific presentation which does not instinctively systematize the empirical. So one must be quite clear as to the necessity of a purposeful system-formation which the human mind demands and hence which has become indispensable to real understanding.

In the historical viewpoint lie dangers which may become grave theoretically and practically. On the one hand one will always be inclined to overestimate the recent discoveries to the disadvantage of the earlier ones. This, however, makes progress possible for the investigator himself and for the science, but one should not be too dogmatic, otherwise it fails in its purpose. It need hardly be emphasized that a second reversed danger threatens from the conservative tendencies of our attitude to hold on to what is already familiar and assimilated and to defend oneself against all that is new. The only possibility of a real and gradual advance seems to be to receive the new reluctantly in trying to make it compatible with what is already familiar.

The systematic viewpoint in contrast to this has the advantage that it first of all automatically does away with all historical conditions and values and creates a new order according to other criteria. The material is, so to say, taken out of the historical length-dimension and is related to a coordinate system which demands and admits another way of consideration. This change of viewpoint occurs several times in the course of the development of a science. Finally this succeeds in crystallizing what is incidental and individual into generally valid and objective scientific results.

Before I go further in the description of the psychoanalytic problems here set forth, I would like to state in advance my own viewpoint and justify my presentation. I do not intend giving a historical or a systematic presentation of the psychoanalytic investigation. The first has often been done and is shown besides in the historical development of psychoanalysis itself. A systematic presentation of psychoanalysis seems to me not only premature, but moreover impossible because it too much contradicts the essence of

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the psychoanalytic method of work and investigation. This is also the reason why the few attempts hitherto to give a systematic presentation (among which I reckon my "Künstler," 1907, and the "Trauma of Birth," 1923), were felt by the analysts to be non-analytical and accordingly could not be fully estimated. But it also explains why Freud himself designated his own systematic attempts as "speculative" as if he himself were ashamed at this quasi non-analytic presentation, which actually could not be participated in by his most conservative pupils.

I hope to be able to show by my further arguments that a systematic elaboration of the psychoanalytic discoveries, psychologically and scientifically necessary, according to its very nature must be synthetic not to say nonanalytic, and must go beyond the narrow psychoanalytic sphere in method, thought, and form.

It has often been said that the term "psychoanalysis" was coined originally for the *method of investigation* based on free associations and their interpretation in the meaning of an unconscious aim. Later the name was extended to the therapeutic method of treating psychical disturbances as also to the psychical doctrine (psychology) built up on it. However justified this extension was within a definite phase of psychoanalysis yet it led later on to confusion and misunderstanding. This makes it advisable to reserve the name psychoanalysis for the classical Freudian method of investigation, which yet may accomplish something for us if we are in the position to avoid the sources of error lying in it. For the therapy which constantly attempts to apply the results of this method of investigation to the treatment of the emotionally disturbed, unadjusted, conflict-laden human beings, it seemed necessary to choose another term somewhat like *psychogogic*, which would also practically settle the problem of the so-called "lay-analysis." With regard to the new psychology being built up from the results of psychoanalysis I would like to propose calling it *Genetic Psychology*. We thus can always remain conscious of the fact that this psychology was gained from the analytic investigation of the patient's psychical life, but in its necessary systematic presentation must be built up genetically into a normal psychology.

One ought not to reply that these are purely questions of terminology, which have nothing to do with the content thus presented. First, I do not believe that there is such a thing as a pure question of terminology at all, and Freud was right when he explained in

defense of his concept of sexuality, it is not merely a question of the name; if one first agrees to a word, then it is only a short step to agreeing to the fact. I am also of the opinion that a change of nomenclature in the above mentioned sense presupposes also a slight yielding to the fact, but that is necessary to give to the psychoanalytic investigation a further productive development. If one does not do that, then the irresistible further development regardless of all resistances, creates for itself new words and concepts which finally are carried into effect. At a certain stage in the development of a new science it is shown that the terminology which indeed is the means of understanding and explanation plays a quite important rôle in hindering or furthering the progress of the science. If one holds fast too tightly to a once coined terminology it may happen that one has either to deny new facts or to twist them in order to make them fit into the conventional terminology. As an analyst, I would like to avoid introducing examples for this from the analytic literature, but it suffices to point out the not always unjustified critical objections from opponents who complain that they cannot understand the analytic "jargon." If in opponents, this could be explained as ignorance of the material or as "resistance" then one must refer to the not seldom case where analysts themselves explain they simply can no longer make any sense out of certain formulations of their colleagues. Here in scientific work is shown the same fixation-tendency which we find as one of the essential peculiarities of the psychical and which can be overcome only slowly and with difficulty. The terminology once appropriate for its development thus becomes a "fixation symptom" at a definite stage of the psychoanalytic development. But the new terminology and its acceptance only slowly follows the progress made in scientific knowledge.

As a preliminary piece of work for a systematic presentation, it would be necessary to start with the terminology. Indeed a complete explanation of the analytic terminology would consist in a systematic presentation, since it must occupy itself with the development and gradual change of psychoanalytic terms. I do not intend to make such an investigation. I would only like to say that the following points of view seem to me decisive for it. Namely one has to distinguish between (a) concepts of the pre-analytic *psychology* as for instance the conscious, the unconscious, etc.; (b) concepts of the pre-analytic (descriptive) *sexology* as for example particularly the designation of perversions (homosexuality, etc.); (c) concepts

of the pre-analytic *psychiatry* particularly regarding the diagnosis of symptoms; (d) concepts of the *analytic investigation* itself under which on the one hand are individual psychological concepts as for example repression, on the other hand phylogenetic, for example castration, etc. All these concepts, which together truly form a chaos, are of different origin, have different meanings, relate historically and genetically to different strata of the psychical development and of the scientific investigation. The pre-analytic concepts represent mere facts, are descriptive, many of them correspond to a definite *social* not psychological standpoint; some of the analytic concepts are phenomenal, others dynamic. Some of the pre-analytic concepts are so disintegrated by the analytic investigation that they are dragged along more like useless empty hulls which one cannot decide to throw away and to replace by more suitable ones. Others have of necessity been automatically replaced without one's having become conscious of the fact. With others finally, one feels their inadequacy and from piety alone one cannot decide to give them up. Certainly chiefly affective inertia and the intolerance of the human being resulting from it contribute to all this. But the human beings are too much inclined to reproach one with inconsistency if one, even as Freud occasionally has done, goes beyond one's own earlier assertions and in an attempt to give a systematic presentation introduces new concepts.

A presentation of the development of the formation and change of the psychoanalytic concepts would lead to a new systematic orientation. So for instance the term "*complex*" which for a long time has proved very useful, first became superfluous then even disturbing because it covered up subtler connections. Nevertheless that which the concept designated is not destroyed, but lives on in another form. If I to-day had to define the concept "*complex*" then I would define it as the sediment of a definite trauma. The *trauma* itself, which plays so important a rôle in the history of psychoanalysis, was originally an accidental and harmful experience (such as premature seduction) whilst to-day I use it to designate a biologically necessary step of development, which according to its nature, is not traumatic in itself, but may become so under certain conditions (birth, weaning, puberty, etc.). The *unconscious* was a concept taken over from philosophical psychology. As a kind of negative border-concept it still really belongs to the psychology of consciousness, in that it comprises everything not conscious. It here likewise became superfluous even disturbing, and was de facto given up by Freud

in his presentation "Das Ich und das Es" (1923). One need only glance at Freud's schematic sketch (p. 26) to see that there is no longer a place in psychoanalysis for the unconscious in the old sense. But then one must decide to give up this mystical concept where it disguises instead of explains the state of affairs. Why not speak simply of inhibited or repressed impulses, as I had already done in "Der Künstler" (1907) where for the first time the attempt is clearly made to conceive psychoanalysis as a doctrine of the instincts. It is the same with the so-called "*extended concept of sexuality*" which according to my view was unfortunately chosen, and has rightly given rise to the most severe protests. As under the habitual manner of speech something quite definite was already understood by "sexuality," it must lead to constant misunderstanding if one designates things briefly as sexual which conform to the extended concept of sexuality. It was thus necessary to insert the concept of "libido" for this extended concept of sexuality. But it is characteristic that hitherto even in analytic circles, there is no clearness as to the meaning of this concept. Also the Platonic term "Eros," proposed later by Freud, has not been adopted. Again here, the genetic way of approaching the subject throws light on it. Whilst one for example from the analytic standpoint designates the sucking as sexual, from the genetic point of view one could say that in sexuality (in the ordinary sense of the word) a great part of oral-libido is gratified.

Similarly it happened to the concept of *repression*, perhaps the most productive viewpoint of the whole analytic psychology. Here also it became the custom to designate every kind of psychical defense as repression. This led to careless negligence of a theoretical and practical nature. And although Freud himself had explained at the beginning, repression is only one of the forms by means of which the ego wards off unpleasant impulses, yet he himself uses almost exclusively the term repression even where another form of defense is operative and hence another term would be more in place. I myself have never been able to find the term repression alone sufficing, and from my earliest works on (1911), have been drawn to the concept of "denial" (Verleugnung) for the description and understanding of certain psychical reactions.* The concept has only recently gained entrance into psychoanalysis as it turned more to

* See the collected works from the years 1911-1923 under the title, "Sexualität und Schuldgefühl" (Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1926).

the ego problems, and for example could not be dispensed with by Laforgue in his study of Schizophrenia ("scotomisation"). In Freud's work already influenced by the "Trauma of Birth" entitled "Der Untergang des Oedipus Komplexes" (1924) he was compelled to take into consideration besides the repression of an impulse, the possibility also of its annihilation.

With that we come to the two most important concepts of psychoanalysis, the Oedipus and the castration complexes. Here also we see the same fate being accomplished, but perhaps here in the most unfortunate way. This signifies less a criticism than the fact that these concepts could be explained only with advancing knowledge, whereby they were stretched beyond their limit. Psychoanalytic terminology has here only partly shared in the advance beyond these primitive mythological concepts. We need only reflect about the simple state of affairs which Freud originally designated with the term "Oedipus-complex" and which to-day must include everything if it is not to be misunderstood. The exact presentation of this mere change in the concept, which however was no real change but only an expansion, would require a comprehensive systematic presentation of the whole of psychoanalysis. Originally only referring to the simple state of affairs expressed in the Oedipus-myth, the relation of the brothers and sisters was soon attributed to the Oedipus complex. On the other hand Freud attempted to trace the whole later formation of the super-ego back to the Oedipus-complex, whilst one extends the concept in the other direction to a "prenatal Oedipus-situation." If thus the Oedipus complex finally includes everything in it, then it was certainly easy to explain it as the "nuclear complex of the neuroses." But this enormous expansion was only possible so long as one did not recognize that the relation of the son to the parents summarized in the Oedipus myth, relates only to the genital stage, whilst *genetically* the relation to the *father* and to the *mother* belongs to a quite different stratum of development. In the "Trauma of Birth" I have attempted to separate the primary relation to the mother from the secondary relation to the father, just as I attempted to differentiate the relation of the children to the mother as a pre-Oedipoean situation from the Oedipus situation in the narrow sense. In doing this the Freudian concept of the Oedipus complex proved to be a first rough comprehension of a highly complicated psycho-biological and social state of affairs which needed further analytic illumination.

It was the same with the concept of the *castration* complex—likewise also borrowed from the myth—but originally belonging to the Oedipus stratum. It likewise was expanded in two directions, and at present everything is put in the castration complex, even the Oedipus complex itself, as recently an analytic colleague said to me in private conversation. Besides castration at the (genital) Oedipus stage, it signifies giving up the mother's breast (Stärcke), yes, birth (Alexander) whilst Freud himself moreover used it as a synonym for anxiety. This led in psychoanalytic literature to the custom of explaining any anxiety state or attack as "castration-anxiety." In the castration complex the difficulty is, that it is not really experienced, as is the Oedipus complex, by the child. It is certain rather that the threat of castration does not definitely occur in all cases and certainly at least for half of humanity, namely the women, does not come into consideration at all. The "masculinity wish" corresponding to it in the woman which according to recent investigations* represents a secondary reaction-formation, one has curtly designated as "castration complex," which makes the concept still more confusing, although Freud has spoken of "the envy of the penis" (Penisneid). The elimination of the ego-psychology then led to the castration anxiety being made of equal importance with every ego-threat (danger) and even the anxiety at the extinction of the entire ego, death-anxiety, was considered to be unreal in comparison with the castration anxiety. In so far as it can be explained psychologically, it must be as a reproduction of an already experienced anxiety, which is, as I think the birth anxiety. But tracing it back to a phylogenetic experience is an admission that one cannot explain it psychologically.

But also the only new concept which Freud in recent years took over from Groddeck, seems to me neither well chosen nor to have escaped the fate of confusion. I do not know exactly whether Freud wanted with it to designate something beyond the instinct life. If so, then the concept of the *Id* (Es), which corresponds so to say to a biological unconscious and is just as mystical as the old unconscious, should be reserved only for this "beyond the instinct life." At the last psychoanalytic congress in Homburg (Sept., 1925) a witty colleague remarked after Groddeck's lecture that the thing (Es) had already become every-thing (All-Es). I see no reason

* K. Horney, "Flucht aus der Weiblichkeit", Internat. Zschr. f. PsA., Vol. XII, 1926, No. 3.

why the analytic psychology must use in its descriptions and designations such mythical personifications and mystical depersonalizations, where simpler and clearer terms are more appropriate and at hand. The first facts, the discovery and terminological conception of which will remain Freud's great merit, with the advancing analytical insight prove to be much more complicated, but also subtler than we imagined, and the original terms are no longer sufficient for their finer description.

If we turn to therapeutic analysis we find the same perplexing picture. When Freud first revealed the emotional feeling of the patient as relating to the analyst and called it "*transference*" this term was fully justified and intelligible. If one wanted to reveal what to-day is understood in analysis by transference, one would have to write a book which would extend from the patient's embryonal development to his love life and to his social super-ego: for the patient takes the analyst in the most primitive sense as mother, further as love-object—in the sense of a mother substitute—and simultaneously (that is, in the course of the analysis) as representative of social inhibitions. I have here felt the necessity to conceive an essential part of this phenomena, which no longer can be summed up under the old designation of "transference" as "*analytic situation*." *

The same applies to "*resistance*" under which term is designated nearly everything in analysis outside the transference and even certain phases of the transference itself ("negative transference"). Here I have first spoken of "ego-resistances" and placed them in contrast to the libido resistances, a temporary distinction which needs further technical valuation.

The theme of therapy is one of the most ticklish in the whole of psychoanalysis. When Freud still strives against recognizing the necessity of a *therapeutic technique* deviating from the method of investigation, as I for some years have attempted to develop, one must call attention to the fact that analytic therapy as every other kind of therapy was from the very beginning and will remain "active" so long as it is just therapy and not research (investigation). The starting-point of Freud's therapeutic endeavor was purely active, namely the removal of the practices recognized by him as etiological in the so-called actual-neuroses, an intervention which is

* "The Development of Psychoanalysis," 1923; "Technik der Psychoanalyse: I Die analytische Situation," 1926.

no different from other medical activity. If all neuroses could have been healed by the simple therapeutic regulation of the sexual life, Freud would probably never have been stimulated to further investigation. But with closer investigation it turned out that first of all inhibitions of a psychical nature, *i.e.*, in the ego must be removed. This also was accomplished by means of an intervention of so unheard of activity that one completely overlooked it; namely in exposing the patients to the transference or as I would now like to say to the "analytic situation" which somewhat corresponds to a continued serum treatment. One daily provides the patient with definite doses of libido, by means of which the loosening of his inhibitions automatically takes place (Ferenczi's "catalysator"). The last and decisive step of therapy, the weaning of the patient from this opiate, can take place likewise only by active intervention as I think, through the setting of the time-limit, which must after a definite period withdraw the "drug" from him.

In the sphere of therapy a whole series of psychoanalytic problems meet, namely the problems of historical and systematic consideration, the relation between theory and practice which comprehends the important problem of causal and final interpretation, *i.e.*, the establishing of an "intelligible connection." If at first it was the task of investigation to extricate from the chaotic material what was universal and typical, it is at present the therapeutic task to single out the individual problem and to work more constructively than historically. Later obtained analytic knowledge can be usefully applied in individual cases right at the beginning and the theoretical importance of a theme is not to be confused with its practical importance in a particular case. If it was a matter of investigation to collect the material as completely as possible and to sift it historically to find out what was typical, then it is the task of therapy through the mastery of the analytic situation to bring the patient to psychical solving of his specific problems and actual conflicts.

With this we come to the weighty problem of *interpretation* which is not merely a technical problem, but a methodological one in so far as the theory-formation (indeed every theory-formation) is already interpretation, or at least presupposes it. Accordingly every explanation which we give to the patient is already interpretation, in so far as it gives him the theory which borders on the "interpretation" of observation. In this sense all analytic interpretations have become final not causal. A causal interpretation can alone be given

by the genetic way of consideration, in which there is no place for the final interpretation. The genetic viewpoint deals with impulses which are not assumed to be constant, and are not linked lastingly to a definite content ("complex"): but the impulses develop and again and again manifest themselves anew from actual occasions. So for instance are jealousy or the guilt-feeling as manifested in the Oedipus-situation. They have not, as Freud thinks, originated there nor are to be deducted from there (final interpretation) but these reactions (namely jealousy and guilt-feeling) are only clearly expressed in this situation. If we then trace jealousy back further, we shall find that it was already expressed at the earliest suckling stage in relation to the mother. The causal explanation finally leads us to admit that this is only the first time this impulse is manifested which we must understand genetically as a *reaction of the ego* to a definite situation which can again and again arise.

Especially in the interpretation of *symbols* the essential mistake of all analytic interpretation occurs, which justifies the reproach of one-sidedness. Not all authoritative persons or figures (for example in the dream) have a father significance, not even ultimately. For one patient the mother may have been the first authority, indeed perhaps she was for most human beings. Besides in the specific case is to be explained why authority is now represented by one now by another symbol. To point out just these special conditions (from the analytic situation) distinguishes the therapeutic task from the formation of theory, which on the other hand shows that this or that group of symbols represents authority. Or if we take the symbol of the snake, that certainly has not always only the phallic significance. It can also represent the woman, as for example in the Paradise Saga, or rebirth (shedding its skin) or the umbilical cord, etc. But even where it has a phallic significance, it is not simply a disguise-presentation, but the snake may represent anxiety, even a quite definite anxiety, whether of being bitten (at the oral stage) or of being born (at an earlier stage), etc. But not merely within the sexual sphere itself must the symbol be explained in its individual specific condition, but one ought not to neglect the other significations in other spheres because they also are effective. So for example, the symbol of the "house" is not simply to be interpreted as woman, but it has the particular significance of protection or possession, etc. Every time it must be explained why the woman is represented sometimes as object of possession or as object of

anxiety, etc. I do not know whether it sounds very enlightening if I say, interpretation is so to say, something which has to establish a relation between the content and the form of the symbol, instead of keeping simply to a typical content. Then one will also be in the position to understand the quite finely shaded vocabulary of the psychical, and not be satisfied with a few primitive roots which sometimes give an understanding in need, but mostly lead to misunderstanding. Interpretation is after all only a means of getting at the significance of things, *i.e.*, of getting at their merit and value in a given situation.

With the problem of the analytic therapy we come to the crux of the whole of psychoanalysis, namely to the *doctrine of neurosis* in general as also in its special formulation as a problem of the choice of neurosis. The development of the psychoanalytic investigation and of the theory formation has often been described in this relation. Nevertheless this most important point has not yet been cleared up since one continually tries to find the etiological roots of the neuroses in any new discovery or new way of consideration. At first the cause appeared to be in the real traumata of childhood, till they revealed themselves sometimes in part as phantasies. On the other hand those infantile experiences are so common in the later non-neurotic human beings, that one could not consider them as of etiological significance. In fact it turned out later, that all the "complexes", so-called by Jung, were not only present in the neurotic and psychotic, but are also present in the normal and healthy. Then there appeared to be an order among the complexes themselves, and for a long time the Oedipus complex was the "nuclear complex of the neuroses," but this was possible only through the above mentioned expansion of the concept. Finally it was replaced by the castration-complex, which to-day—in its extended form—figures as a first class etiological factor. Freud already under the influence of my criticism of the castration complex begins to comprehend this as a partial symptom of the great anxiety problem.*

Closely connected with the problem of the neuroses, almost identical with it is the *problem of anxiety* which now seems to represent the nuclear problem of the neurosis. On that account, Freud's attempt to solve the neurosis as a libido problem turned out to be

* Freud: "Hemmung, Symptom und Angst." (Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1926).

unsuccessful. When Freud compares my own attempt to solve the neurosis problem as an anxiety problem, with that of Adler's he neglects the most decisive mark of distinction. Adler namely, in his theory of inferiority does not place anxiety, as I do, in the center point, but the organic, thus a qualitative, whilst I see a quantitative moment as the decisive and etiological factor. But that is finally also the result to which Freud comes in admitting "quantitative relations" are decisive, the effect of which I say begins at birth, while Freud explains they "cannot be directly shown, are comprehensible only by means of the conclusion" (p. 108). So Freud in his recent book comes to the same conclusion which I had already drawn in the "Trauma of Birth," that psychoanalysis can give us no specific cause for the neuroses. In the "Trauma of Birth" I have resisted the temptation to find in the primal source of anxiety which I admit with Freud to be in parturition, the specific etiological factor of the formation of neuroses. I expressly state there that it indeed would be very alluring to find it in the Trauma of Birth, but this again proved to be only a part of the normal psychology. I therefore come to the conclusion that the psychological problem of the neuroses is partly a quantitative partly a problem of form. When Freud states as one advantage over other causal factors, that the birth trauma is accessible to direct observation even to statistical, then he is right only in a limited degree; but besides I believe we can spare ourselves from the beginning the work and trouble of such an investigation. For we know beforehand that a number of people are born who do not later fall into a neurosis. But it is just as certain that extreme cases of birth have a decisive influence in the later neurosis formation.* There are innumerable transition stages corresponding to the quantitative character of this factor which are just as little measurable as in the case of the other etiological factors (Oedipus complex, etc.).

What Freud, in his discussion of my theory, has not valued enough is that it is not merely the intensity of the anxiety experienced at birth, which I emphasized, but the *psychical anchoring* of this affect to the mother and the loss of this irreplaceable libido-object so important for the ego. As I in the "Trauma of Birth" conceive this so to say as the primal-psychical, one might even say that the real etiological factor of the neuroses consists in the fact that we

* See for example Stefan Hollos "Aus der Analyse einer Frühgeburt," Internat. Zschr. f. PsA., Vol. X, 1924.

have a psychical life, and that just in that as in the production of the neuroses we differ from the animals which are capable also of physiological anxiety.

If Freud's earlier anxiety theory was too psychical (repressed libido) then his present concept of anxiety goes to the other extreme and is too biological; for the "appearance of the anxiety affect as a signal of danger" is perhaps one of the most primitive reactions of the living being, but certainly is no viewpoint which can help us further in understanding the neuroses. If we want to understand these to some extent then we must keep to the psychical representations of anxiety. One of which I have in the "Trauma of Birth" (and even much earlier 1911)* stated as guilt feeling, formerly derived from repressed libido, with which it is certainly (later) connected. This *connection* of anxiety with libido, which Freud now wants to deny entirely because he can no longer hold to the theory of the *conversion* of libido into anxiety, actually exists and can also be therapeutically separated, if one follows the genetic development from the primary anxiety to the guilt-feeling. The only point to which Freud still holds in the linking of libido with anxiety is the castration complex, but this appears to me only as a last attempt to save his earlier libido theory. For the castration theory still implies that anxiety arises from suppressed (forbidden) libido, a mechanism which Freud at the same time has already given up. On the other hand with his acceptance of birth anxiety as the source of anxiety, an important part of the castration theory has fallen. For the castration anxiety can be traced back neither to a real danger situation nor is it in the Freudian sense, anxiety at the loss of an object, but it is simply anxiety in the ego and for the ego (one part of it). Moreover Freud must now admit that the anxiety theory of castration for the woman has no value, which quite depreciates the castration complex as the etiological factor in the formation of neuroses. But for the man also the castration complex has only the significance of a "narcissistic" threat to the ego.

This point of view leads us beyond the narrower problem of the *choice of neurosis* to the real theme of this work, the construction of a genetic psychology which embraces the relation of the ego to its milieu in its biological, psychological and social relations. This fundamental problem of the relation of the ego to objects, came

* "Sexualität und Schuldgefühl, Psychoanalytische Studien." Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag (1926).

to us in the narrower problem of the choice of neurosis, *i.e.*, the individual way in which the ego reacts in trying to adjust itself to a given milieu. This problem of the specific choice of neurosis seems analytically still to be as unsolvable as the problem of the etiology of the neurosis in general. I have already in the "Trauma of Birth" expressed doubt in the theory of specific pathogenic fixation-points to which one regresses by means of the specific form of neurosis. The gradual development of the libido in different stages, was a useful explanation for a first orientation, but was finally given up by Freud himself in that he distinguishes between two great impulse-groups, the life impulse and the death impulse. But if the libido organization is given up, as Freud admits in "Hemmung Symptom und Angst" (p. 64) then the etiology of the fixation-point also falls. The compulsion neurosis for example, no longer regresses to the "sadistic stage" which was mere description, but the whole individual is somehow built up on this sadistic stage. This ultimately goes back to some kind of a strong sadistic disposition (constitutional) with equally strong inhibitions, and is again only a problem of quantity. As there is no specific etiology so there is no longer a specific symptomatology, but there are *mechanisms* which for want of a better expression one could call "compulsive" (reaction-formation), "hysterical" (conversion), "paranoid" (projection), etc., but which in the normal psychical life are expressed as inhibitions, affects, perceptions, etc., and are only exaggerated in the corresponding pathological disturbances.

Indeed it may be a general human need to want a simple and tangible cause for everything that happens, especially in the sphere of illness, because then therapy would become simple. But I think in the case of neuroses that a special factor is added which is responsible for the failure of this purpose. The search for a specific cause of the neuroses arises from the purely medical attitude that the neuroses are diseases of the "nerves." But just psychoanalysis has taught us that they are no disease in the medical sense but in the social sense. They correspond to maladjustments and hence also the analytic treatment can be no causal therapy in the medical sense, but only as Freud himself has always emphasized, more of an education or reeducation. A causal therapy of the neuroses would mean a radical reform of our society and cultural life which is not only socially impossible, but also psychologically, because we ourselves have created this social milieu. Just this knowledge is one of the chief merits of the psychoanalytic investigation, which accord-

ing to its very nature can never give us a specific etiology for the social maladjustments which we still describe by the old medical term "neuroses." Hence also our therapeutic endeavor by means of the analytic technique, cannot attempt to "heal" men of a disease which is not purely internal, but lies in the difficulty of adjusting themselves to the social and cultural demands which they themselves have created and arranged. The reëducation of the patient to better adjustment to his milieu consists then in showing him the generality of his problem and his suffering in order to reconcile him to his milieu. He becomes free from his guilt-feeling resulting from this false ideal-formation, in seeing that other men wrestle with the same problems, *i.e.*, they are no better than he, and so he can content himself with an adjustment which is neither better nor worse than others, instead of always striving after an ideal in which he sees only the unattainable manifesting itself in him as the "feeling of inferiority." One had better then make no use of the medical concept "normality" in analysis, but speak rather of the average adjustment. From this it becomes clear that before everything we must give up the concept of the neuroses which is a relic from the neurological conception of their cause, and has no justification on psychoanalytic grounds. Whether the occasionally proposed names (for example Stekel's "Parapathie," etc.) are more suitable seems to me less important here than the emphasis of the viewpoint that in essence it is a matter of difficulty in adjustment to a given or demanded social and cultural milieu.

Out of these considerations the resulting problem is that of the relation between phantasy and reality, the inner and the outer, the ego and the world. If one has overestimated reality in the original trauma-theory, then the next and most essential phase of the analytic development clearly represented an overestimation of the phantasy-life characterized by the concept of "psychical reality." Without underestimating the great merit of analysis in this direction, it must yet be said that one has made it a little too easy and finally took refuge in an unjustifiable degree in phylogenesis. So Freud came ultimately to the "primal-phantasies" with which one yet operates as if they were primal realities—a phylogenetic past. The great and not fully estimated importance of my concept represented in the "Trauma of Birth" among other things lay in this, that it endeavored to replace the so-called primal phantasies by tangible, individual, real experiences. So for example I traced the womb-phantasy back to the physiological intrauterine existence, the never experienced death

or castration anxiety back to the certainly experienced birth anxiety, the re-birth phantasy back to one's own birth. In a word, I attempted to give to the purely psychological state of affairs which analysis had revealed in the psychical life (phantasy) a really experienced biological correlation, instead of contenting myself with projecting psychical realities back into the historical or prehistorical past.

One has tried to depreciate the theoretic and therapeutic importance of the birth trauma and the tendency to regress to the womb through the fact of wanting it to be valid *only* as a flight tendency. Apart from the fact that I myself emphasized the regressive character of the longing for the womb, this objection could be raised against all the material coming up in analysis. Indeed I might say—and I will follow it up elsewhere—that the whole analytic situation and analysis can and must be conceived as phenomena of regression. Is not the "Oedipus complex" a flight from the real sexual adjustment, and the castration anxiety a flight from the Oedipus complex? Even the birth situation which one has already fortunately overcome in the sense of the consoling mechanism brought forward by me (Trauma of Birth, p. 75) can be a flight from "castration," indeed from every adjustment (in Jung's sense) and the intrauterine situation finally a flight from the painful danger of birth!

But one can consider the whole from another viewpoint namely the genetic, by which a new insight is given. Although in the psycho-physiological junction of birth, the concepts of libido and anxiety, of object and ego mingle, yet we want to guard ourselves against the desire to solve all these problems there where we find them already before us in this place of origin. It is shown that not only for lack of statistical investigation of the newborn, but also from theoretical and practical grounds, we must go back again to the analysis of adults, in order to understand more about our impulses and mental life. One had long enough observed children without recognizing the Oedipus complex even without recognizing the clear expression of their sexuality. How much more this is valid for the less clear expressions of the infant or the newborn. Long years spent in the most careful observations of the newborn would not help us to decide the question raised by Freud as to when the mother is first valued as an "object."

On the other hand I hope to show how a genetic study of the adult's object choice, throws light on the very beginning of the object relations in the newborn, and that we must work genetically to under-

stand the object relation in general, which primarily is simply a problem of the ego and its first relation to the mother. This problem of the relation of the ego to the object and to reality represents the essential theme of genetic psychology which is constructed on the results of the analytic method of investigation. This itself has developed from the empirical investigation to a systematic presentation, from the final interpretation to the causal, from the Oedipus complex to the castration theory. This means it has developed from the libido to anxiety, or from the object to the ego. But this relation of the ego to the object determines not only the adjustment, but finally also the individual's health and illness, *i.e.*, the difficulties or impossibility of adjustment.

PRENUPTIAL INTERCOURSE BETWEEN THE SEXES IN THE TROBRIAND ISLANDS, N. W. MELANESIA*

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The Trobrianders are very free and easy in their sexual relations. To a superficial observer it might indeed appear that they are entirely untrammelled. This, however, is not the case, for their liberty has very well-defined limits. To show this clearly it will be best to give a consecutive account of the various stages through which a man and a woman pass from childhood to maturity—a sort of sexual life-history of a representative couple. We shall have to start with childhood, for these natives begin their acquaintance with sex at a very early age. The unregulated and, so to speak, capricious intercourse of tender years becomes systematized in adolescence into more or less stable intrigues, which later on again develop into lasting liaisons. Connected with these latter stages of sexual life, there exists in the Trobriand Islands an extremely important institution, the bachelors and unmarried girls' house, called by the natives *bukumatula*.

* This article is a chapter from a pending publication on *The Sexual Life of Savages in N. W. Melanesia*. Compare also the writer's book on "*Sex and Repression in Primitive Society*," Kegan Paul, London, 1926.

I.

Children in the Trobriand Islands enjoy a great deal of independence and freedom. They soon become emancipated from parental tutelage, which in any case is never very strict. Some obey their parents willingly, but this rests entirely with the personal character of both parties, for there are pliant children and despotic parents or vice versa. But there is no idea among these natives of a regular discipline, no system of domestic coercion. Often as I sat among them, observing a household scene or quarrel between parent and child, I would notice that a youngster would be told to do this or that, move away or approach, or go on some errand. It was generally a request in the form of prayer, as of a favor; though sometimes it might be backed up by a threat of violence. The parents would either coax or scold, or at best they would ask as from one equal to another. A simple command, implying natural obedience, is never heard from parent to child.

People will sometimes be angry with their children and beat them in an outbreak of rage. I have seen, I should say quite as often, a child furiously rushing at his parent and striking him. This might be received with a good-natured smile, or with an equally angry hit back. The idea of a definite retribution, or of coercive punishment, however, is not only foreign, but distinctly repugnant to the natives. Several times, when I suggested, after some flagrant infantile misdeed, that it would mend things for the future if the child were beaten or otherwise punished in cold blood, the idea appeared unnatural and immoral to my friends and it was indignantly spurned.

Such freedom gives the children scope for forming their own little community, an independent group, into which children from the age of four or five drop naturally. As the mood prompts them, they remain with their parents for a day or so, or else join their playmates for a time in their small republic. And this community within a community acts very much as its members decide, standing often in a sort of collective opposition against the elders. If they make up their minds to go for a day's expedition, or undertake some other escapade, the elders, even the chief himself, will not be able to stop them, as I saw happen many a time. It must be remembered, however, that there is one authority before which even small children bend, and that is custom, those restrictions which have the character of a taboo, of a definite command of tribal law, usage or propriety.

II.

Freedom and independence extend also to sexual matters. The children hear of and witness a good deal in the sexual life of their elders. Within the house, where the parents have no possibility of finding privacy, a child has opportunities to acquire practical information about the sexual act. I was told that no special precautions would be taken to prevent children from taking a glance at the parents' sexual enjoyment. The child would merely be scolded and told to cover its head with a mat. I sometimes heard a little boy or girl praised: "Good child, he never says what happens between his parents."¹ Very small children are allowed to listen to baldly sexual talk, and they understand perfectly well all that is discussed. They also are fair experts in the use of obscene language and swearing. With their early mental development, some children, quite small, are able to make smutty jokes, in which the elders will join with laughter.

Small girls follow their fathers on fishing expeditions, on which men remove their pubic leaf and exhibit their sexual parts. Once, when I was engaged in the discussion of an obscene subject, a little girl, the daughter of one of my informants, joined our group. I asked the father to order her away. "Oh no," was the answer, "she is a good girl, she never repeats to her mother anything that is talked among men. When we take her with us on fishing, we need not be ashamed. Another girl will often describe to her companions or to her mothers" (*i.e.*, mother and maternal aunts) "the details of our nakedness. Then they will chaff us and repeat what they know about us. This little girl never says a word." The other men present enthusiastically assented and developed the theme of the girl's discretion. Not wishing to be more catholic than the Pope, I let her remain while the conversation went on. A boy, however, is much less in contact with his mother in such matters, for here, between maternal relations, that is between real kindred, as they are for the natives, the taboo of incest begins to act at an early age, and the boy is removed from any contact of this sort with his mother or sisters.

There are plenty of opportunities for boys and girls alike to receive instruction in matters of sexual intercourse and love from their companions. At a tender age, the children initiate each other

¹All direct quotations are sentences actually uttered by natives and taken down *verbatim*. As a rule they are in my notes in the native language.

into the mysteries of sexual life in the direct practical manner. Very early, a premature amorous life begins between them, long before they are able to carry out the act of sex properly. Their intercourse consists of bodily plays, in which they satisfy their curiosity about the organs of generation and their functions, and incidentally receive, as it seems, some direct pleasure. Indecent manipulation and minor perversions, such as a stimulation of the organs by oral application are typical forms of these amusements. Small boys and girls are said to be often initiated by their somewhat elder companions, who allow them to witness their amorous dalliance. Untrammelled by the authority of elders, not restrained by any code of morals, except the specific tribal taboos, there is nothing but the degree of curiosity, of ripeness, and of "temperament" or sensuality to determine how much or how little they should indulge in sexual pastimes.

The attitude of the elder generation and even of the parents towards such infantile indulgence is that of complete indifference or complacency—they find it simply natural, and do not see any reason why they should chide or interfere. Usually they show a tolerant and amused interest, and the love affairs of children are discussed with easy jocularly. I often heard such benevolent gossip, "So-and-so (a small girl) has already had intercourse with So-and-so (a boy)." It would be also added that it was her first experience. Or an exchange of lovers, or a small love drama in the little world would be half-seriously, half-jocularly, discussed. The infantile sexual act is regarded as an innocent amusement of children. "It is their play to *kayta* (to have intercourse). They give each other coconut, a small piece of betel-nut, a few beads, or some fruits from the bush, and then they go and hide and *kayta*." It is not considered proper for the children to carry out their affairs in the house. It has always to be done in the bush.

The age of the girl when she begins to play in this manner is said to coincide with her putting on of a small fiber skirt, that is, it has to be placed at about the age of four to five years. This obviously can refer only to premature practices and not to the real act. Some of my informants insisted that such small female children actually have intercourse with penetration. Considering, however, the Trobriander's very strong tendency to exaggerate in the direction of the grotesque, a tendency not altogether devoid of a malicious, Rabelaisian humor, I am inclined to discount the hilarious affirmations of my authorities. Setting the beginning of real sexual life at the age of six to eight in the case of girls, and ten to twelve in

the case of boys, we shall probably not be erring much in either direction. From that time, sexuality will gradually assume a greater and greater importance as life goes on, till age puts another limit to it.

III.

Sexual or at least sensuous pleasure constitutes also the nucleus, or at least an element of many of the children's games and pastimes. Some of their plays do not lend themselves to sexual excitement at all, as for instance those in imitation of economic activities of the elders, games of skill and infantile athletic sports. All sorts of round games, however, played by children of both sexes on the central place of the village have a more or less strong flavor of sex. But these games furnish only indirect outlets for sexual interest, outlets accessible rather to elder youths and maidens, who also participate in them. Indeed, we shall have to return to the subject of sexuality in certain games, ditties, cats' cradles and stories, for, in the measure as association with sex becomes subtler and more indirect, it becomes accessible only to older people, and has to be described in contexts of later life.²

There are, however, some specific games of small children in which elders never participate, and into which sex enters directly. Thus they play sometimes at house-building, and at household life. A small hut of sticks and boughs is constructed in a secluded spot of the jungle. A couple or two repair there and play at husband and wife, prepare food, and incidentally carry out or imitate as best they can the act of sex. Again, groups of children, mimicking the amorous expeditions of older people, take some food and go to some favored spot on the sea-shore or in the coral ridge, cook the vegetables, eat them and "when they are full of food, the boys will sometimes fight with each other, or sometimes *kayta* (copulate) with the girls." When fruit ripens on some wild trees in the jungle, they will go in parties to pick it, exchange and give presents to each other, make "Kula" (ceremonial exchange) with the fruit, as they call it, and again engage in erotic pastimes.³ There is thus a tendency to palliate the crudity of their sexual interest and its indulgence by associating it with some more poetic enterprise. The

² This refers to the forthcoming volume in its later chapters and not to this article.

³ For the description of the real Kula, see the writer's *"Argonauts of the Western Pacific,"* 1922.

native children have a great sense of the singular and romantic in their games. For example, if part of the jungle or village is flooded by rain, they will go there and sail their small canoes on the water; or if a very strong sea has thrown up some interesting flotsam on the beach, there they will repair and play some imaginative game around it. The boys will search for interesting animals or insects or flowers and give them as presents to girls, thus lending a redeeming aesthetic touch to crude infantile indecencies.

In spite of the importance of the sexual motive in the life of the youngest generation, it must be realized that the separation of the sexes in many matters obtains also among the children. Small girls can very often be seen playing or wandering in independent groups by themselves. Little boys in certain moods which seem to be predominant, scorn the society of the female sex and amuse themselves alone. Thus the small republic falls decidedly into two groups which are perhaps to be seen more often separately than together, but which unite frequently in play, which even then need not be necessarily sensuous.

It is important to note that the sexual life of children is carried out only among themselves. There is no interference by older people. On rare occasions, some old man or woman is suspected of taking strong sexual interest in children and of having intercourse with some of them. But such suspicions I never found even to be supported by a general consensus of opinion, and it was considered both improper and silly for an older man or woman to mix sexually with children. There is certainly no trace of any custom of ceremonial defloration by old men, or even by boys belonging to an older age class.

IV.

I have just used the expression "age class," but I did it in a broad sense only: for there are no sharply distinguished age grades or age classes among the Trobriand natives. The following table of age designations describes only roughly the stages in life flowing without definite boundaries into each other.

The terms of this table partially overlap. Thus a very small infant may be referred to as *waywaya* or *pwapwawa* indiscriminately, but the former term only would be used in speaking of a foetus or referring to the non-incarnated children from Tuma.⁴ Again you might call

⁴ Compare the writer's small book entitled "*The Father in Primitive Psychology*," 1926; and "Baloma; the Spirits of the Dead in the Trobriand Islands," in the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 1916.

DESIGNATIONS OF AGE

Male

1. <i>Wawaya</i> (Foetus; infant till the age of crawling, both male and female.)		I. Stage. <i>Gwadi</i> — Word used as a generic designation for all these stages, meaning <i>child</i> at any time between birth and maturity, male or female.
2. <i>Pwapwawa</i> (Infant, till the stage of walking, male or female.)		
3. <i>Gwadi</i> (Child, till puberty, male or female.)		
4. <i>Monagwadi</i> (Male child.)	4. <i>Inagwadi</i> (Female child.)	
5. <i>To'ulatile</i> (Youth from puberty till marriage.)	5. <i>Nakapugula or Naku-bukwabuya</i> (Maiden from maturity till marriage.)	
6. <i>Tobubowa'u</i> (Man in the force of age.)	6. <i>Nabubowa'u</i> (Ripe woman.)	II. Stage. Generic designations— <i>Ta'u</i> (man) <i>Vivila</i> (woman)
6. <i>Bas Tovavaygile</i> (Married man.)	6. <i>Bas Navavaygile</i> (Ripe woman.)	
7. <i>Tomwaya</i> (Old man.)	7. <i>Numwaya</i> (Old woman.)	
7. <i>Bas Toboma</i> (Old honored man.)		III. Stage

a year-old child either *gwadi* or *pwapwawa* though *gwadi* is not used when speaking of a very small infant. Thus, though two consecutive terms encroach on each other's field of meaning, if you skip one stage you find you have to take up the proper expression. The terms (4) which have the sex prefixes are normally used for elder children only, distinguished by the dress which they wear.

There are, besides the more specific subdivisions, the three main distinctions of age, between the ripe man and woman in full vigor of life and the two stages—those of childhood and of old age,—which frame manhood and womanhood on both sides. The second main stage is divided into two parts mainly by the fact of marriage. Thus, the words under (5) designate unmarried people primarily and are in this character opposed to (6 *bis*), but they also have a meaning of youthfulness, unripeness, and in that respect are contrasted by terms (6).

The male term for old age, *tomwaya* (7), is used also to denote rank or importance. Thus, I was often addressed by this term, whose sound somehow did not flatter me, and I much preferred to

be called *toboma* (literally "the tabooed man"), which name is given to old men of rank, but refers to the latter attribute rather than to the former. Remarkably enough, the compliment or distinction implied in the word *tomwaya* becomes much weaker, almost disappears in its feminine equivalent. *Numwaya* conveys the tinge of scorn, of ridicule, pertaining to expressions for "old woman" in so many languages.

V.

When a boy reaches the age of twelve to fourteen years, and his physical vigor develops side by side with his sexual maturity, and when moreover his greater strength and mental ripeness allow him to take a yet somewhat limited and fitful part in some of the economic activities of his elders, he ceases to be regarded as a child (*gwadi*) and assumes the position of adolescent (*ulatile*). With this, he receives a different status, involving some duties and many privileges, a stricter observance of taboos, and greater participation in tribal affairs. He has already worn the pubic leaf for some time, and now he only becomes more careful and elaborate about it. The girl emerges from childhood into adolescence by the obvious bodily changes: "her breasts are round and full; her bodily hair begins to grow; her menses flow and ebb every moon," as the natives put it. She also does not change anything in her attire, for she has assumed her fiber skirt earlier, and becomes only more particular and elaborate about it.

At this stage a partial break-up of the family takes place. Brothers and sisters must be segregated in obedience to the stringent taboo which plays such an important part in tribal life.⁵ The elder children, especially male, have to be removed from the house, so as not to hamper by their embarrassing presence the sexual life of their parents. This partial disintegration of the family group is brought about by the boy's moving into a house inhabited by bachelors or by elderly widowed male relatives or friends. Such a house is called *bukumatula* and in the next section we shall become acquainted with the details of its arrangements. The girls sometimes may move to the abode of an elderly widowed maternal aunt, or other relative.

As the boy or girl enters into the stage of adolescence, his or her sexual activity becomes more serious. It ceases to be the play

⁵ Compare *Sex and Repression*, in the International Library of Philosophy, Kegan Paul, 1926.

of a child, and it assumes its place among the prominent interests of life. What were the unstable relations, culminating in an exchange of indecencies, or in an immature act of sex, now turn into an absorbing passion, and a matter for serious endeavor. An adolescent becomes definitely attached to a given person, wishes for her possession, works towards it with a purpose, plans the fulfilment of his desires by various means, mainly magical, and is happy in the achievement of this aim. Again it is possible to observe young people of this age positively unhappy through ill-success in love. This stage, therefore, differs from the previous one by the existence of personal preferences which lead to more lasting intrigues. There develops a tendency to keep the affection and fidelity of the beloved one, and to keep them exclusively, at least for a time. But so far this tendency is not associated with the idea of settling down to one exclusive relationship, nor do adolescents yet begin to think of marriage. A boy or girl wants to pass through many more experiences; he or she still enjoys the prospect of complete freedom and does not wish to accept any obligations. Though pleased to imagine that the partner is faithful, the youthful lover does not feel obliged to reciprocate the fidelity.

We have seen in the previous section that there stands out in every village a group of children forming a sort of small republic within the community. The second stage of adolescence furnishes the community with a smaller group of young boys and maidens. The natives take evident pride in what could be called the flower of their village. They will frequently mention that "all the *to'ulatile* and *nakubukwabuya* (youths and maidens) of the village were there." In speaking of some competitive game, dance or sport, they will compare the looks or performance of their youths with those of some other village, always to the advantage of their own. This group leads a happy, arcadian existence, full of freedom, amusement and pursuit of pleasure. They are not subject yet to any serious duties, while on the other hand greater physical strength and ripeness give them more independence and a wider scope of action than they had as children. The adolescent boys participate as free lances in fishing, hunting, overseas expeditions, getting all the excitement and pleasure as well as some prestige out of it, while free from some of the drudgery and many of the restrictions which trammel and weigh on their elders. Many of the taboos are not quite binding on them yet, the magical burdens are not on their shoulders. If tired

and weary of work, they simply stop and rest. For the self-discipline of ambition, and subservience to custom have not yet entirely caught them into the wheels of the social machine, which moves all the elder individuals of the tribe, and leaves them such a small degree of personal freedom.⁶ Girls also are given a certain amount of enjoyment and excitement denied to children, by joining in some of the activities of their elders, while they can still avoid the worst drudgery.

VI.

In sexual matters, people of this age, besides carrying on their love affairs more seriously and intensely, widen the setting of their amorous interest, and give it a greater variety. Both sexes arrange picnics and excursions and on these they enjoy fine scenery, new sporting experiences, in association with which they give themselves up to intimate intercourse. They also link up sexual connections outside the village community to which they belong. Whenever there occurs in some other place one of the ceremonial occasions on which custom allows of license there they will repair in groups—as a rule only either the boys or the girls, for on such occasions opportunity is offered for one sex only.

It is necessary still to add that the topographical setting of love-making differs in this stage from that of infantile love-making. The children fornicate surreptitiously in bush or grove, in connection with plays and games, using all sorts of makeshift arrangements to attain some privacy. The *ulatile*, adolescent, has either a bed of his own in a bachelor's house, or he has the use of a hut of one of his unmarried relatives. In a certain type of yam-house there is an empty, closed-up space in which boys sometimes arrange little cozy corners, affording room for two people. In these, they make a litter of dry leaves and mats and thus obtain a comfortable *garçonnière*, where they can meet and spend a happy hour or two with their lady-loves. Such arrangements are of course necessary now, when amorous intercourse has become a passion instead of a mere play.

At this stage, however, a couple will not regularly cohabit in a bachelor's house (*bukumatula*), living together and sharing night after night the same bed. Both the girl and the boy prefer to adopt more surreptitious and less binding methods. Else they might lapse

⁶ Cf. position of adolescents in the *Kula*, Chap. IV, Sec. V, and Chap. IX, Sec. II, and *passim*, in the writer's *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, 1922.

into a permanent relationship, which would get generally known, and thus put unnecessary trammels on their liberty. For this reason a little nest in the *sokwaypa* (covered yam-house) or even the bush or the grove is generally preferred.

We have seen that the youthful attachments between boys and girls at this stage have ripened out of infantile acquaintanceships and pastimes of children. All these young people have grown up in great intimacy and mutual knowledge. Such acquaintances blaze up into more fiery feelings under the influence of certain entertainments, where the intoxicating influence of music, the narcotic effect of moon-shine, the mood and attire of all the surrounding people, change the whole atmosphere, break through the monotony of life, and transform to one another the everyday personalities of friends and acquaintances. Intimate observation of the natives, their personal confidences, and the following up of many a history of a passion, have convinced me that extraneous stimuli of this kind play a great part in the love affairs of the Trobrianders. Such opportunities are offered to them by the several festive seasons, by the increase of pleasure-seeking mood associated with many pastimes at full-moon and by the various arrangements for customary license.

Thus the period of adolescence forms, in the sexual respect, the transition between infantile playful obscenities and the serious permanent relations which precede marriage. In this period of transition, free, passionate love has a great deal of liberty, both because its object may often be changed and because considerable variety may be introduced into its setting.

VII.

As time goes on, and the boys and girls grow older, the intrigues extend in length, and the ties tend to become deeper and more permanent. One strong personal preference as a rule develops, and begins to stand out definitely against the other love affairs. It may be based on real sexual passions, or else mainly on an affinity of characters. With it, some practical considerations will become mixed, and as a result of all these motives, sooner or later a man will think of stabilizing one of his *liaisons* by marriage. In the ordinary course of events, every marriage concluded is preceded by a more or less protracted period of sexual life in common. This is publicly known and spoken of and it is regarded as the public intimation of matrimonial projects of the pair. It serves also as the test

of the strength of attachment and of mutual compatibility. To the prospective bridegroom and to the woman's family, the period of *fiançailles* gives the time economically to prepare for the event.

Two people living together as permanent lovers are described respectively as "his woman" (*la vivila*) and "her man" (*la ta'u*). Or else a term, also used to describe the friendship between two men, is applied to this relationship (*luba'i*, with pronominal suffixes). In order to distinguish between a passing intrigue and one which is considered preliminary for marriage, they would say of the latter: "*la vivila mokita; imisiya yambwata yambwata*"—"his woman truly; he sleeps with her always always." In this locution, the sexual relationship between the two is described by the word "to sleep" (*imisia*, the durative and iterative form of *masisi*, to sleep). The use of this verb also characterizes the lawfulness of the relation, for it is used to describe sexual intercourse between husband and wife, or such relations of which the speaker wants to speak seriously and respectfully. An approximate equivalent in English would be the verb "to cohabit." In distinction to this, the natives have two other words, the verb *kaylasi*, which implies the element of illicitness in the act, and is used when describing adultery or other forms of non-lawful intercourse. Here the English word "to fornicate" would come nearest to rendering the native meaning. When the natives want to indicate the crude physiological fact, they use the word *kayta*, translatable by the verb "to copulate."

The pre-matrimonial, lasting intrigue is based upon and maintained by personal elements only. There is no legal obligation on either party. They may enter into it and dissolve it as they like. In fact, this relationship differs from other intrigues only by the fact of its duration and stability. Towards the end, when marriage actually approaches, the element of personal responsibility and obligation becomes stronger. The two regularly cohabit in the same house, and a considerable degree of mutual exclusiveness in sexual matters is observed. Not that either has given up his or her freedom yet. In the several forms of customary license, the affianced couples are torn apart and participate, each partner according to pleasure. Even within the village, in the normal course, the girl who is definitely going to marry a certain boy will bestow favors on other men. But a certain measure in this must be observed, as well as a sufficient decorum. That is to say if she sleeps out too often, there will be either a dissolution of the tie, or frictions and quarrels. Neither

the boy nor the girl should be openly and flagrantly seen with other partners on amorous expeditions. Even apart from nocturnal cohabitation, the two should keep company with each other, and make a display of their relationship in public. So that any deviations from the exclusive intrigue must be done decently or properly: that is, in a clandestine manner. The relationship of free engagement is the natural outcome of a series of trial intrigues, and the appropriate preliminary test of marriage.

VIII.

The most important feature of this mode of steering towards marriage, through gradually lengthening and tightening intimacies is an institution which might be called "the limited bachelor's house," which indeed has at first sight the appearance of a Group Concubinage or Cicisbeism. It is clear that in order to enable couples of lovers permanently to cohabit, some seclusion, some house is needed. We saw the makeshift arrangements of children and the more comfortable, but not yet permanent, love-nests of adolescent boys and girls. The later lasting intrigues need some special institution, which must be more definitely established, which must have a customary hallmark and must be more convenient from the point of view of physical comfort.

Tribal custom and etiquette offer accommodation and privacy in the form of the *bukumatula*, the already-mentioned bachelors' and unmarried girls' house. In this a limited number of couples, some two, three or four, live for longer or shorter times together in a temporary community. These houses incidentally offer shelter for younger couples if they want amorous privacy for an hour or two.

We must now give some more detailed attention to this institution, extremely important and significant as it is from many points of view. It will be necessary to consider the position of the houses in the village, their internal arrangements, and the manner in which life within the *bukumatula* shapes itself.

In the description of the typical village in the Trobriands, attention was drawn to its schematic division into several parts.⁷ This division expresses certain sociological rules and regularities. As we have seen, there is a vague association between the central place and

⁷ This sentence refers to the first chapters of the forthcoming book on Sex. Compare however *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, Chap. II.

the male life of the community; between the street and the feminine activities. Again, all the houses of the inner row, which consists principally of store houses, are subject to certain taboos, especially to the taboo of cooking, which is believed to be inimical to the stored-up yam food. The outer ring, on the other hand, consists of household dwellings in which cooking is allowed. With this distinction is associated the fact that all the establishments of married people have to find their place in the outer ring, whereas a bachelor's house may be allowed to stand among the store houses in the middle. The inner row thus consists of yam houses (*bwayma*), personal huts of a chief and his kinsmen (*lisiga*), and bachelor's houses (*bukumatula*). The outer ring is made up of matrimonial homes (*bulaviyaka*), closed yam houses (*sokwaypa*), and widows' or widowers' houses (*bwala nakaka'u*). The main distinction between the two rings is the taboo on cooking.

At present there are five bachelor's establishments in Omarakana, and four in the adjoining village of Kasana'i.⁸ Their number has greatly diminished owing to missionary influence. In fear of being singled out, admonished and preached against, the owners of some *bukumatulas* erect them now in the outer ring, where they are less conspicuous. Some ten years ago, my informants could count as many as fifteen bachelor's homes in both villages, and my oldest acquaintances remember the time when there were some thirty. This dwindling of the number is due, of course, partly to the enormous decrease of population, and partly only to the fact that nowadays some bachelors live with their parents, some in widowers' houses, some in the missionary compounds. Needless to say, this state of affairs does not enhance real sex morality.

The internal arrangements of a *bukumatula* are simple. The furniture consists almost exclusively of the bunks with their mat covering. As in the daytime the inmates lead their life in association with other households, as they have all their working implements put away in other houses, the inside of a typical *bukumatula* is strikingly bare. It lacks the feminine touch of being really inhabited.

IX.

In such an interior, the elder boys and their temporary mistresses live together. Each boy owns and permanently sleeps in his

⁸ In these villages I have spent most of my time in the Trobriands.

bunk. When a couple dissolve their *liaison*, it is the girl who as a rule moves, to find another sleeping place with another sweetheart. The *bukumatula* is, as a rule, owned by the group of boys who inhabit it, one of them, the eldest, being its owner *en titre*. I was told that sometimes a man would build a house as a *bukumatula* for his daughter, and that in olden days there used to be unmarried people's houses owned and tenanted by girls. I never met, however, any actual instance of such an arrangement in existence nowadays.

At first sight, as I have said, the institution of the *bukumatula* might appear as a sort of Group Marriage or at least Group Concubinage. A deeper analysis shows it is nothing of the kind. Any such wholesale terms are always misleading, if we allow them to carry any extraneous implications. If we were to call this institution "Group Concubinage," it would also lead to a misunderstanding for it must be remembered that we have to deal with a number of couples who sleep in a common house, each in an exclusive *liaison*, and not with a group of people all living promiscuously with each other. For there is a definite appropriation of each couple, and there is never an exchange of partners, no poaching and no "complaisancies." In fact, there is a special code of honor within the *bukumatula*, which makes an inmate much more particular to respect sexual rights within the house than outside it. The word *kaylasi*, indicating sexual trespass, would be used against a poacher. And I was told that a man should not do it, because it is very bad, "like adultery with a friend's wife."

Within the *bukumatula* a strict decorum obtains. The inmates never indulge in orgiastic pastimes, and it is considered improper to watch another couple during their amorous proceedings. I was told by my young friends that it is the rule either to wait till all the others are asleep, or, on other occasions, they would all agree to be at liberty in their love-doings, and then each couple would pay no attention to the others. I could find no trace in my information of any prurient interest taken by the average boy in watching others, nor any tendency to exhibitionism. Indeed, when I was discussing the positions and techniques in which the sexual act can be carried out, the statement was volunteered that there are specially unobtrusive ways of doing it "so as not to wake up the other people in the *bukumatula*."

Of course the couples in the *bukumatula* are not bound to each other by any ties valid in tribal law or customary usage. They join

up under the spell of personal attraction, they remain as long as kept together by sexual passion or personal attachment, and they dissolve at pleasure. The fact that in due course a permanent *liaison* often develops out of these temporary ones, and ends in marriage, is due to the operation of complex causes, of which we shall speak subsequently, but even such a gradually tightening *liaison* is not binding until marriage is contracted. The *bukumatula* relationship, as such, imposes no legal ties.

Another important point is that the community of interests is limited to the sexual relation only. The couple share the bed and nothing else. In the case of a permanent *liaison* about to lead into marriage, they share it regularly. But they never have meals in common, there are no services to be mutually rendered, no obligation of any help, nothing which would constitute a common *ménage*. This must be realized clearly, because, when we speak, in the current European use of the words about *liaisons*, or concubinage, a community of household goods and interests is usually meant. In the French language, the expression "*vivre en ménage*" is a synonym for typical concubinage, and means common domestic economies, as well as all other phases of life in common, besides sex. In Kiriwina (Trobriand Islands) this phrase could not be correctly applied to a couple living together in the *bukumatula*.

Two people about to be married in the Trobriands must never have a meal in common. Such an act would greatly shock the moral susceptibility of a native and his sense of propriety. To take a girl to dinner without having previously married her, as we may do in Europe, would be to disgrace her in the eyes of the Trobrianders. While we cavil at an unmarried girl's sharing a man's bed, the Trobriander would be extremely shocked at the idea of an unmarried girl's sharing a man's meal. The boys never eat within, or in front of, the *bukumatula*, but always join their parents or other relatives at meals.

The institution of the *bukumatula* is therefore characterized by: (1) exclusive relationship and individual appropriation, the partners of each couple belonging exclusively to one another; (2) by strict decorum and absence of any orgiastic or lascivious display; (3) by the lack of legally binding elements; (4) by the exclusion of any other community of interests between partners except that of sexual cohabitation.

In describing the latter intrigues which lead to marriage, we

have finished the survey of the various stages of the sexual life history before wedlock. But this does not exhaust the subject. We have spoken of the normal course of sexuality in its main outlines. There are, besides this, certain orgiastic forms of license allowed by custom. We must also, besides following the mere description here given, learn more of the details about the technique of love-making and its psychology; about some taboos, myths and the folklore of sex. Before we deal with these subjects in some of the later chapters, it may be best to proceed with our descriptive narrative into the last stage of love-making and sexual relations, that, namely, of marriage.⁹

⁹ These matters will be discussed in the chapters following the present one, in the forthcoming book on the *Sexual Life of Savages in N. W. Melanesia*.

SPENCER'S LOVE FOR GEORGE ELIOT

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Many men of genius are often so neurally unstable that they suffer from chronic neurasthenia, melancholia, hypochondria, insomnia, excessive irritability, eccentricity, temporary insanity and other psychopathic afflictions. The names of Socrates, Paul, Lucretius, Caesar, Luther, Newton, Darwin, Comte, Nietzsche, Ibsen, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, and others readily come to mind. I believe the name of Herbert Spencer should be included. I shall give the facts which prove his neural instability and then offer a tentative explanation of his nervous breakdown.

This is what I mean by saying the genius is often "neurally unstable." He is extremely sensitive to stimuli; he is capable of rapid, accurate, retentive responses; in a given time, he has many more experiences than an ordinary person, and, because of his neuromuscular constitution, they mean much more to him. He has a higher metabolic rate than normal people: he can release and direct effectively much more nervous energy than they. In short, he is a better thinking machine—a very delicately adjusted, marvelously complex hairspring and hairtrigger sort of mechanism. Hence, the genius is in greater danger of functional disorders than the ordinary individual. It is the difference between a Swiss watch and a sundial.

It is well known that Herbert Spencer suffered a "nervous breakdown" in the summer of 1855 which rendered him incapable of scholarly work until the early months of 1857. It was a more serious thing for him than the mere "loss of eighteen months" (Autobiography, Vol. I, Ch. 38), for he never fully recovered; during the remainder of his life he was unable to sleep well, read much, talk animatedly, or work more than two hours a day. (Id., 580.)

The accepted explanation for this breakdown is overwork on the "Psychology." I shall attempt a different, or at least, a complementary one. Why did Spencer work himself to physical and nervous exhaustion on "The Principles of Psychology"? He was a temperate man who boasted that thinking was no effort for him—he

was "never puzzled." (Id., 462.) He never "overworked" before 1855, nor afterwards. I believe the true explanation is found in his physical and social heritage together with the unique social situation in which he found himself during the fall of 1854.

His father's family was characterized by an intense, neurasthenic disposition, and a temperamental tendency to radicalism and rebellion. Spencer may have inherited this tendency. On both sides, his ancestors had been rebels against authority: they were Huguenots, Quakers, Methodists and very liberal, reformatarian Anglicans. (Auto. I, 2-8, 12.)

His grandfather Spencer was a victim of chronic melancholia. (Auto., I:18.) He was so "tender hearted" that he could not bear to hear a passage of cruelty or injustice read aloud. (Id., 20.) His aunt, Mary Anne Spencer, was a "bed-ridden invalid, woe-worn and fretful. . . . The opinion of my father was that a disappointed attachment had originated the invalid life." (Id., 23.) His uncle John Spencer "was entirely egoistic," apparently a quibbling, self-assertive, ill-balanced person. (Id., 26-7.) According to Mozley, when Spencer's Uncle Thomas preached, he "always worked himself into something like a passion and came home exhausted." (Id., 29.) He was an ascetic, contentious, rebellious, radical reformer type of man, "mad as a march hare," one described him. (Id., 30-43.) All of Spencer's paternal uncles "were regarded as more or less eccentric." (Id., 44.)

His father was a radical in education, politics and religion, and betrayed other traits indicating a good deal of neural instability. At one time he feared insanity. (Duncan's "Life of Herbert Spencer," 8.) He had a "singular lack of judgment in practical affairs." (Id., 4.) He was childishly meticulous about insignificant details such as writing marginal notes in his Euclid and emendations in his dictionaries. (Auto., I:60-1.) "He was not kind to my mother. Exacting and inconsiderate, he did not habitually display that sympathy which should characterize the marital relation." (Id., 61.) He had a "chronic irritability consequent on his nervous disorder which set in some two or three years after marriage and continued during the rest of his life." (Id., 62.) This "nervous disorder" was a nervous breakdown very similar to Spencer's. Father and son had a similar nervous disorder which attacked them both at about the same age.

His mother also showed evidence of marked neural instability.

She came from a long line of nonconformist ancestors. She broke her engagement; exhibited great lack of tact; suffered from chronic exhaustion all her life; in her last years she "lost her faculties," that is, went insane. (Id., 63-8.) She was apparently a sweet, sensible, domestic, religious, retiring, somewhat saintly, almost mystical woman of rather ordinary intelligence. Her consciousness oscillated between her religious and domestic duties. (Id., 65.) There was in her little of the fire, fervor and nervous overtension of the Spencers, but her personality clearly betrays a continual inner conflict of a psychopathic sort.

This brief survey of the biological ancestry of Herbert Spencer suggests that he was a neurally unstable person whom we would expect to behave as he did in the circumstances I am about to relate. The biopsychic soil of the Spencer-Brettell family was well prepared for the kind of a personality plant that developed into the greatest synthetic philosopher of the nineteenth century.

Nor was the sociological heritage of Spencer any more conducive to the growth of a normal, balanced personality. To all intents he was an "only child," since his four brothers and four sisters all died at early ages. (Duncan, *op. cit.*, 7-8.) These infant deaths may indicate the physical defects of the ancestral stock, but in any case, their sociological effects on Spencer's life were very great. His parents were thirty and twenty-six when he was born. Both were in poor health. Spencer himself was never robust, either as an infant or in later life. During his childhood, he was a lonely little fair-haired fellow associating almost entirely with grown-ups, most of whom had "peculiar ideas." Huxley said, "Men of that force of character, if they had been less wise and less self-restrained, would have played the deuce with the abnormal chicken hatched among them." (Life of Huxley, II: 146; quoted by Duncan, *op. cit.*, 12.) I think they did "play the deuce" with him, in spite of their alleged wisdom and self-restraint. Their good intentions cannot be questioned, but the biosocial conditions over which they had little control inevitably produced the kind of man Spencer became.

Due to his psychopathic inheritance and his abnormal childhood, void of all wholesome association with other children, his precocious mind moulded by radical persons much older than himself, Spencer soon became an introspective, self-centered, socially unadjusted child. He always remained essentially the same kind of man—full of nervous energy, overintense, egoistic, supersensitive, lonely, unadjusted. In

boyhood he was allowed to "run wild," usually alone, fishing, visiting remote farmers, collecting, walking the violet-flowered hedgerows. (Auto., I: 74-85.)

The outcome was a self-willed, unrestrained boy, entirely unused to mental and physical discipline and thoroughly impatient of it. "I was extremely prone to castle-building—a habit which continued throughout youth and into mature life. . . . In early days the habit was such that on going to bed, it was a source of satisfaction to me to think I should be able to lie for a length of time and dwell on the fancies which at the time occupied me, and frequently next morning, on awakening, I was vexed with myself because I had gone to sleep before I had revelled in my imagination as much as I had intended. Often these dreams, becoming literally daydreams, quite filled my consciousness when walking. Even in the streets my state of abstraction was such that I occasionally talked aloud as I went along." (Id., 85-6.) This, then, was the Spencer of nine or ten.

When he was thirteen he was sent to his uncle Thomas Spencer's school at Hinton. After a month or so, his dislike of the school, his homesickness and a quarrel with his uncle, impelled him to run away. He arrived home after two and a half days of constant walking during which he covered 115 miles. In a couple of weeks he was returned to Hinton and remained there three years except for occasional short visits home. This was the only formal education he ever received. In commenting on the meager results obtained, he says, "They had to deal with intractable material—an individuality too stiff to be easily moulded." (Id., 133.)

So much for the social and biopsychic backgrounds of Spencer. We have seen that he came of a family congenitally stiffnecked and perverse, physically weak and psychologically eccentric, if not erratic. Nervous breakdowns were not unknown among them. Fears of insanity, morbidity, chronic melancholia, excessive egoism, insanity and invalidism are all present; all members of the family were "odd," radical, pioneering, poorly balanced people. He himself was romantic, idealistic, introspective and introvertive, exhibiting that combination of self-depreciation and self-assertion which often characterizes the world's great achievers.

This brief sketch of Spencer's physical and social inheritance brings us to the period of his life just preceding the nervous breakdown of 1855.

In the spring of 1850 he met George Henry Lewes. (Id., 399,

435.) They soon became intimate friends and always remained on good terms. Lewes gives Spencer great credit for raising him out of the slough of despond, into which he had fallen after the defection of his wife. (Deakin, *Early Life of George Eliot*, 90.) Spencer was always loyal to Lewes; he does not mention the fact in his autobiography that they once quarreled (Duncan, *op. cit.*, 64-5), nor that Lewes refused to go with him to the continent on the short summer holiday of 1853. (*Id.*, 72.) Yet I think this love for Lewes, and these two omissions are very important in the explanation of Spencer's "illness" in 1855.

In the summer of 1851, Spencer met George Eliot at the home of Chapman. (*Auto.*, I: 456.) In the fall of the same year he introduced Lewes to her. (Cross, J. W., *Life and Letters of George Eliot*, I: 197; Duncan, *op. cit.*, 634.) Spencer does not mention this in his autobiography, but did remark to Cross that it was quite a coincidence that he had introduced Lewes both to her and to Cross. (Cross, *op. cit.*, III: 16-17.)

It is quite apparent that his friendship for George Eliot developed into love during the fall and spring of 1851-2. While George Eliot was apparently also in love with him, she was well on the way to recovery by the fall of 1852. Spencer never recovered. It was his "grand passion," his only heterosexual experience, so far as I have learned. It was an episodic interlude for George Eliot, but it was a tragic adventure of the spirit for Spencer.

There is evidence of Spencer's love for George Eliot in his autobiography, I think, in spite of his overt denial, but the letters in her "Life" by Cross are more conclusive. I am convinced that some of the letters were suppressed by Cross and that Spencer's denial is a case of one who "protests too much." I shall briefly review these two sources.

In the ten pages devoted to George Eliot (*Auto.*, I: 456-65) there is a lyric note seldom struck by Spencer. There is only fulsome praise of the lady, and lover-like magnification of things they said and did; yet one always feels that Spencer's remarks conceal more than they reveal. The style is generally restrained and dignified, but sometimes very warm for Spencer. One feels that he lingered lovingly over these pages. One fancies he must have read them over many times, wondering if perchance he had said too much, and yet feeling deeply that he could say no less. Reading these pages as a unit one receives a vivid impression that Spencer was trying to be

loyal both to his youthful love and to his mature pride. The imagination conjures up many tender scenes and reads romance between the lines. I shall attempt only a brief summary. The reader is referred to the text for the full force of my interpretation.

George Eliot "was the most admirable woman mentally" he ever met. (Letter to Lott, April 23, 1852; *Auto.*, I: 457.) "We have been for some time past on very intimate terms. I am very frequently at Chapman's and the greatness of her intellect conjoined with her womanly qualities and manner, generally keep me by her side most of the evening" (*Id.*, 457); he "had frequently—indeed nearly always—the pleasure of her companionship in addition to the pleasure afforded by the" operas which he attended regularly during the spring of 1852 (457); "striking by its power when in repose, her face was remarkably transfigured by a smile" (458); she had a low contralto voice, gentle, subdued, sympathetic, like her smile; was full of domestic affection; altruistic; self-controlled; had evenness of temper; was indignant against wrong, but conscious of human weakness and quickly forgiving; had great ability to acquire and organize knowledge; calm, and full of latent power. These are some of the traits Spencer found in her. "I have known but few men with whom I could discuss a question in philosophy with more satisfaction. Capacity for abstract thinking is rarely found along with capacity for concrete representation even in men; and among women, such a union of the two as existed in her, has, I should think, never been paralleled." (460.)

To Spencer, she was evidently the paragon of women, the only one he ever knew intimately. I can find no record of close association with any women before he met her, nor after he lost her. Consequently, all of his repressed interest in the other sex flared into consciousness during these months, lighting a fire which, after her rejection of his suit, could gain expression only through an inward burning. The result was the nervous breakdown of 1855 and the psychic disabilities from which Spencer suffered the remainder of his life. Youthful sex repression was undoubtedly serious and fraught with danger, but the repression that followed his unsuccessful attempt at mature sex expression was bitter, tragic, and almost fatal.

There is no doubt that George Eliot deserves in a large measure the encomiums Spencer heaps upon her, but I think the secret of her fascination for him lies, first, in the fact that she was the only woman with whom he ever had any amorous experience, and secondly, that

she always deferred to his egocentricity. He could discuss philosophy with her satisfactorily because she always agreed with him. When they disagreed during their reading of Comte, she simply abandoned the field—the way of a maid with this abnormally argumentative and self-assertive man. (Auto., I:461.) There are indications in her letters that her acquiescent listening to Spencer's endless, ponderous, cosmic exposition was not always rose scent and moon glamor to her volatile spirit. The witty, brilliant, scintillant Lewes was more likely to arouse and retain her permanent interest. A man like Spencer often must have been very dull to a woman like George Eliot.

As the spring advanced, they became more intimate. "Our conversations were no longer indoors or at places of amusement." (461.) There was a secluded garden at the base of the Somerset House near Chapman's home. "Frequently on fine afternoons in May, June and July she obtained the key; and we made our way on the terrace where we paced backwards and forwards for an hour or so, discussing many things." (462.) One wonders what those "many things" might have been—those youthful conversations of this man and woman soon to be the world's most famous people in their respective fields. Then there were calls at her house in the evenings when operas were not on the program, and late departures.

Although Spencer flatly and brusquely denies it in his autobiography (p. 462) and in all other places, it would not have been strange if they fell in love and became engaged. Spencer was not averse to marriage, as is shown by a letter to his father in April, 1851. He attributes the idleness of the year to a pessimistic mood. (Id., 425-8.) In his autobiography (429), he rates marriage as 100 in series of estimates of the advantages he would obtain by emigrating to New Zealand. Literature and science rate 8 and 3 respectively, while "better health" rates only 40.

So I think it fair to assume that the idea of marriage was not wholly alien to his mind in the spring of 1852 when he had a lady at hand to whose charms he pays such high tribute in later life and upon whom he bestowed more time and attention than one would expect from such a "cold logic machine" as Spencer is supposed to have been. Deakin reports (op. cit., 80) that Chapman and George Eliot used to joke him about getting married, and even found a prospective wife for him. When they met, however, neither party was satisfied. If Spencer was in love with George Eliot, the explanation is simple.

If she was in love with him, what more natural than that she should offer to find him a wife! Women in love have been known to behave in such a manner.

Spencer's vehement denial that he was ever in love with George Eliot may be construed as good evidence that he was. He was a proud, super-sensitive man, much given to that secrecy regarding the inner life so often found in the "only child." He would not admit that he ever made a mistake or failure, even in love. When George Eliot broke the engagement, if they were engaged, or refused him when he proposed, and finally went away under a cloud with his best friend, such a denial is just what we should expect from a man like Spencer. His self-centered, imperious, secretive, brooding nature could not brook the public exposure of his inadequacy as a lover. Every passionate denial thus becomes the expression of the smouldering smothered passion he was impelled to conceal. Eventually it became a sort of mania to assert that he never had loved her. Possibly he came finally to believe it. But no man can practice such emotional dishonesty without paying a psychophysical penalty, especially if he is such a neurally unstable man as I have shown Spencer to be. The psychoanalysts have taught us this much, at least.

There are other evidences of Spencer's "overcorrection" in this matter. When he heard Cross was publishing "The Life and Letters of George Eliot," Spencer tried to get him to insert a note stating that Spencer had never been in love with her. Cross at first agreed, Duncan says (*op. cit.*, 266-7), but "after some correspondence" (would that we had it!) the note was not inserted.

In a letter to Youmans in America, February 4, 1885, Spencer writes, "Cross argued that the indirect evidence would amply suffice to refute the report. I think when you come to look at the state of the case, and such extracts as are given from April, 1852, onward, you will see that this is by no means the fact, and that any one who had previously accepted the report would find nothing to dissipate his belief in it." (*Duncan, op. cit.*, 267.)

Precisely. Reading Spencer's own account, and "such extracts" as Cross gives of her letters, one is led inevitably to the conclusion that Herbert Spencer and George Eliot were in love with each other during the spring of 1852. I think Spencer was in love with her before that and long afterwards. He probably regarded his denial of that love as one of his greatest sacrifices to it. Cross does not mention the incident at all, and one wonders if the real reason he

did not insert the note was that he knew it would have been out and out falsification. We can easily imagine George Eliot telling him of those old days when Somerset garden was an enchanted field. In reading the "Life" one feels the truth of the remark, "He tells us little or nothing of some matters which he must thoroughly have known, and which he must have felt his readers ached to know. All the mysteries of George Eliot's life are left unexplained, or only partially explained." (Whipple, E. P., *Recollections of Eminent Men*, p. 380, chapter on George Eliot's Private Life.) One feels that Cross has left out much we should like to know about both Spencer and Lewes, but I think he has included sufficient data to permit a partial reconstruction of Spencer's sad romance with George Eliot.

Spencer's name first occurs in the "Life and Letters of George Eliot" on page 196, vol. I (to Mr. Bray, end of September, 1851), mentioning him as among the "nice people" present and as the author of "Social Statics" "which Lewes pronounces the best book he has seen on the subject." George Eliot had known Spencer since the mid-summer of 1851 according to the autobiography. (P. 456.) She did not meet Lewes until November when Spencer introduced him. Lewes was one of the best known men in London literary and journalistic circles in 1851 which accounts for George Eliot's reference to his opinion of "Social Statics." On the twenty-third of November, 1851, Spencer took George Eliot to see the "Merry Wives of Windsor" the first record of many such engagements. There is no indication of what she thought of Spencer at this time. She does mention the fact that Lewes sat with them, however, and "helped to carry off the dolorousness of the play." (Cross, I:201.)

They must have seen a good deal of each other in the fall and winter of 1851-2. Lewes also was not a stranger to her after November, 1851, as the above reference indicates and a remark at the close of a letter to the Brays, April 22, 1852, proves. (Id., 209.) "I went to the opera on Saturday . . . with my 'excellent friend,' Herbert Spencer, as Lewes calls him. We have agreed that there is no reason why we should not have as much of each other's society as we like. He is a good, delightful creature, and I always feel better for being with him."

Lewes, a married man with three children, was having unsavory domestic difficulties with his faithless wife during these months. So it is not strange that the none too attractive, rather provincial but

highly intellectual young woman should have preferred the company of Spencer to that of Lewes. Although his prospects were only promises compared to the solid achievement of Lewes, Spencer was no mean man in the literary London of 1852. Lewes was about three years older than Spencer and George Eliot. He was considerably more brilliant and sophisticated than either.

Thus it is easy to see why Spencer rather than Lewes was the lover of 1852. Even while she gave her attention to Spencer for the time being, it is reasonable to suppose that George Eliot was not insensible to the remarkable difference between the two friends. She had known Spencer longer, and the condition of Lewes' domestic affairs made him impossible as a lover. But two years of London life doubtless left its influence on George Eliot's philosophy of life. She was more brilliant than Spencer, and certainly soon became more sophisticated. She grew toward Lewes and away from Spencer. Lewes' time had not come, but his star was rising.

So we may fairly assume that George Eliot was as much in love with Spencer as he was with her in that memorable spring of 1852. This was the time of the walks in the secluded garden at Somerset House ("She frequently obtained the key!", *Auto.*, I:462), the many nights at the opera and probably many such incidents as the one recorded in a letter to the Brays, May 5. "I saluted Mr. Chapman with 'See the Conquering Hero Comes' on the piano at 12 o'clock; for not until then was the last magnate, except Herbert Spencer, out of the house." (*Cross*, I:210.) Does this mean that Spencer remained after the others? I have so interpreted it. Even great masters of English may be ambiguous at times, it appears. It would be interesting to know how much longer the redoubtable Herbert remained. "My days have slipped away in a most mysterious fashion lately—chiefly, I suppose, in long walks and long talks." (*Cross*, I:212. May 12, to the Brays.)

In the period from May 2 to 27, we find the mention of four operas, and on the latter date, this (to Miss Sara Hennell), "My brightest spot, next to my love of *old* friends is the deliciously calm *new* friendship that Herbert Spencer gives me. We see each other every day, and have a delightful camaraderie in everything. But for him my life would be desolate enough. What a wretched lot of old shrivelled creatures we shall be by-and-by! Never mind—the uglier we get in the eyes of others, the lovelier we shall be to each

other; that has always been my firm faith about friendship, and now it is in a slight degree my experience." (Cross, I:212.)

Charles Bray had invited Spencer to come and see him. George Eliot "assured Spencer that Bray would think it formal enough" if she should tell Bray that Spencer preferred putting off the visit until she could be there too! (June 23, 1852, Cross, I:213-4.) This young lady could "frequently obtain the keys," and use them to unlock difficult doors of social propriety. This is the roguish letter of a young woman in love, if I interpret it correctly—the way of a mid-Victorian maid with a preternaturally shy, lonely, abstract young man, inexperienced in the ways of the world of love.

What happens now? The bright blooms of spring and summer begin to fade and fall in the waning year. There is a saddened note in the letters of late June, with a playful attempt to cover some subtle darkness in the soul; from a letter to the Brays, end of June, 1852 (Cross, I:214), "The opera, Chiswick Flower Show, the French Play and the Lyceum, all in one week, brought their natural consequences of headache and hysterics—all yesterday. At five o'clock I felt quite sure that life was unendurable. This morning, however, the weather and I are both better, having cried ourselves out and used up all our clouds; and I can even contemplate living six months longer. Was there ever anything more dreary than this June?"

The scene changes. Herbert Spencer begins to drop out of the picture, and the jeering, pock-marked face of Lewes appears. We can only speculate as to what happened. Perhaps on that visit to Charles Bray, Spencer proposed to her, and for some reason of which she herself was scarcely conscious, she rejected him; or if they had been engaged before, perhaps it was then she jilted him. Perhaps Lewes, whose wife had definitely deserted him, began to fascinate her. He was not the man to remain silent if she had caught his amorous fancy. The ill use his wife had given him, his three attractive motherless children, the tragedy of his life, his brilliance and despondency must have made a powerful appeal to George Eliot's tender, romantic imagination. If he was paying marked attention to her, there is no doubt she was flattered, honored, and deeply moved. "Pity is akin to love," and in those days everybody either pitied Lewes or condemned him. He was a romantic figure, the literary lion of London, tragic, scintillant, sorrowful; a

man whose outward flippant cynicism was merely the covering of a sensitive, deep and faithful nature. He was just the sort of man to capture the love of a woman like George Eliot.

At any rate, there was turmoil in her heart during the summer and fall of 1852. The foregoing letter suggests it and the succeeding ones confirm it. She was recovering from a small spring passion which her knowing spirit assured her was not the "grand passion" of her life; but it was Spencer's great experience. She could recover, strong for a new and more lovely flight; Spencer's wings were broken. She was sorry for him, as any noble woman must be for a man who loves her with a great love which she cannot return. But her sorrow merely made her inner struggle more poignant. George Eliot was not the woman to trifle with love. She must be true to herself even though it meant pain and tragedy to herself or to another. There is no evidence that she ever chose the easiest way in affairs of the heart. She loved love as only the romantic idealist can.

So she suffered because Spencer was suffering. She was anxious to escape from London (to Chas. Bray, July 21, 1852; Cross, I:216); "irritable and out of sorts" (to Mrs. Bray, August 14 (?); (Id., 216); "well and plucky but not happy" (Id.); "all is well with me so far as my individuality is concerned—but I have plenty of friends' troubles to sorrow over" (to Mrs. Houghton, August 22, 1852); she imagined the walls would crush her . . . "I say nothing about matters of feeling until my good genius has returned from his excursions: the evil one has possession just now" (to Sara Hennell, September, 1852; Cross, I:219).

It is very apparent from these extracts, that "getting out of love" with Herbert Spencer was not a pleasant task for George Eliot. Probably we shall never surely know the detailed story of this spiritual struggle. Had she merely become tired of the philosophical ponderosities and egocentric nature of the lonely man, or had she begun to feel the fascination of Lewes' subtle and irresistible wooing? As between him and Spencer, it was a race of the tortoise and the hare. The tortoises of real life do not fare so well as they do in fables.

She paid a short visit to the Brays at Rosehill and returned to London on November 3. Writing to them on the sixth she says of the first night she was in town, "after dinner, came Herbert Spencer and spent the evening." (Cross, I:223.) This is the tenor of all the remarks concerning Spencer hereafter, and even such remarks

are few. Spencer has faded out and the "miniature Mirabeau," as she once called Lewes (*Id.*, 197), has taken the center of the screen. After her dark mood of August, 1852, we find the brightness of a new dawning love reflected in the letters of the spring of 1853. This time, it was the "grand passion" indeed. On April 16, she is going to "William Tell" again, but with Lewes, not Spencer. "People are very good to me. Mr. Lewes especially is kind and attentive, and has quite won my regard, after having a good deal of my vituperation. Like a few other people in the world, he is much better than he seems. A man of heart and conscience wearing a mask of flippancy." (*To Mrs. Bray, Cross, I:232-3.*)

We are not concerned, however, with this growing love for Lewes, so soon to blaze into rebellion against established law and morals, to be a glaring offense for all time to all people—who are not artists and lovers. It was more than a case of "another spring, another love." It was the irrevocable rolling—and grinding—of the iron wheels of destiny. They hurt George Eliot cruelly and crushed Herbert Spencer almost to death.

So we can understand why Herbert Spencer was glad to get out of England in the summer of 1853; and why Lewes, who had planned to go, "could not join him." (*Duncan, op. cit.*, 72.) We can also understand why Spencer omits this fact from his autobiography. Likewise, it is clear why he became dissatisfied with the "Economist" in the fall of 1852, and why he moralizes on the folly of working overmuch and living overlittle. (*Auto.*, I:474-81.)

He begins to complain of failing health. (*Id.*, 490.) The reason is clear if my theory is sound. Dogged by the nemesis of a deep love unreturned, in the fall of 1852, he had seen his best friend become the accepted lover of his beloved in the winter and spring of 1853. He was helpless and hopeless and ready to run. And run he did, assisted by the fortunate death of his uncle Thomas who left him £500. He says those years on the "Economist" were the most important period of his life, which we can well accept, for more reasons than the rationalizing ones he gives. (*Id.*, 490.) They were the most important for professional reasons. He had found himself in literature and philosophy. They were the most important for personal reasons. He had found love—and lost it. He tried to run away from his sorrow and disappointment, but a man cannot run away from his own shadow. He injured his heart beyond complete recovery. He is careful to say "There was no mental

cause." (Id., 501.) Such an assertion may well be a conscious or unconscious attempt to conceal the fact that this trip to Switzerland was a flight as much as it was a journey.

He returned to London in October and free lanced for some time, writing essays and preparing to write the "Principles of Psychology." But his physical condition was not improving, because, as I assume, his mental distress was as great as ever. He tried hydropathy in the spring and summer of 1854. (Id., 550-7.)

Then came the event which finished the tragedy of Spencer's love affair with George Eliot, an event which he is careful not to mention in the autobiography. George Eliot and George Henry Lewes left England for Germany on July 20, 1854 (Cross, I:245), to live as man and wife. Although it was quite impossible for them to get married in England, Whipple (op. cit., 388) suggests they did get married "in some foreign city." I am unable to find any evidence for this. One would expect Cross to mention it, were it true.

So far as one may judge from her published letters, George Eliot was never so "much in love" with Lewes from the spring of 1853 to their flight in July, 1854, as she was with Spencer in the spring of 1852. One must conclude either that Cross has suppressed the more passionate letters, or that she, knowing what moral condemnation her friends would visit upon her, did not refer to her love for Lewes in her letters. Or it may be that her relations with Lewes were of such a nature that her conscience or native caution prevented her mentioning the subject at all. Or it may have been so sacred that she hid it away in the mystic fastnesses of her heart. Probably her reticence was a complex of all these moods. Whatever her reasons for concealment, we are not prepared by the published letters for her announcement to the Brays on July 20, 1854, that she and Lewes were leaving for Weimar, although the context suggests that her decision was not wholly unknown to them. Cross may have suppressed some of the letters of the spring of 1854. Evidence that this is so, appears from the following facts: Cross gives 27 letters in the period January to June, 1852, the period of Spencer; 15 from January-June, 1853, the period of Lewes; 9 from January to July 20, 1854, when Lewes and George Eliot left England. Cross thus seems very reticent on the subject of Lewes' relations to George Eliot. In all cases, he gives only excerpts of letters. It has been suggested that George Eliot began to "live with Lewes in the fall of 1853, when she took private lodgings. She

writes, November 22, 1853, "We may find ourselves at the end of the year going faster to the hell of conscious moral and intellectual weakness." (Who is the "we"?) And on December 28, 1853, her "only complaint is idleness and dislike-to-getting-up-in-the-morningness—I resolve every day to conquer the flesh." (Cross, op. cit., I:162.)

The letter immediately before the one announcing her departure with Lewes, was written to Miss Sara Hennell, July 10, 1854. (Cross, I:245.) In this, she refers to Spencer, giving a mock biographical note as of 1954. She estimates him as a scholar much more highly than we do at present, but her estimate of him as a man perhaps throws some light upon her rejection of him as a lover. "The life of this philosopher, like that of the great Kant, offers little material for the narrator."

Spencer was as dry as dust, emotionally uninspiring, lacking in artistic insight; deadening in his ponderous and perpetual dullness. Lewes was as fresh as spring foliage, a prophetic spirit, an artist in every fiber; enlivening and exhilarating with a keen and nimble wit; brilliant; literary; a much better scholar than Spencer and a much more famous man. He could give her everything that Spencer could never give. The passing years justify the wisdom of her choice, whether it was made from impulse or reason or both. Lewes, by the help of his great critical ability, his sympathetic understanding, his artistic judgment and his loyal self-effacement was a powerful factor in making her the greatest woman novelist of her generation, if not of all time. One fears that Spencer would have crushed her genius instead of nourishing it to its great fruition. One can easily imagine him dictating to her the endless pages of the "Synthetic Philosophy"! To it he was devoting his fortune and his very life; surely even the paragon of women could desire no greater glory than a humble part in its composition. Where Lewes stimulated, Spencer might have stifled.

Yet, with characteristic effrontery, Spencer tried to arrogate to himself the honor of starting George Eliot upon her novelistic career. It was he who first told her that she had all the qualifications of the novelist to a high degree and urged her to attempt novel writing. (Auto., I:460-1.) He recurred to the subject on his first visit to the Leweses after their return from Germany. She informed him she was doing so, and bound him to secrecy. (Id., 577.) But Spencer let the truth of the authorship out, taking occasion to mention again

that *he* was responsible for her writing novels. (Auto., II:44-5.) George Eliot, however, gives all the credit to Lewes. (Cross I:313-14.)

This digression seems warranted because it proves that Spencer, although he specifically denied ever having had anything to do with her education had staked out for himself a very definite preserve in her greatness, which he zealously defended. (Auto., II:429.) I am sure he always felt that the greatness of George Eliot was due, in large measure, to the fact that she had known him and loved him. And it may be so.

But I must return to the events in the life of Spencer succeeding George Eliot's "marriage" to Lewes.

I have pointed out the indications of shock resulting from Spencer's rejection in the summer of 1852. His health was gradually breaking under the strain of disappointed and hopeless love. The denouement of July, 1854, completed the process. This removed the last vague hope, probably never very consciously admitted to himself, that she would tire of Lewes and return to him. Now she had crossed her Rubicon and Spencer passed into his valley of darkness and despair.

The Leweses had scarcely left England before Spencer also left, ostensibly to write "The Principles of Psychology" abroad. (Auto., I:526.)

Let us follow him for the first few months of this attempted flight from his sorrow and himself. He chose Tréport "as his place of sojourn for the rest of the summer," a quiet little seaport town eminently fitted for writing. (Id., 529.) But he did not stay there. By August 31, he is in Paris. (531.) By the middle of September, he is gone to Jersey (532), with a break of two weeks unaccounted for. (533.) He had left Paris "long before he had intended," and he left Jersey in the same discontented manner. He assigned this discontent to "being so far from friends," rather lamely saying that he does not need to see them, but "is depressed if they are not accessible." (534.) So by the first of October he is at Brighton. (535.) Before the end of October he is back in London complaining of illness. (536.) But he cannot stay in London. By the first of December he is going down to Derby. (536.) Yet he cannot stay at home. He is unwell and insomniac. (537.) In January, he returns to London, trying to find a publisher. One small section of the "Psychology" is written. This much for over six months' "writing abroad"!

Now I submit that the movements of Spencer from July 31, 1854, to February 1, 1855, were not those of a man seriously engaged upon the composition of a scholarly work. They were rather the frantic efforts of a powerful nature to escape the teeth of sorrow and despair gnawing at the roots of his reason.

By the first of the year he had begun to find relief in work. The wound was scarifying and he was at last settling down to productive work, finding relief in that sovereign remedy for the ills of mind and heart. He returned to Derby in mid-March and spent three months in what must have been very severe labor. (Auto., I:540.) By the end of June the book was nearly finished, and so was Spencer. Since the last August, leisure hours had been "chiefly occupied by thinking." "Especially while walking I was thinking" . . . Practically therefore, the mental strain went on with but little intermission . . . "A photograph . . . taken during the spring, has a worn, anxious look . . . It seems strange that such knowledge as I had of physiology did not force on me the inference that I was injuring myself." (Id., 540-41.)

If my interpretation of the cause of this mental condition is correct, it is not strange that the "inference was not forced on him." The "thinking and mental strain" that went on continually, walking, traveling, and when trying to work or sleep from July, 1854, to the first of January, 1855, were not due to the "Psychology," but to his morbid brooding over the tragedy of his "grand passion," over the emptiness of life filled only with ruined romance, over the vesicating bitterness of blighted love. When he finally settled down to real work, it was merely a choice of the lesser of two evils: to work hard and suffer much, or to work less and suffer more. By the beginning of 1855, Spencer must have begun to realize that longer indulgence in the self-pitying, self-condemning, soul-fester of his now hopeless love was leading inevitably to tragic consequences. But he was no weakling coward; he was rather a moral and mental giant. He determined to conquer his sorrow by work, to live courageously the life of the mind in utter defiance of the deceiving will-o-the-wisps of the heart. The philosopher purposed to submerge and chasten the man. So Spencer fell feverishly to work—with what success we shall soon see.

He went to Wales to finish the book, making three moves in quick succession, finally breaking down completely at Pen-y-Gwryd before the end of July. (Auto., I:545.) He did very little work from that time until the beginning of 1857—"eighteen months lost,"

he says. (Id., ch. 38.) But the loss was greater and more tragic than mere loss of time can ever be.

This, then, completes my analysis of Spencer's "illness." Briefly, I have depicted a man of neurally unstable ancestry, characterized by the "only child psychosis," with its attendant egocentric "flight from reality"; proud and imperious, utterly shielded from amorous relations with women. He fell in love with George Eliot, the first, and possibly only, woman with whom he ever came into intimate social and personal contact. His suit was rejected in favor of his best friend. He suffered a nervous shock which shattered his health, threatened his mind, and from which he only gradually and never completely recovered. His noble loyalty to Lewes did not lessen his love for George Eliot but rather magnified the shock, heightened and prolonged the intensity of his inner conflict. He finally made a sufficiently satisfactory adjustment to permit him to visit the Leweses often. All three were the best of friends from their first acquaintance to the end of their lives. Spencer was one of the few people whom George Eliot permitted to see her in the last days of her life. (Cross, III:354.)

It is probably true that the immediate cause of the breakdown of July, 1885, was overwork on the "Psychology." But I think I have submitted evidence tending to explain why he worked so unreasonably at this particular time.* I am aware that a great part of this evidence is inferential and circumstantial, but the conclusion does not seem unreasonable. One wonders if there are not letters and documents yet in the possession of friends and relatives of the three families, or possibly in the British Museum, which would conclusively prove the hypothesis above set forth.

I believe Spencer loved George Eliot as only a man of his nature and experience is capable of loving—wholly, singly, and everlastingly. He also loved Lewes, and more than all, perhaps, he loved himself. The result of this triangular affection, blunted at all three angles, is largely responsible, in my opinion, not only for his breakdown

*"Of all literary men that ever lived, Mr. Spencer was least accurately described as one who overworked." Gould, G. M., *Biographic Clinics*, Philadelphia, 1904, Vol. I, p. 247. Gould accounts for Spencer's breakdown as a result of eye-strain, "a compound myopic astigmatism—probably anisometropic (p. 248). He has the same explanation for the nervous ills of many famous people. On the face of it, his analysis seems too simple, and too inclusive. To account for all neurasthenic symptoms on the basis of eye-strain would appear to be a prime case of diagnostic particularism.

in 1855-6, but also for the bitterness and disillusionment which filled his life from 1851 to his death, except for the lyric interlude of the spring of 1852 when his "grand passion," mingled all of music, mind and the eternal mystery of love, unified for one bright moment that puzzling universe which he so vainly sought to brow-beat into coherence with the ponderous hammers of his "Synthetic Philosophy." His was essentially a frustrated life, temperamentally predisposed to sorrow, and socially defined to inadequacy and futility. The extreme individualism of his philosophy, so inconsistent with its general implications, is the natural psychological result of his inherited neural instability, his "only childness," and his unnatural sex life—the three factors which prevented the achievement of those socialized attitudes which usually develop in a normal life. The "Synthetic Philosophy" is his attempted sublimation, inadequate thought it be, either as sublimation, or science, or philosophy. It is the visible monument of a sick soul, the overt expression of an introvert repression.

So let us leave him, peaceful at last in the dusty mould of his love and the mouldy dust of his philosophy, finally at one with the world he never understood and never mastered, either as a man or as a philosopher. Life dealt not softly with Herbert Spencer; he should be forgiven if he sometimes dealt harshly and bitterly with life and man's blundersome attempts to ameliorate life's cruelty, stupidity, and tragedy.

PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL GLIMPSES AT THE BEHAVIOR OF SOME BIBLICAL CHARACTERS

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In mental diseases we are confronted with abnormal psychic states, often manifested by symptoms significant of beliefs apparently unfounded, obviously false, totally incompatible with simple reason and common experience, and which moreover, are maintained in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

In the field of mental development, Psychopathology claims that much of the workings of the primitive instincts are carried out below the level of conscious thought, and that within the silent depths of the unconscious, the powerful driving forces of the primitive urge are frequently engaged in fierce and bitter conflict. Not only is this true of psychotic states, but it holds good in the workings of the normal mind, a fact to which the behavioristic attitude of the individual often bears mute, but expressive evidence.

The life of every individual is like an ever-changing picture, the beauty, or horror of which, is gauged according as the individual's behavior meets or falls below the recognized standards of Society. In this respect, therefore, each individual paints his own picture, and it is a matter of common knowledge, that the materials from which the colors are selected, and the background upon which are registered the conceptions of the painter's genius, are of first rate importance in making or marring the excellence of the finished work of art.

Through the eye of Psychopathology we are enabled to see in the behavioristic attitude of an individual, a picture of the reaction to a given situation, and behind this reaction, careful and patient search will reveal a personality make-up, as well as present and past environmental influences which constitute the colors and the background to the picture before us. It is true that within the field of Medical Science, Psychopathology undertakes a description, and a grouping of abnormal mental or psychic states according to their clinical pictures, but were this the end, then it could not deserve a place among the Sciences. If therapeutic concepts are to find a place in the mind of the psychiatrist, the consideration of cause and effect

is of vital importance, and to this end the psychoanalyst faced with the peculiar behavior of a given individual, must endeavor to retrace step by step the progress of the psyche in its attempt to solve its difficulties, by the special type of behavior which draws our attention to the individual.

With this as a basic principle, I shall endeavor to locate in the behavioristic attitude of some of the earliest characters of whom we have any record, echoes of the tumultuous strife, waged in the unconscious depths of the personality. I shall further attempt to point out the reaction to such difficulties, and endeavor to trace the ideational content of the individual's behavior. My subjects have been selected from among Biblical characters, a fact which leads me to pause for a moment, in order to offer a few explanatory and apologetic remarks.

Among the fundamental forces which throughout all ages and in all climes have stirred the human race, Religion occupies a prominent place, and whether it be the superstition of the worshippers of Ra (the sun god), the blind and frenzied gropings of the savage who sees in whatever surpasses his understanding, an object of worship, the devout prayers and weird traditions of the Moslem, the awe-inspiring ceremonies of Judaism, or the simple faith of Christianity, the defense of its principles has more often than any other single issue plunged individuals and communities in the midst of bitter conflict and bloody strife. Mindful of this and fully cognizant of the tendency on the part of the young student of Science, to regard the Bible as a target for adverse criticism, I shall endeavor to present my observations entirely independent of any religious interpretation or criticism, and without regard for, or reference to the comparative merits of sects or creeds.

The characters selected are familiar to the most casual readers of Holy Writ, and represent different periods in Jewish history.

Jacob, a representative of the Patriarchal age, *David*, shepherd king, musician, poet and warrior, *Paul*, scholar, lawyer, orator, and logician of all times, these stand out prominently among the colossal figures of biblical fame, who stamped with the impress of their personal greatness, the periods in which they lived; and while we have been accustomed to regard recorded acts of conduct in their lives merely as laudable or reprehensible, closer observation will recognize in them simple distortions or exaggerations of the genetic factors which furnish the instinctive driving forces in all mankind.

Character No. 1—Jacob:

The childhood history of Jacob presents an individual, the younger of two sons, whose delicate stature and handsome features made of him a special object of maternal love. Petted and pampered by an indulgent mother, the lad early developed an attitude of self-concern which throughout his life formed the basis of his efforts to justify the means, fair or foul, whereby he sought to sweep from his path the barriers which confronted him in his efforts to realize his ambitions.

The earliest example of his childhood behavior of which the Bible shows record appears in *Genesis, Chapter 25, Verses 29-34*. Here the lad is seen bartering with his brother, a life-saving meal for the latter's birthright, an act by which he realized his selfish ambition, and showed the extent to which his brotherly love had fallen victim to his all-absorbing egoism.

In *Genesis, Chapter 27*, we next find him at a very critical period of his life, when in obedience to an ambitious and unscrupulous mother, he obtained from his aged and blind father the blessing intended for his brother. Guilty of base deception and fraud, he soon realized that it would not be long before he would have to reckon with his brother in deadly combat. The painfulness of such a realization was unbearable, he would be unable to defend himself for we are reminded, that maternal petting had made of him "a plain man dwelling in tents," while his brother was a man of enviable physique, "a daring hunter, skillful with the bow." *Genesis 25:27*. Here then, was conflict: Should he choose the path of the fugitive, and leave behind him, home and all he held dear, or should he remain and face certain death? Too weak to defend his life, and unable to entertain the painful idea of death by his brother's sword, the smooth-skinned egoist was content to seek relief in flight. But what of the mechanism by which the psyche in its unconscious attempt to escape from the painfulness of conflict, seeks expression in the individual's actual escape from home?

Let the dream at Bethel next tell its story, and we shall perhaps be able to find an answer to our question.

Genesis 28:11-22:

Wearied, worn and sad, the fugitive rests his head upon the lap of earth, in the gray mists of twilight, the ghostlike forms of the surrounding heights rising terrace upon terrace toward the skies, remind the wanderer of the heights of excellence to which he must

attain as predicted in his stolen blessing; but in another moment even as the creeping shadows of evening envelop the scene in their stern embrace, so the fears and anxieties at the thought of retribution for his deception crowd his ambitions into the shadows of despondency, and the unhappy man, too weak to withstand the painfulness of the situation, reposes in the arms of Morpheus and seeks relief in sleep. But now the conflict, repressed into the silent depths of the unconscious personality, reappears as a sleep-disturbing stimulus to be manifested in a dream.

In the *ladder* stretching from earth to heaven the dreamer is reminded of the greatness, the excellence, and prosperity which are the objects of his ambition.

In the *voice* which speaks from the top of the ladder he recognizes his father's prediction of his future greatness and prosperity, but the Dream Censor must suppress the painful idea of the deception by which the blessing was obtained, hence the father's voice comes to the dreamer disguised as that of God.

According to Freud, "the dream is charged with the useful function of guarding sleep from disturbance." With this in mind, it is not difficult to further trace the path of the psyche in its meanderings throughout the course of the dream. The voice promises the dreamer, ownership of the surrounding country, and a long line of descendants who in due course would come into its inheritance. Behind this promise the mind satisfies itself in the assurance of deliverance from immediate destruction by his brother's sword. "In thee, and in thy seed," says the voice, "shall all families of the earth be blessed." Behind this the dreamer sees divine approval, hence forgiveness of his deceitful and fraudulent action. And finally the dreamer is assured of divine protection, and safe return to his native land. In this the mind sees a happy issue out of his afflictions, and a fitting climax to the situation, following the unpleasant experiences surrounding the dreamer. On awaking the dreamer is tortured by fear and anxiety and exclaims: "How dreadful is this place! Surely God is in this place and I knew it not." (Genesis 28:16-17.) He is confident of divine knowledge of his actions, but he is apprehensive as to its forgiveness, and in his frenzy he for once loses his inordinate love of power and wealth, and expresses merely the desire for life and protection, even vowing to repay divine assistance by one-tenth of his possessions.

We follow the fugitive into the home of his uncle where mindful of former experiences the individual seeks compensation in self-

inflicted punishment. This we see in his unique plan of giving seven years of labor in exchange for his love object. (Genesis 29:20.)

Seven years have passed, and the selfishness and resistless egoism of the individual repressed into the silent depths of the unconscious, rise to the surface to find expression in the cruder instincts of love, anger and hate. Roused to anger by the clever deception of his uncle in substituting his elder daughter for the younger, Jacob's memory of his deception of his father is awakened with all its accompanying painfulness leading him to despise Leah and volunteer seven years more of service to secure the woman he loved.

In course of time having become the father of a large family Jacob sees the materializing of one part of his dream: "the father of a great nation," but the much desired prosperity is not yet in view. He must therefore either resort to means of quickly and substantially increasing his wealth or submit the mind to the painful admission of failure in his ambitious desires. How does he meet this situation? From the background of the unconscious the suppressed ego returns with all its primitive and resistless urge to find expression in the practice of such trickery as is calculated to result in the production of spots on the newly born animals. By this means the individual finds satisfaction for his unrighteous ambition and selfish greed even though it entails fraudulent possession of his uncle's flocks and herds. (Genesis 30:32-43.)

We now come to the culminating point of the man's ambitions—the safe return to his native land—and with all his family and his wealth the individual sets out on the accomplishment of this phase of his dream.

Retracing the path which twenty years before had taken him from home, he is once more face to face with conflict. Memories of the past rise menacingly from the shadows of forgetfulness, and once again the mind is victimized by the peace-destroying tentacles of fear and anxiety. He learns that his brother, armed for battle, is on the way to meet him. What a situation! How does the mind solve this difficulty? Is the man's behavior compatible with divine assurance of protection? Accustomed to glory in the possession of wealth, he endeavors to appease his brother's anger by presents from his herds and flocks, but not confident as to the success of his plans, he loses completely his sense of patriarchal responsibility, nay the dignity of manhood itself dwindles before his consuming egoism, and he sends all his possessions, even his wives and children to meet his brother's vengeance, while far in the rear he seeks deliverance

in prayer. Shall he retrace his steps and be forever a fugitive or must he face destruction in his brother's anger?

Racked by the terrible conflict, his tortured mind refuses the idea of destruction, and this is relegated to the depths of the unconscious. He recalls his dream at Bethel. In divine assistance only, could the mind find its salvation.

In his phantasy of a struggle with his brother the man experiences a visual hallucination in which he pictures a struggle with an angel who detains him in his journey. Here the mind seeks compensation for the individual's delay in the rear.

An all-night encounter in which the man, obviously in a hysterical condition, undergoes an actual physical struggle, results in dislocation of his hip. The realization of this injury brings to the mind the conviction of the divine presence and power in the adversary of his phantasy. Jacob, we are told, now held on to his adversary refusing to release him till he had blessed him. (Genesis 32:26-29.)

In this physical disability the mind sees an effective means of enlisting fraternal sympathy and averting a bloody encounter with his brother. But in this, there is no absolute certainty, the psyche is in search of divine assurance, which in answer to the man's solicitation of a blessing comes in the form of an auditory hallucination. "Thy name," says the angel, "shall be called no more Jacob, but Israel, for as a prince hast thou power with God, and with men, and hast prevailed." The satisfaction is now complete, if as a prince he has fought with God (the angel) and had prevailed, he could proceed on his journey for he would also prevail against his brother.

Character No. 2—David:

The life of this illustrious individual takes us to a period in the history of Israel, when the administration of Government by a king was in the experimental stage. At this juncture the prophet Samuel, standing on the pinnacle of his prophetic watch-tower, and taking a look into the distant future, could clearly see that destruction awaited Israel and Judah, if Saul were allowed to continue his rule. He sets out, therefore, in search of a successor to the rejected king, and as his search is rewarded we get our first glimpse of an individual destined to occupy a place unique in its importance in the history of Israel. (I Samuel 16:12.)

As the curtain rises, we are faced by a youth, healthy and vigorous, a blithe spirit and a loving heart are indexed in the radiance of

his countenance, and the simple dignity of his manner captures our admiration. As our acquaintance ripens we find in this youth, the patience, prudence, and self-sacrificing love of the shepherd, the taste and skill of the musician and the valor and daring of the warrior.

In the episode with Goliath, the youth experiences his first great difficulty. (I Samuel 17:19-52.) In reality the taunts of the Philistine giant are not intended for him, but a lover of adventure, and accustomed to rush unselfishly and unhesitatingly to the defense of his sheep he volunteers to risk his life to avenge the insult to his people.

We next find him in difficulties during his flight before Saul. With several opportunities of slaying the king in defense of his own life, his unselfishness, his respect for divine law, and his unqualified spirit of forgiveness forbids him doing the slightest injury to his adversary.

In continuation of his escape before Saul, David experiences the most trying situation of his flight, when at Gath, he is recognized as the conqueror of Goliath and thrown into prison. Here he is placed in a situation from which he sees no escape. His belligerent spirit refuses to accept defeat, yet his usual optimism disappears beneath the calamity which has befallen him. Above his head is the outstretched sword of death, yet he realizes that of himself, he is incapable of either resistance or escape. Let us examine his behavior, in this trying situation.

The simple narrative of the Bible tells us that he changed his behavior, feigned himself mad, scrambled on the doors and let his spittle fall on his beard. (I Samuel 21:13.)

There is however, nothing in support of the statement that his madness was feigned. We rather see in the man's behavior evidences of a true Situation Psychosis in which the mind, unable to adjust itself to the painfulness of the situation, seeks relief in the saving power of God only, and in realization of inability to escape the psyche undergoes a repression to the level of infantilism. This unconscious regression is manifested by a change in the individual's behavior, in which we find the behavior of the thoughtless, the irresponsible and helpless child. He scrambles on the walls and lets his spittle dribble careless from his mouth.

The unconscious regression however does not long outlive the removal of the unpleasant situation. No sooner is the individual set at liberty than we find his behavior returning to normal.

A glimpse of Psalm 34, written during this episode, will throw

some light on the psychic aspect of this difficult situation: "I sought the Lord and he heard me, and delivered me from all my fears." (Verse 4.)

"The young lions do lack and suffer hunger but they that seek the Lord shall not want any good thing." (Verse 10.)

"Come ye children hearken unto me, I will teach you the fear of the Lord." (Verse 11.)

We pass on to an event in the man's life which at one and the same time reveals two character traits, which have combined to win for him the unique distinction of being called "The man after God's own heart."

Still a fugitive before the wrath of Saul, he learns of the defeat of Israel, before the overwhelming hordes of the Philistines, of the capture of the Ark and the slaying of Saul and his sons in the battle. At once, *LOVE FOR HIS PEOPLE* overcomes the satisfaction and joy born of the realization of his own deliverance, and his spirit of *FORGIVENESS* breaks the fetters of his grief-stricken soul to find expression in the mournful notes of lament:

"The beauty of Israel is slain upon the high places, how are the mighty fallen!

"Tell it not in Gath, publish it not in the streets of Askelon, lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice." (II Samuel 1: 19-37.)

This love for his people and readiness to forgive personal wrongs are the dominant features of the man's life. Listen to his lament at the death of Absalom who is slain in the midst of rebellion against him:

"O my son Absalom, my son, my son Absalom, would God I had died for thee, O Absalom my son, my son." (II Samuel 18:33.)

We see him forgive Shimee who cursed him as he fled before Absalom (II Samuel 19:23) and as he bitterly rebukes Joab for his treacherous slaying of Abner we note the symbols of his forgiveness of the deed for which the latter had been slain:

"Rend your clothes and gird you with sack-cloth and mourn before Abner, for as a man falleth before wicked men so fell Abner." (II Samuel 3:31-34.)

In considering the sexual life of this wonderful man, as chronicled in the Scriptures, we are faced by a career of remarkable heterosexual activity, in the midst of which we find an event of great psychiatric importance. Living in an age, and in the midst of environment where polygamy is not only countenanced, but is regarded as an achievement, David surrounds himself by numerous wives

among whom we find: Michal, daughter of Saul, Abigail, widow of Nabal, Ahinoam of Jezreel, Haggith and Bathsheba. It is not easy to arrive at any definite conclusion as to whether a satisfactory adjustment resulted from these various affinities, but it does seem that David's affection was of the "Don Juan type" and that he was continually on the *qui vive* for some new love object.

We must give more than passing notice to the episode with Uriah's wife: At a time when the call of war takes the picked of the city's manhood from Jerusalem, and when custom decrees that Kings lead their armies into battle we find David lingering in the city. We see him promenading the flat roof of his palace, from which the view of the surrounding houses and court-yards is undisturbed. He frequents his position of vantage at an hour when it is customary for the women to repose in the open boudoir at the end of the day's work. Soon he sees a woman whose charm taxes to the extreme his sexual cravings. She is the wife of one of his captains, but taking advantage of his kingly power, he summons the woman to the palace, seeks sexual gratification, and thinks no more of his behavior. His peace of mind is however soon to be disturbed, and conflict arises when the woman informs him of the natural results of the illicit intercourse. He sees in this the possibility of exposure, with resulting condemnation at the bar of public opinion. The mind refuses to countenance the painful humiliation of such an exposure, and he therefore seeks means whereby he might conceal his misconduct. Failing in his efforts to induce Uriah to go home to his wife, he begins to suspect that the man has knowledge of his misdeeds, and he decides that his only escape from disgrace lies in silencing forever the man whose house he has violated. (II Samuel 11:1-15.)

In his next step we see the profound tragedy of his soul. By his secret orders Uriah is placed in the hottest part of the battle and is slain. Here then was conflict sufficiently fierce and bitter to make a virtual murderer out of a man who had hitherto been a scourge to evil doers, and a fearless avenger of the wrongs of the innocent.

Further consideration of this episode, leads us to the conclusion that David's fear of public censure and condemnation was greater than his dread of divine disapproval, for in the latter he could always see forgiveness. This is further exemplified in his reply to the prophet Gad as he chooses his punishment for his pride of heart in numbering his army: "Let us now fall into the hands of the Lord, for His mercies are great, and let me not fall into the hands of man." (II Samuel 24:14.)

Again in Psalms 6, 7, 11, 43 and 52 the "Sweet singer of Israel" lays bare his fear of man's mischievous judgments and declares his confidence in the goodness of God.

One more incident in support of this: In his wanderings before Saul, he reaches Nob, and there receives the hospitality of Abimelech. News of this is taken to Saul by Doeg, the Edomite, and Abimelech and his household are slain by the malicious king. Listen to the outpourings of David's soul as he receives the sorrowful news:

"Why boastest thou thyself in mischief O mighty man? The goodness of God endureth forever." (Psalm 52:1.) "Thy tongue deviseth mischief like a sharp razor, working deceitfully." (Verse 2.)

No great degree of observation is necessary to discern in the Psalms the picture of a mind highly sensitized by environmental influences and intensely susceptible to emotional extremes. Living in the midst of belligerent nations, and with treachery and rebellion ever present among his own people David has frequent cause for discouragement and depression of spirits, while on the other hand, his numerous victories, coupled with his implicit trust in divine assistance often raised him to the highest pitch of emotional exaltation. Thus in Psalm 22 we see his depression of spirit: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? Why art Thou so far from helping me, and from the words of my roaring?" And hardly have these dolorous notes sunken into silence, before we hear the cheering tones of his song of confidence in Psalm 23, "The Lord is my Shepherd, I shall not want," followed by the shouts of triumph in Psalm 30: "I will extol Thee O Lord, for Thou hast lifted me up."

Finally as we review the life of this wonderful and versatile character, we see in every outstanding trait, the background of shepherd life, with its unselfish devotion, its deep sense of responsibility, its remarkable spirit of forbearance, its inestimable patience and unqualified love. These are the moving principles of the man's life, and as occasions arise which stimulate first the one, and then the other we see an awakening of emotional reactions manifested through the avenues of behavior.

Character No. 3—Paul:

In my third attempt, I shall confine my observations to the most important event in the life of Paul of Tarsus, namely his conversion to Christianity.

The history of Paul's life presents an individual of good family connections, of good strong native intellectual equipment, of high

political and Ecclesiastical aspirations, and indefatigable in his defense and support of his honest convictions. Afforded the opportunities of high intellectual training, and the advantages of the tutorship of the most famous teacher of his day (Gamaliel) Paul became expert in his knowledge of Jewish law, political and ecclesiastical, as well as in their customs and traditions, and in fact at a comparatively early age he proved himself an able representative of Hebrew lore.

Paul's early training had made of him a Pharisee, which he himself described as "the most strictest sect of our religion." (Acts 25:5.) He had received a solid groundwork in the principles of his religion, but his superior training had done more than this, it had taught him to seek an underlying cause for every effect, to reason from the known to the unknown, from the simple to the complex, from the concrete to the abstract, and to seek for all his arguments the support of a well established foundation, and to arrive at his conclusions by a chain of evidence of logical sequence and convincing forcefulness.

As the individual grew into manhood, he found himself surrounded by an atmosphere of religious uncertainty. The wonderful works and exemplary life of one Jesus of Nazareth had so won the admiration of the crowd as to make of him an object of worship, and the principles of his life and character, the foundations of a new religion.

Trained to the strict observance of the letter of the law, Paul could see nothing but punishment for the religious revolutionists, and death for their leaders. This was his honest conviction, and we find him making havoc of these early Christians, entering every house and committing them to prison. (Acts 8:13.)

Having forced the Christians at Jerusalem to retreat behind closed doors, Paul with the full conviction of the justification of his religious zeal obtained warrants to extend his religious crusade to Damascus. Thus armed with political and moral support the enthusiast started on his mission. But as his journey grew more tiresome the tension of his vengeance gradually relaxed and he began to examine more closely the claims of those who represented the new religion. He reviewed the Old Testament prophecies relating to the advent and reign of the Messiah:

"Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel." (Isaiah 7:14.)

"He was oppressed and he was afflicted yet he opened not his mouth, he is brought . . . opened not his mouth (Isaiah 53:7).

"Shout O daughters of Jerusalem behold thy king cometh unto thee, he is just and having salvation, lowly and riding upon an ass." (Zach. 9:9.)

In these and like prophecies his logical mind saw a likeness to the character and life of the humble Nazarene and he began to wonder whether the faith of these Christians had not a good foundation.

While his reason weighed the question, memories of the martyrdom of Stephen arose in his mind, and the events of the Day of Pentecost were vividly recalled. He had seen the quiet resignation of Stephen, he had heard of the eloquence of Peter, the uneducated and unpolished Galilean fisherman, and he had been too well informed of the facts surrounding the crucifixion and Resurrection of this Jesus of Nazareth. With these and other evidences in favor of the new faith pitted against the persuasions of his religious training, a fierce and terrible battle ensued in the silent depths of the unconscious, and at last the mind emerged from the conflict in favor of the new religion.

But this was only the signal for another and fiercer struggle in which all the powers of the psyche would be enlisted. Should the individual carry out his mission, in violation of his latest convictions or should he return to Jerusalem and admit failure before his sect and his admirers?

Trained to follow the rigid path of duty his mind refused to entertain the possibility of failure, the painful idea was repressed into the unconscious, and the psyche sought protection in its conscious respect for divine power.

Paul had heard of divine presence symbolized in "a burning bush," also in "a pillar of fire which led Israel by night." He had heard of Elijah's translation in "a chariot and horses of fire" and as his imagination recalled these symbols of divine presence, the struggling psyche took shelter behind the assurance of a visual hallucination. He saw a great light flash forth from heaven, a symbol of divine presence before which he dared not stand. To complete this wishfulfilling phantasy, he heard a voice saying: "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?" and in answer to the question it continued: "I am Jesus of Nazareth whom thou persecutest. It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks." (Acts 9:4-6.)

Here then the mind found justification for the man's failure to carry out his mission. He was persecuting not the Christians but Jesus of Nazareth whose presence and powers were synonymous with divine strength. He was justified in his cessation of hostilities against the Christians, for the divine voice had reminded him of the futility of kicking against the pricks.

In support of our arguments we note that of the whole party journeying to Damascus, Paul was the only man who saw this light and fell to the ground. The others, we are told, stood speechless (Acts 9:7). This same record tells us that they "heard a voice but saw no man." This is however rather vague, and as it appears to me seems to indicate that they heard in Paul's words a voice on one side of a dialogue, but saw no man with whom he conversed.

We note also that although the man fell from his horse to the ground he suffered no injury, and that on rising though his eyes were open he was blind, and continued so for several days, until cured by the persuasion of one of the new Christians who placing his hand on his eyes said: "Brother Saul, the Lord that appeared unto thee hath sent me to say, receive thy sight." (Acts 9:17.)

But we ask ourselves whence this blindness, and what is its function in the struggle facing the individual?

The psyche had found justification for the cessation of hostilities against the Christians but Paul's infamous persecution of the Christians at Jerusalem had been noised throughout the country, he must therefore have some means of proving to the Christians at Damascus that his belief in this new faith was genuine, and to prove that he was not an impostor endeavoring to entrap them he must be able to convince them of his inability to do them harm. What better evidence of helplessness could the mind conceive, than the blind individual led into the presence of those whom he once pursued?

In this episode we see all the features of hysteria. A painful idea repressed into unconscious, reappears behind cover of visual and auditory hallucinations, in course of which the individual falls from horseback to the ground but suffers no injury. A condition of functional blindness is developed to meet certain existing difficulties. His blindness apparently brought on by suggestion is cured by persuasion and the individual emerges from the conflict with new convictions, and a feeling of moral justification in his final disposition of the difficulty by which he had been confronted.

SUMMARY

A study of the life history of three outstanding Biblical characters reveals the operation in them of distinct unconscious motivations which have profoundly influenced their life reactions. In Jacob we recognize an individual whose incestuous fixations have led to the development of strong narcissistic tendencies which later furnished the driving power in his life and to which all other considerations were made subservient. On the altar of his egocentric and selfish interests he sacrificed ties of kinship, sacred traditions of his race and household, religious principles and the demands of patriarchal responsibility. He exemplifies a typical neurotic whose behavior is colored and guided by primitive emotions as against either reason or social conventions.

In David, on the other hand, we have an individual showing, a mixture of neurotic and psychopathic reactions. There is a good deal in his personality make-up that suggests the neurotic—the sensitive, patient, courageous, forgiving and self-sacrificing individual, while his sexual adjustment was hectic and promiscuous, approaching the Don Juan type. At the same time, the man gives unmistakable evidence of certain psychic asymmetry and inconsistency of conduct in the field of self-control, and widely differing from a strictly neurotic reaction. Impulses and emotions so ruled his behavior that he was in reality a "man of moods" and his many incongruous actions clearly appear to be due to his emotional instability. A man who would one moment slay a heathen for his idolatrous practices and in the next take the man's widow to be his wife, who one day condemns to death a rich man for robbing a poor man of his only ewe lamb, yet in his capacity as king would violate the sanctity of the home of a loyal subject and virtually put the unfortunate man to death,—such man is clearly psychopathic in his behavior; in the presence of a strong urge, particularly sexual, his otherwise good reason and judgment desert him. When imprisoned, he developed a transitory psychotic reaction which again betokens a very labile personality.

In Paul of Tarsus we have an individual who by ties of early training and the prominent social position he occupies has developed a high sense of responsibility as regards his social and religious obligations. Gradually leaning towards Christianity until he is fully converted, he finds himself now in the throes of insolvable conflict. He must face the strong and resolute Jewish community, which to

him has always been a symbol of austere power and authority; he must also face the Christian community which he has heretofore severely persecuted with all the zeal of a blind follower; he must acquit himself honorably before the first body and must convince the other of his sincerity. His struggling psyche then takes shelter behind the assurance of a visual hallucination and overwhelmed by the remarkable experience, he falls unconscious from his horse and temporarily becomes blind—a fairly typical hysterical reaction, whose essential function was to fulfill a particular wish and escape a trying situation.

In the foregoing an attempt has been made to show that psychic difficulties are by no means new phases in the development of human nature. They constitute a chapter as old as life itself, and are evidenced in the life of the most primitive, as well as that of the most highly cultured, if we are keen enough to recognize them.

It is however to be borne in mind that in attempting to fathom the meaning of a psychic reaction, it is necessary to acquaint oneself with the standard of social conventions surrounding the individual, the nature and extent of his early training, his environmental influences, and personality traits, which last-named as we have seen are largely dependent on the preceding.

With these facts before him, one is then favorably equipped to recognize in every psychic disturbance a response evidenced by a special type of behavior, elaborated by the individual in his struggle to meet the difficult problems of conventionalism and to gain satisfaction from life.

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MANUFACTURING "THE EXPERIENCE OF GOD"

BY THEODORE SCHROEDER

"Profound, indeed, is the suggestion of Voltaire that if God did not exist we should have to invent him! So whether he exists or not we have invented ideas of him, not deliberately to be sure, but by vital instinct and the slow, but sure method of trial and failure."

These are the words of a highly cultured clergyman of an orthodox church, who tolerates all varieties of the formulation of the God-idea as these are made by others, and yet he has no need of any such definite formulation for himself. In one sense he is perhaps quite as atheistic as his more blatant atheistic neighbors, and yet he possesses and values highest of all that life offers, the psychologic quintessence of religiosity. He can accept all the hypotheses accredited by scientists, without violence to any of his religious concepts. He is as free as any agnostic can possibly be, to reject the traditional valuation of holy writ, or the literal interpretations of creedal declaration, whenever these conflict with the well accredited scientific hypotheses. He knows so much more than the average Freethinker about the psychology and essential nature of religion, that he actually can and does describe to us many of the very details by which religion and the gods are created by or for their devotees.

Furthermore, he justifies, pragmatically, the manufacture of the experience of God, by what he alleges to be the personal esthetic and social value of the results, of this religious artifice. Incidentally, if we have psychologic insight and understanding, he makes it quite plain how ignorant we must be to throw bricks at Jehovah of the Jews, as a means of destroying religiosity, or of discrediting the religious temperament. Indeed he does not care how much you discredit the Jehovah-concept. If you succeed thoroughly, he feels sure that you have rendered a valuable service to real, or pure religion, which is very distinct from any particular rationalization or theological formulation of it. Those who have not yet learned the difference between religion and theology, cannot be very intelligently engaged on the task of helping humanity to outgrow the need of either.

I am now going to make a very condensed portrayal of this clergyman's concept of *religion as an experience*, and of his descrip-

tions of the psychologic processes by which such experiences are achieved. I hope that this will show to some persons that they cannot destroy religion or the need of it, by attacking only theories about it, or any particular self-explanation or self-justification made by religionists. Merely reciting a theologic dogma does not make one a religious person. While the need for religion remains, a new rationalization will be invented as fast as the older one is discredited. My thought is, that the evils of religion are not contained in its doctrines, but in the immature quality, and often morbid intensity of the underlying impulses and the accompanying immature intellectual methods, of which the doctrines are but symptomatic. Treating the symptoms has but little value.¹ All my quotations are from an anonymous book, of the clergyman in question. I desire to protect him by preserving his anonymity.

"The wish is father to the thought," perhaps all thought. "Who knows?" But what creates the wish for religious experience, and the need for its resultant theologies? So muses our clergyman, and he gives us frank answers, such as satisfy him. He would make religion experimental—experiential. If by searching we cannot find God, then "let us begin with the facts, * * * let us for God's sake, as well as man's begin with man." So maybe we can learn at least a little about God; that is: "We may, reverently infer a working hypothesis of God."

"What needs do appear in the life of the individual as such, that compel resort to religion?" He answers his own question by a soliloquy put in the mouth of a waking sleeper.

"Suddenly I am aroused. Why am I here? I remember."

"I failed. What is the use of waking? To try again? To fail again: And failure was my fault—at least so largely. And I knew better, I was warned—in fact, I had experience."

"Self-depreciation, remorse, despair! I leap out of my bed. To fly."

"Whither? The facts will dog me. They cannot be put off the scent."

"Ah, I will go to my familiar friend. He will help me. No, for how could I meet him? He had advised me. He had forgiven me before. How face him? I am at the end of my means, and of my wits. No one can help. I won't be scorned or pitied by my acquaintances; and strangers don't know—yet seem to know. My self-scorn somehow betrays me, advertises my failure."

¹ Religion, not Theology is the Enemy. Unity, 1926.

"But how can I endure solitude? I must come to myself: or get away from myself: wake up and find the self-contempt groundless, all a mistake—or lapse into some sort of sleep." * * *

"And yet there is another 'I'—there was THEN another. All of me was not involved in the shameful failure. Some of me was left out of play. All of me that was in consciousness, in my control; but below—to one side of it, above it? I am not one, but many. Where is now that 'I' that was not to blame, and can now be complacent; serene, triumphant?"

"Appear: Thou not me, thou ME! Appear, to remake 'me' into thy likeness; to impart of THYSELF to 'me'!"

"I have no right to self-confidence, courage; not even to hope. But thou hast. In thee I put my trust. Impart to me thy confidence, courage, hope. Trust me enough to give me what I do not deserve. Trust for Trust. I trust thee and cry to thee. Trust me, and give to me. For, art thou, not more truly ME than 'I' am?" * * *

"Success could have only given me an external right to joy and pride. I have another, a more intimate, a more inalienable right to it. For, I (that is He, who trusts me, loves me, and is one with me) have never failed, can never fail." Obviously, the glorified unconscious and subjective part of the determinants of personality are here already nearing apotheosis.

"Study this experience. The language does not exactly describe every case. You may not realize that 'He,' him, the efficiency of him is within you, imagining him outside of you. But, as the thought of him, the feeling of him, the efficiency of him is within you, imagining him without, does not alter the facts: unless you therefore suppose him powerless to give, incapable of self-communication of communion, and so break off at that point in the procedure."

From the psychologic point of view this looks like a pretty good description of a psychologic dissociation within the personality, a little of which probably exists in every personality. On the one hand is the extravagantly valued consciousness of inadequacy. On the other hand is another aspect of the disrupted personality which suggests power, a submerged, suppressed power—an inhibited potency which must be brought to action and to consciousness. Thus out of the desire for a compensating or neutralizing feeling of superiority, we visualize and idealize the hitherto ineffective submerged aspect of the self, as being so much more efficient and potent than the average human, as we actually feel the other aspect of our disrupted personality to be below the average.

"Out of weak you were made strong." That is out of an emotionally determined and exaggerated self-depreciation has been made an equally over-valued delusional self-idealization, projected onto the canvas of the outer world, and deified.

"But suppose the effect is not lasting? Very well. The cause can be brought into action again as often as necessary. In any case, we have been helped through a crisis." But there are painful moments in between these delusional reliefs, and they are accepted with some knowledge of their delusional character and justified on pragmatic grounds.

"Melancholia? Suicidal mania? What can be worse? Nervous troubles? Imaginary ailments? Are there any, more common, more infectious, more obstinate, or more fatal? As preventive of sickness, as hygienic regimen, as tonic, as social sanitation—who will dare to limit exactly, for every case the power of hope and faith and peace and joy?" Health and heaven by auto-suggestion!! Religion and Coué have almost become one.

Through a number of pages our clergyman gives us many effective suggestions of the ambivalency, so characteristic of psychoneuroses. Always a rhythmic alternation between deep depression and equally morbid ecstatic exaltation. Then comes this: "Only by disappointment is a higher goal set to desire. Only in discouragement is the passionate pursuit sped onward, accelerated by despair. Only through protracted sense of failure, is success made delirious delight. Only by death is palpitant life endowed with its ultimate delicacy, grace, ineffable charm; fragility, transiency, and consequent preciousness, constituting the very intensity of realization mistermmed everlasting, eternal, because out of time, and above time."

Because of the dissociation within the psychic personality, it is easy, often necessary, to exclude from consciousness at least temporarily, the troublesome realities of temporal and spacial relations. This can be accomplished by an obsessing concentration upon any ecstatic experience. Thus it is that many achieve the illusion of having attained immortality, or of having experienced the "absolute" under some of its many names. However, our present parson is obviously too intelligent an introspectionist to *wholly* delude himself, under such circumstances. Hence he says: "mistermed everlasting eternal," etc. For him there can not be a pantheistic identification with an eternal omnipotent omnipresence. Apparently he even discounts all his absolutes.

Furthermore the process toward the religious experience is considered as not always being initiated in the subconscious. "The heart can be solicited through the head." And, therefore, we just consciously start something. But must there not be an unconscious predisposition to make this appeal to the head effective? "So we set about exciting now, when necessity does not press, our emotional nature! Desire, or fear, artificially produced will serve. So an idea of God is formulated. An ideal of man is made, [seemingly only?] to derive from that idea. The idea, itself, is fixed by the will. The mind is concentrated upon it, until desire or fear are aroused. And this is meditation, contemplation, systematic adoration."

Now one wonders, if it is really so conscious a process as our parson believes. May not after all his repressed and for the moment unconscious fears have determined the time and circumstance, when this fear-producing process shall be initiated? The notion that all was an "uncaused" product of an alleged "free will," may only be a device for evading the consciousness of the controlling yet repressed fears, some qualms of conscience perhaps, which make religion a necessity. I am sure that his need for religion has many unconscious subjective determinants. Does not the following all but confess this psychologic trick?

"Though our religion primarily derives from our needs, we have endeavored to forestall them, to make our religion independent of change and chance. Hence we have caused it to appear as a deduction from some cosmic idea, some divine ideal. And this has been done in good faith, the order of logic, mistaken for the order of fact."

"And with the young, the mentally immature, the process works perfectly. The cosmic idea, the divine ideal is dogmatically affirmed. Every little experience of life is referred to it. Meditation and contemplation are made the supreme duty. Prayer is made to derive from them as corollary from theorem. The soul is brought up to pray before it had experienced any need of prayer. When the need appears [especially strong, as during the sexual conflict of impulse—during or soon after pubescence or adolescence?] the soul is already expert and praying now of its own accord, is delighted with its effective [a psycho-sexual ecstasy?] practice of devotion. But, for the great mass of mankind an idea, an ideal, will not of itself profoundly stir the emotional life." The relatively healthy-minded ones have not suffered enough of depression, are not sufficiently sensitive sexually, and have not developed the phantasmal religious associ-

ations for their erotic impulses. So it won't work on the average human. Such must take it all on faith, founded upon a lesser need and on psychologic ignorance. Therefore such persons become mere followers and supporters of mystic cults ever vaguely hoping for but without actually enjoying a mystic thrill.

"Resort has therefore always been had to the great law of association. Certain sensations, certain activities are absolutely in control. Associate them exclusively with certain ideas [God, mortality, humility, obedience] moods [feeling of moral inadequacy] desires [for superiority] and aspirations [for identification with super-righteousness] and they will tend to recur together. See [the symbol of the ideal on a little cross], hear [the invitation to the arms of Jesus amid the organ peals or songs of divine love], taste [the divine in the blessed sacrament], touch [the relic of a saint, the holy-water, or a symbol of divinity], smell [the incense, or the musty odor of a church, as a reminder of the holy sepulchre], do [something to realize the phantasmal ultimate], and the particular state of consciousness, arbitrarily associated, will suggest itself, or more readily appear at call." Now we have artificially manufactured some kind, or preliminary aspect of religious experience.

"In this law of association all rites and sacraments find their real source of influence. Of course, for the highest potency the association must be exclusive. Hence the obligation of keeping holy, hallowing, consecrating. Hence blasphemy and sacrilege derive their sinfulness. Taboo is a prerequisite of practical reverence, a condition of successful practical reverence, a condition of successful conjuration."

"If the ritualist was not himself affected consciously, then he was mysteriously blessed, or at all events his Deity was believed to be influenced; and the belief that his Deity was somehow altered by his obedient fulfilling of the ritual prescription, altered the worshipper's attitude toward himself and the world. Even therefore when rites and sacraments become mere external magic, so long as they were presumed to have transcendental virtue, they were not performed altogether in vain. The belief in their power, was their power; and a power nowise to be condemned." * * *

"So history comes to our aid * * * and fancy, helps out fact. Defects in the actual, are mended by defective memory. Hopes are 'perfected' not only 'by suffering' but by tradition!"

"And the heroes are projected into nature. And out of nature again the heroes are reborn glorified. [See this mechanism described

by Feuerbach in his: *Essence of Christianity*; and in some of my own contributions to the psychology of religion. T. S.] The cycles of the day, and of the year are humanized. The sum of righteousness with healing in its wings! Such interpretations of heroic legend and natural phenomena result in all the most affecting religious conceptions, and from it derive all the most imposing ritual acts."

"But natural phenomena, and hero tales become estranged from civilized man. To him there must be in his artificial environment of edifice, of market, of complex civic relations, a rebirth of nature and history." Therefore numerous devices are resorted to as incidental to religious propaganda. Probably "propaganda" is here the wrong word. The devices are mere enticement, incitement, lures toward those states of consciousness which can then be expressed as a need of religion, and that need satisfactorily rationalized in any terms that the existing cultural status will permit.

"As soon as I am alone there detach themselves more or less distinctly other me's. Silence becomes speech; analysis communication; soliloquy; passionate monologue a dialogue of mutual interest."

"For the soul [the unconscious mentation] is instinctively dramatic. What, in morbid cases, we call divided personality, is the allegory of social intercourse injected into the mysterious life of our complex being; and without which, apparently, it cannot be carried to the utmost operative intensity, this side of unconsciousness and ecstasy."

"Perhaps here it will be well to recapitulate."

"The pure mood, the resources of the soul, the goal of effort are visualized and worshipped through nature symbolism."

"They are enfleshed in heroic figures, and felt to be our kindred, our ancestral heritage, our personal right; they are thus made from objects of adoration, reasonable quests of desire and will."

"By the esthetic arts their spell is increased, so as to include the whole man; our ancestral heritage, our personal right; they are thus made from objects of adoration, reasonable quests of desire and will."

"By the esthetic arts their spell is increased, so as to include the whole man; our ideals are not merely enfleshed, but made [as projection, seeming] to seize on the very flesh of us. Up and down our backbone runs the religious shudder and the brain thrills, and somehow an obsession is wrought for us, that we could never have ourselves compelled." A glorious ecstasy now certifies to the objective reality of our phantasm.

"Lastly by imagined personation and personal intercourse, walking with a quasi-human God, and talking with him, we take cordial possession of our ideal as by the inevitable method of social infection." Fantasy has almost become hallucination.

"In the enactment of an interior drama for which the soul provides the actors and the scene, the abstract cognition, the cold perception of duty, the alien esthetic ideal are transformed. Not only are we taken hold of by God, but God is taken hold of by us, and is felt as nearer than hand and foot, more our very selves than we." That is to say, God is the creature of our subjective but unconscious determinants.

Now comes a substantial confession, in one paragraph.

"May not after all a God that man conceives as PURE SPIRIT, as himself projected onward and upward, as a resource beneath and about the primary consciousness; a God whom to realize for himself effectively, man must freely exploit all nature, and history, and art, and dramatic passion; God, who may be or not the cosmic power; who though personifiable to satisfy the heart, is also impersonal to satisfy the mind; a God who should turn out to be the supreme intellectual and passionate FICTION of man; may not such a God become also for man the supreme FACTOR? To man his act is ever the chief fact. And in fact is but his own act, as it reappears to him in mind and heart."

So my clergyman has all the psychologic essentials of religion, and can yet repudiate every attempt toward forming a concrete concept of God. Now, if you have been able to read my clergyman empathically, we can get meaning out of what otherwise would seem a strange paradox, when he says: "Atheism [such as his] is altogether too religious for the irreligious [non-mystical clericals] of our enlightened age."

Phantasmal and delusional it may be, and subconsciously conditioned also; but our parson finds in it an intelligible definition of religion, and justifies it, delusional though it may be, by its fruits. Are not all our scientific concepts also a bit delusional? Have you read Vaihinger's: *The Philosophy of 'As If'?* Or Ogden's: *Meaning of Meaning?*

"The religious life is a life, any mode of increasing the power and joy of life which operates from within, and penetrates inward to explode outward—is essentially religious."

"Who in the moment of extreme need has access to an interior Source of Supply or deems he has; for it renders him more confident,

self-exacting, serene, or at all events more able to re-establish a rational quiet, a dispassionate calm."

Yes, of course, there are admitted evils, which accompany such subjectivism. These our parson would cure by the socialization of religion. Here the other aspect of his disrupted personality gets busy. He must be both extremely subjective as well as try sometimes to be highly objective in the determinants of his conduct. Accordingly he must be unhappy, because one cannot cultivate these irreconcilable trends to the point of becoming habitual, and have either habit work to the fullest, that is to say—without the inhibiting influence of the contrary habit, developed through the "split off" interest of the dissociation-process.

"In other words there is instinct, first; then there is failure, because there is awakening and self-direction; then, in time there is habit and a new instinct."

When the wearisome effect of the internal conflict is made conscious through exhaustion or failure, the fag must be overcome, the zest reestablished. "We make believe a little, so bring about again [by auto-suggestion] the genuine belief. We open up our former experience to the uninitiated [further auto-suggestion by propaganda] and in their interest, surprise delight [by the help of their imitative suggestion back to us] we have our experience afresh * * * So proselyting * * * is an inexhaustible well spring of refreshment."

"Who has not realized the power of mimicry [over psychologic infants?] for evil and good? Humble though it be as an aid to devotion, yet how truly precious! [to those who need association with a crowd to help overcome a feeling of inferiority?] We see others bow and kneel—how real their experience at the time, not they themselves could tell. But their apparent devotion, makes our own reappear. Think of the value of keeping step, of the uniform, of the fellow by one's side or behind one; how great a part it is of the soldier's steadfastness and intrepidity, no matter what his individual courage and zeal for the cause". This is the suggestive "social support to personal religion," so desirable to the morbidly suggestible ones.

"The fact simply is this: let one idea, one feeling, one will synchronously seize upon a number of persons, and if by 'human' we mean what they are, or can be in any other condition, they [seem to feel, to] become super-human. Explain it how we may, the explanation is immaterial and irrelevant to our purpose." Hence

religious doctrines are as nothing, and the religious experience is everything. "The individual becomes more suggestible in the union, or the souls of the individuals at-oned create the condition for the manifesting of the oversoul, God or devil. With either view we note the value of the 'coming together' will be gauged by what 'comes out therefrom'; and that in turn will be conditioned by 'the Name' in which they are 'gathered together'—the purpose, the passion, the idea—as incarnate in the leaders, as suggested by the occasion, and place, and order."

"'Into the Name' then represents the direction the new power takes; which power is generated by 'the gathering together of the two or three.'"

"Now the strength of a rope depends upon the number of the strands, their several soundness and strength, and on the twist. To forget the twist in estimating the strength of the rope, would be as foolish as to overlook either of the other elements of strength."

"So with the operation of the Law of Two or Three."

"The greater the number, and the finer and stouter the quality of individuals, consistent with the greatest possible intimacy of inter-volution: this states figuratively the triple test of the power of our Socialization."

This is how, during the ecstasy, an unconsciousness of objectives, of time and space, produces the illusion of cosmic consciousness. Now also, through the religious crowd, we understand something of the process by which the cosmic religion is developed from the most personal of experience, an ecstasy.

"But having admitted thus much, we are suddenly assaulted with queries: And at that latter end then, what idea of God? What conception of Universal Christianity, and its ultimate world mission?"

"Well, let us not be over-hasty in self commitments. For, no doubt we might differ and perhaps most radically in theology, christology, ecclesiology; and yet preserve together of one accord, in one place, our common access of the Source, and persist together in fervent, instant, constant intercession for realizing the Soul of the Whole in each and all."

"The practical attitude should waive theoretic questions, that inevitably sunder us, for the sake of coöperation in practice. It should positively preclude all irritating controversy. We are at all stages and of all ages—unless we are indeed assorted specimens of arrested development in the show-case of a diminutive sect. Each individually, for his fullest unfoldment, has to go through an abridged

rehearsal of the spiritual drama of the human race (in more or less expurgated version, thank God)—but, be that as it may, in order to be of our times we must first catch up with our times, by being more or less of all preceding times. The heresies peculiar to our temperament, incident to our sort of circumstances, will have their turn of influence under ever novel names, in ever shifting ritual alliances."

"But as all sorts and conditions of men can alone constitute the Authoritative Church Universal, it will never cease being an impracticable ideal, a sorry jest of the self-supposed elect, a scheme merely on blue line legal cap, a formula expansive and contractile at will to serve all purposes by being true to none: until it sets down candidly without mental reservation as its first practical axiom: (1) freedom of theology; and as its second, (2) hospitable inclusion of all essentials of method and discipline, provided always that absolute insistence shall be placed and stringently maintained, only on two things: (a) that all members shall desire and strive to establish, according to their particular ability, intimate commerce with the interior Source; and (b) allow, nay pray and labor, for the blessed consummation that all others shall enjoy the same access, by identical or equivalent means."

"And the SOURCE—be it conceived however this or that brain may have to conceive it—will be immanent in the demand of each, transcendent in the whence of the supply; and self incarnating through the intercourse and communion therewith of each and all.

"Laying stress first and last then on the PRACTICE OF DEVOTION for the realization by actualization of ideals (that is, by deeds making things of them); allowing charitably for the PROGRESSIVE APPREHENSION of whatever the IDEALS must at any time be for us; resorting finally (as to the Supreme Oracle of Religious Truth) to the Holy Ghost, that is the VITAL HOLY COMMONSENSE OF ASPIRING MANKIND AS A WHOLE—there might come into blessed visible being—at least as an incipient, tentative process—that glorious dream of the ages: the Catholic, the Universal Church."

Judged by the standards of the older descriptive psychology, this clergyman has given us an unexcelled description of his intellectual processes, as these can be discovered by the keenest introspection, and explained by a highly cultured intellect. He has evaded nothing that came to his consciousness, not even the fictive character of our Gods, or of any rationalization of the religious experience. Although he can see and laugh at much of this, he still clings to the essentials of religiosity, namely, the mystic thrill, and he values this as the most

important thing in life. But obviously, his valuation is subjectively determined, and ignores the larger social values as these may be involved with problems of mental hygiene. Also his estimate is ecstatic as to its qualitative or intensive standards. So far as he goes, one cannot quarrel with his conclusions. However, the subjectively determined *valuations* may not be confirmed if we put the intellectual methods which are involved in his valuation, to the test of a psychogenetic explanation, and a psycho-evolutionary concept and rating.

Here then is a man who probably is not even 100 per cent convinced of the existence of any entity outside of and distinct from himself that can be labeled "God," without doing some violence to conventional religious expectations. He is not 100 per cent convinced that his religious experience and its rationalization are not delusive. He possesses no dogmatic formulation of any theology. He has no quarrel with the scientific method as applied in physics or biology, or with its fruits, all of which he can, to his own satisfaction, explain in complete harmony with his religious philosophy. But he *values* his mystico-religious experience above all else in life. Here then we have the concentrated essence of religion, as being for him the most influential thing in life, and yet find its victim in the fullest harmony with all scientific endeavor. It is of course absurd to talk of this as a surrender of the religionist to the scientist. It is but a verbal harmonizing of the religious temperament, its needs and their rationalization, with scientific hypotheses. There is no giving up of religious valuations nor of the emotional need for it. Our clergyman has merely become more conscious as to what has always been the differential essence of religion, and coördinated this self-understanding with the larger scientific information. Only the older rationalization of religion, in terms of an antique theology and cosmogony, has been changed. Those religionists who have not yet learned the difference between religious experience and any particular rationalization thereof, will be tempted to denounce this clergyman as a heretic. A psychologically unenlightened Freethinker will perhaps call him a hypocrite for remaining in the church. Both are more ignorant than is he.

This then presents the religious issue as it always existed for some mystic religionists, who perhaps often understood his opponent better than that opponent understood him. How silly it is to act as though one could confute him by logical argument, directed against Jehovah of the Jews; or by a controversy over Genesis and evolution;

or over the historicity of Jesus; or by contrasting a Buddhist rationalization of the mystic experience with a Christian rationalization of the same. This is the same folly which formerly induced physicians to treat symptoms instead of the causes of mental disease.

Here the issue presented by this clergyman is one wholly within the field of psychology. Even there it is hardly an issue of objective or material fact, so much as it is one of interpretation and method, in dealing with the *meaning and valuation* of the facts of the "mystical experience." Another matter is quite obvious, namely: Upon the meaning and value of mystical experiences as psychologic problems, both the older descriptive psychology and the more modern laboratory psychology, leave us quite as helpless, as a mere logical criticism about the inconsistencies that are found among the varied rationalizations of religion. These are inevitably as inconsistent as life sometimes appears to us, if we do not understand the psychology of "double personality," and as varied as life, or as our differences of experiential and cultural acquisition.

What then is the problem of religion? Is it not one of evolutionary psychology or one of mental hygiene? What is the solution? According to my view the only promising scientific approach to the problem of the *meaning and value* of the mystical experience is that of the psycho-geneticist. The only technique for discovering the knowable determinants for the peculiarly personal mental content of each mystic, is that of the Freudian psychoanalysts.² By such methods we will be able to get about all the meaning there is to any mystical experience, and get it in terms of each individual's personal psychologic past. The revised valuation of mysticism is also coming through the psychoanalyst's concept of the subjective aspect of evolution in intellectual methods. By the psychoanalytic technique, we bring again into the mystic's consciousness approximately all of the earlier impulsive experiences which enter as determining factors in inducing, valuing and interpreting the mystic thrill. This now gives us the data which are most important for making an evolutionary classification of the unconscious mentation, that is implicit in any given mystical experience and its rationalization. Thus do we reappraise the mystic's valuation of his peculiar experience. I have not psychoanalyzed the clergyman whose mental output I have hereinabove quoted. However, the published and unpublished studies

² Psychoanalytic Method of Observation. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. VI, part 2:155-170, 1925.

that I have made of others, suggest conclusions which many persons would not consider flattering. I repeat, that the important issue in relation to religion is not its theory or theology, but the valuation thereof and the underlying temperamental need. The conflict between some interpretations of Genesis and evolutionary hypotheses is unimportant. The conflict over the antecedent intellectual methods is of dominant importance. These issues are to be decided, not by any special plea for expediency, judged by our habitual preconceptions, but according to its status, or the influence of the contestants as a factor in the mental hygiene of the race, and of the process of maturing our intellectual methods. Even such a person as I have quoted may be in the psycho-pathologic borderland, and yet accept practically all conclusions of modern scientists. Or he may be a highly efficient psychologically mature person. Which he is, cannot be determined merely from reading his words. The answer can only come through a psycho-genetic study of the conscious output; and rating these antecedent determinants and their latest rationalization, according to an evolutionary concept of intellectual methods. Thus the whole religious issue may resolve itself into a problem of mental hygiene. These are the lessons which I wish to bring to the reader, through this recital.

A TENTATIVE FORMULATION OF THE ORIGIN OF SADOMASOCHISM

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It has been tentatively postulated by several investigators that the root of sadism is to be found essentially in the pleasure the infant derives from biting the mother's nipple during the latter part of the nursing epoch. If this holds true in principle, it would then seem logical that the infant's biting with the lips which antedates the presence of teeth would be an even earlier phase of this process. To go back still further, the infant's very desire to engulf or absorb the mother within its own person would seem to be the precedent logical root of sadism, for no doubt this is but a still more vague attempt on the part of the infantile organism to recapture the status quo first disequilibrated by the fetal separation from the parental stem. In following such instinctive impulses to their source, perhaps one is apt to place too much stress upon repetitive compulsion phenomena per se.

In some languages, notably the Dutch and the German, provision is made for two distinct entities: one word ordinarily used to designate the mother as a person or an agent (equally applicable to any agency or barrier that calls for the deflection or suppression of the pleasure principle in the autoerotic act of nursing), and another for the breast of the mother, "mamma" (Stärcke). The distinction is of more than academic interest inasmuch as the infant would seem to consider the organic mother as a part of itself which is taken from it by the mother as a person. It is toward the mother as a person, therefore, that it directs its distrust and hostility, and perhaps hate, because the mother has deprived the infant of this part of itself, the "mamma." Hence the infant probably experiences the feelings of loneliness and dejection, and becomes aware of its "smallness and weakness" from this beginning of an outer world from which the child always feels more or less estranged. But perhaps it may be felt no more poignantly than a feeling of severed relations and yearning for a reestablished unity. On the other hand the mother as a person is the first to give the child a sense of perfidy which

runs the long gamut of emotion to that of absolute destructive rage. If a restoration of the severed relationship were not the immediate concern of the mother, then no faith or trust in the future would be possible for the infant. How is this issue actually met? The mother, instinctively aware that she herself has been the perfidious one, denies the infant nothing but the one thing which the child seemingly craves most. The infant's repression of chagrin, disappointment, and violent anger paves the way for all the attitudes of distrust which follow in the wake of this virtual castration. Slowly, point by point, the infant is made to realize that aside from a denial of this one fruiting in its Eden, it may enjoy an emotional rapport with the mother quite as before. The substitutes and evasions the mother or nurse offers may be more or less plastically accepted, and thus the child may successfully heal itself from the weaning trauma.

From our phantasia material, time and again we gain a sufficient sadistic motive in the weaning process shown in efforts to recapture the mother's bodily contact. The mother's body, once a physical part of the child's, is taken away. In the language of the child-phantasy of the mother at the time of weaning, "It is she who takes this part of myself away from me" and the mother thus becomes the agent whereby this deprivation is consummated. She then becomes cruel, unjust and unfaithful, an arch enemy, and is correspondingly surcharged with the enmity engendered by the pain by which the "mamma" was lost. An illustration of the reverse of this loneliness and dejection of the infant is shown when after an attempt at weaning the nursing is again temporarily resumed and the pain in and by which the outer world was lost is dispelled and our patient phantasies: "Everything he can see understands his joy and is participating in it—with this there comes a general contentment—he seems to fit in with all things that surround him—everything has lost its hostility and strangeness—everything is right and as he wants it—objects in the room seem to share his happiness—he is glad to see everything sharing his joy—there is a feeling of common understanding and friendliness between him and the objects about—why shouldn't everything be happy—how wonderful it is to be in such surroundings." Thus the mother in the weaning act is the object of sadistic feeling and through an oral attempt to absorb her in sucking and biting she is to be removed so that the infant may return within the mother's body, the part which was taken from him by her, or it may be expressed in as true a sense by saying the child strives to take the mother's body once a part

of itself. Again the mother as a person may be conquered more completely within its very self by another process which is the antipode of sadism, that of masochism: The child having learned that it may not annihilate this arch enemy by sadistic cruelty as the enemy is too powerful, learns that the mother's love may be wounded even though she as a person may not be. This new process is learned in that the mother's narcissistic concern is much disturbed by the beginning of separation from the child in a nursing relationship. Through the identification with the mother and her attitudes the child takes on the same attitude which the mother assumes in the weaning. This principle holds good for both extremes of sadomasochism and ought to be relatively easy of objective proof by observing the mother's behavior and feelings during the weaning period. Soon the child assumes these same attitudes at every cross-road in life. At the weaning the child continues to invoke dejective attitudes and acts that the mother's love for the child may also suffer. Thus through its masochistic lust it punishes the parent and wins renewed and reawakened love which has seemingly previously been denied or on the point of being completely withdrawn. Again and again it will be observed running all through the neuroses in which masochistic reactions occur that there is a direct ratio between the degree and amount of masochism manifested and the degree of love needed that remains unrequited in the neurotic's soul. The same principle holds equally true of the opposite polar sadism. It is therefore our great effort to cathectate the wounded love by furnishing new and fresh objects of love as well as to break down the narcissism and place more libido to the service of love objects. While these two attitudes on the part of the child in sadomasochistic activity may not be final, it gives us tentative and authentic data illustrating the personification of sadomasochism in that the soldier and the saint may be but antipodal forms of the one force seeking analogous or the same final ends.

Perhaps the strongest objection that may be put forward to the foregoing formulation of sadomasochism is that it is not directly in accord with the pleasure principle and therefore not essentially dynamic, but if one eliminates the common meaning of cruelty from the sadomasochistic concept as Van Ophuijsen maintains, the matter is easier of acceptance. It will not be denied, however, that in the end the result of the sadomasochistic reactions are tantamount to cruelty at least as it is experienced by others than the perpetrator of the acts. It is easy to understand that in selecting the weaning

trauma one does not abrogate to it an exclusive soul injury; indeed, it is only a paradigm of a life series of acute anxieties or demoralizations or castrations if one pleases. Any adaptation may carry its own rewards and penalties. It is only the birth and weaning traumas, however, that seem to disturb so profoundly the somatic pattern in the narcissistic neuroses. The latter in a sense might be called reaction formations in behaviors which replace or fulfill the enduring sense of infantile wrong or injury. It is not difficult to envisage the fault here in ego development, the autoeroticism perhaps in excess in the nursing act being abrogated from its usual course flows back to form the ego libido complement, the narcissism which in its very excess greatly disturbs the tranquil and orderly development of the ego nucleus or unidentified portion of the child's personality as I term it. It is not our purpose to hold a thesis for this point at this time although in passing one may cite Freud in saying that if the narcissistic neuroses should be capable of reduction the situation may be the worse for its possessor. Of course if a simple reduction of the state were the only thing possible the warning might well give us pause. We have seen from previous data submitted in reference to the phantasy method that this is not our objective or our final disposal of the issues at stake. One might readily ask how does the sado-masochistic reaction in narcissists differ from that seen in compulsives for instance? It would seem to be largely one of degree and arrangements of the dominance of the cruder patterns in the character formation. It may be that these two provisos are sufficient to constitute a difference in kind as well as degree. No doubt the state of sado-masochism is the result of an excess of autoerotism converted into narcissistic libido and thus withdraws from reality testing or object libido employment. In common parlance we say that in such narcissistic persons the libido is too deeply and firmly stamped in the pattern of individual response so that in many such individuals the narcissism and its gesture of sado-masochism is an integral part of the somatic makeup. Even in such a seeming organic composition of the ego the state must not be reckoned as irremediable so long as we may by narcissistic transference reopen the formative period of excessive narcissistic formation.

In all my initial studies of the significance of the primary identification with the mother I am indebted to Burrow's work in this field which has helped so materially in our comprehension of the essential foundations of ego development and its perversions.

VARIA

SOME FOOTNOTES

TO THE ARTICLE IN THE PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW, JULY, 1926, ENTITLED
"ACTIVITY IN ANALYSIS."

If in any science an unified language is necessary for understanding and progress, then it is obvious that this is especially true in psychoanalysis. An unified terminology restricts misconception and saves superfluous efforts. For the re-verification of the truth of its concepts and for the progress of psychoanalysis the same tools must be used and the path traversed which has been marked out by the founders and experienced contributors. One receives the impression that the popularization which psychoanalysis has, unfortunately, undergone, has led away from this aim.

On reading "Activity in Analysis" the psychoanalyst thinks of what is called activity in the literature, *i.e.*, he thinks of the active technique which is complementary to the principal one of passivity. Activity in analysis was introduced, about eight years ago, by Ferenczi and since then studied, extended and limited by him, Freud and a few others. The active technique refers to an interference in form of prohibition or suggestion in specifically indicated moments during the analysis. This interference is always an exception made for bridging over some persistent difficulty of resistance. The activity is only a temporary departure from the fundamental technique in psychoanalysis, that is passivity. Having given several contributions on this subject in which he, in an admirable way, studies his experiences and weighs indications and contra-indications for activity, Ferenczi, himself, again and again emphasize the point that *passivity is the fundamental principle of analytic therapy*. His work is worthy of being respected.

The experienced analyst can never cease to admire Freud's genius for his introduction of the *passive* analytic technique. When the practicing analyst—"passively"—allows the neurotic to re-live and assimilate his infantile as well as his later experiences *on the level of the psycho-analytic situation*, he is most *actively* helping his patient.

One might think that in speaking of active and passive in the quoted article the author is referring to psychotherapy in general rather than specifically to psychoanalysis.

May I enumerate the following papers in which the subject of activity is given detail discussion:

- Ferenczi. Difficulties in Technique of Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (Technische Schwierigkeiten einer Hysterieanalyse, *Int. Psa Zeitschrift*, Bd. V., 1919, pp. 34-40).
- Freud. Some Methods of Psychoanalytic Therapy (Wege der psychoanalytischen Therapie, *Ges. Schriften*, Bd. VI., pp. 136-147).
- Ferenczi. Psychoanalytic Technique (Zur psychoanalytischen Technik, *Intern. Psa Zeitschrift*, Bd. V., 1919, pp. 181-192).
- Ferenczi. Further Extension of "Active Technique" in Analysis (Weiterer Ausbau der "aktiven Technik" in der Psychoanalyse, *Intern. Psa Zeitschrift*, Bd. VII., 1921, pp. 233-251).
- Ferenczi. On Forced Phantasies (Ueber forcierte Phantasien, *Intern. Psa Zeitschrift*, Bd. X., 1924, pp. 6-16).
- K. Landauer. Passive Technique (Ueber passive Technik, *Intern. Psa Zeitschrift*, Bd. X., 1924, pp. 415-422).
- Ferenczi and Rank. The Development of Psychoanalysis (Entwicklungsziele der Psychoanalyse, *Neue Arbeiten zur ärztlichen Psychoanalyse*, Heft I., 1924).
- Ferenczi. Psychoanalysis of Sexual Habits (Zur Psychoanalyse von Sexualgewohnheiten, *Intern. Psa Zeitschrift*, Bd. XI., 1925, pp. 6-39).
- Ferenczi. Contra-Indications of Active Technique (Kontra-indikationen der aktiven Technik, *Intern. Psa Zeitschrift*, Bd. XII., 1926, pp. 3-14).

DR. DORIAN FEIGENBAUM,

New York.

Potts, W. A., et al. Psychoanalysis and its Developments. (*Jl. Mental Science*, LXXII, 1926, 542.)

Here may be found an excellent discussion of the subject of psychoanalysis before the Royal Medico-Psychological Association, held July 15, 1926. It shows how very definitely the English neuropsychiatrist has advanced beyond the narrow prejudicial views held but a few years ago. Those taking part in the discussion were W. A. Potts, William Brown, A. Wohlgemuth, M. Hamblin Smith, E. Mapother, H. Crichton-Miller, G. M. Robertson, T. A. Ross and J. R. Lord.

ABSTRACTS

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ABSTRACTED BY CLARA WILLARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

(Vol. VII, No. 1)

1. Psychoanalytic Contribution to the Theory of Emotion. G. JELGERSMA.
2. The Castration Complex. AUGUST STAERCKE.
3. Psychoanalytic Observations on Tic. S. FERENCZI.

1. *Psychoanalytic Contribution to the Theory of Emotion.* In Jelgersma's opinion emotion is the psychic side of a certain intensity of a process in the organ of thought. A slight acceleration in the material process always produces a feeling of pleasure; with further increase the pleasure is diffused and when the intensity of the material process has attained a slightly greater increase the pleasure vanishes and with still greater increase there arises the feeling of pain in some one of its intensities and varieties. Jelgersma holds that the same conditions which prevail in regard to simple senses (taste, etc.) also exist in the ideational and thought spheres, in the instinctive and ideational spheres; here also the lesser degrees of intensity of the material processes are accompanied by pleasure and the higher degrees by feelings of pain or melancholy. The author notes the resemblance of his views to those of Ebbinghaus and their divergence from those of Wundt. It is very remarkable, he says, that the contribution of psychoanalysis to the theory of the emotions has been so small, since the important results which the new method of research have brought to light have been for the most part in the emotional sphere. However Jelgersma sees confirmation of his view of the emotions in something Freud says incidentally in the discussion of an entirely different question (*Zur Einführung des Narcissmus*) Freud explains the pain produced by the damming back of the libido in the ego by saying: "I content myself with the explanation that pain is the expression of a higher tension, dependent on a certain degree attained in the physical process, which, in the psyche, is transformed into the quality of pain; it would seem then that the pain is not due to an absolute quantity in the material substratum, but to a function of a quantity." The damming back of the libido, Jelgersma comments, may be regarded as a summation of stimuli. Every time an instinct is thwarted of satisfaction, a condition of over-

stimulation arises and out of the various single stimulations a summation results. Our psyche, like the gray matter of the cortex, is an apparatus which does not react directly to stimulus, it stores the stimuli and adds them together. If the summation is psychic, the result is hysteria; if physical, the result is epilepsy.

A further confirmation of his view Jellgersma finds in ambivalence—that remarkable quality of the emotions, first described by Bleuler, which, in pathological conditions, renders it possible for the patient to react with feelings either of pleasure or of pain to the same person—a quality very fully developed in schizophrenia, being one of the fundamental symptoms of the disease. Psychoanalysis has detected this ambivalence in the unconscious emotional life of the transference neuroses and also, in a certain sense, in normal persons. The author notes that if his view of the emotions is the right one, there are two conditions which would influence the nature of the emotions, the objective external stimulus and the condition of the person upon whom the stimulus is effective; in contrast to the intellectual processes (the content of a perception or the solution of a problem) which are dependent on objective factors. Explaining the pathological emotional conditions the author states that an ambivalence of the parent image is regularly present in schizophrenia and in the transference neuroses. As illustration he cites the case of a patient who stated that he honored his father as a king and wished to cut his father's head off for misusing his sister (the surrogate for the mother) whom his father did not wish the patient to marry. Psychoanalysis furnishes the explanation of these attitudes, Jellgersma believes: on account of the libido interest in question the mother image was pleasurable toned, and the father image was probably also emphasized in the same way, as possessor of the mother and also because of the patient's identification with the father (that is to say because of the narcissistic fixation). From this situation there arises a competition with the father and at the same time the factor of renunciation, causing a damming back of the emotion in Freud's sense, with resulting summation and feeling of displeasure—in this case in the form of hate,—all going to show that pleasure and pain are not mutually exclusive, are not antipodes, as they seem to introspection.

Referring to the processes in the psychic and physical spheres, the author says that Freud has repeatedly called attention to the fact that psychoanalysis reaches its limitations when the organic conditions are approached, among which he has referred to intoxications, emphasizing this moment in the actual neuroses, and clearly indicating that he considers neurasthenia, the anxiety neuroses and hypochondria as originating in intoxications in the sexual organs or in the erogenous zones. As his

own opinion Jeltersma states that there is an intoxication, either endogenous or exogenous at the foundation of every mental disease accompanied with dementia, as for example, dementia paranoides and dementia phantastica; in the transference neuroses and manic-depressive insanity and paranoia there is never dementia, and here we find on the somatic side inhibitions, merely, and a damming back of the libido. In connection with paraphrenia, in which there is always dementia, a puzzling question arises: How is it possible for a disease certainly organic, to assume so nearly the mechanism of the transference neuroses? Jeltersma notes that in other intoxications traces of regression are also found, as in the occupational delirium of the alcoholic and in dementia senilis. He deplores the fact that psychoanalysts, because of the conviction that processes primarily material, such as infections and intoxication, are not amenable to psychic treatment, have neglected the study of diseases of this sort.

Disclaiming any effort to establish causal (hence metaphysical) relations between the psychic and physical he ventures to assert that observation furnishes evidence of an invariable connection between the two phenomena, in the sense that (1) the emotion of pleasure is accompanied by a heightening of the organic nervous process; (2) that when the organic process is still further intensified and exceeds a certain maximum, the pleasure is not increased, but, on the contrary diminished, and finally vanishes; and (3) that with further increase of intensity of the material process pain arises, which then remains constant.

2. *The castration complex.* A translation of this article appeared in the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. 2, p. 179, and an abstract by Dr. Smith Ely Jelliffe was published in the PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW, Vol. XI, p. 83. Following Staercke's definition of the complex as a network of unconscious thoughts and strivings in the center of which is the idea of having been deprived, or the expectation of becoming deprived of the external (male) genitals, the various forms which the complex may assume are described, and the connection of this phantasy with the incest complex is traced.

3. *Psychoanalytic observations on tic.* This article appeared in English in the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. 2, p. 1, and was abstracted in the PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW, Vol. X, 1923, p. 225. Dealing with psychogenic tics, Ferenczi touches on their relation to organ libido fixation and to stereotypies, sets forth their quality as an onanistic equivalent and defines their form as defenses against local damming up of the libido. He contrasts the transference neurosis characteristics of hysterical conversion with the narcissistic neurosis features of tics, and discusses the relation of both phenomena to autoerotism.

(Vol. VII, No. 2)

1. Psychoanalysis and Clinical Psychiatry. LUDWIG BINSWANGER.
2. Pleasure in Sleep and the Disturbed Capacity for Sleep. MICHAEL JOSEF EISLER.
3. On the Technique of Child Analysis. HERMINE HUG-HELLMUTH.

1. *Psychoanalysis and Clinical Psychiatry.* Binswanger opens his discussion by citing the analogy which Freud drew between psychoanalysis and psychiatry, and histology and anatomy, implying that it is the work of psychiatry to give the description of the material and that of psychoanalysis to determine inner connections. Binswanger then endeavors to show how difficult it is for psychiatry to limit itself to the mere relation of facts as they appear on the surface, and how advantageous it is to enter the field of psychoanalysis for their explanation; psychiatry determines in a scientific manner what facts coexist from the phenomenological point of view, and psychoanalysis seeks to show how things regularly follow one another from the genetic point of view. This contrast of psychoanalysis and clinical psychiatry brings clearly before our eyes, he explains, a dilemma which confronts psychiatry to-day; it finds itself in a position where it must decide whether it is going to remain simply an applied science—an empirical conglomerate of psychopathology, neurology and biology, held together by no other bond than the practical use which may be made of it, or whether it shall become an individual science. No one will demand that psychiatry should resolve itself into psychoanalysis, but on the other hand, no harm can come to psychiatry from studying the foundations of psychoanalysis and learning the processes of this scientific system which has such close bearing on its own problems. That interpretations and constructions are used by psychoanalysis is no argument against it, for they must also be used by any psychiatry worthy of the name and rejection of the system on this account is evidence of total ignorance of the purposes of science. Said Kant "Under the dominion of reason the facts furnished by our perceptions must not be a mere rhapsody; they must constitute a system, the essential purpose of which they support and further."

That the psychoanalytical system should always remain as it exists to-day would not be the wish even of its creator, who repeatedly emphasizes that it is still incomplete, preliminary, and tentative. A patient reaching out of thought and individual diligence in observation will still be necessary before the foundations of psychoanalysis are known in detail and the theory can be brought into satisfactory relation with the empirical material.

Binswanger believes that those works which approach the subject from the side of phenomenology offer promise of best results and mentions in this connection the writings of Husserl, Jaspers, and Schilder. He says

that in Schilder's work we find psychiatry and psychoanalysis, which before in all the universities except that of Zürich, were at swords' points with each other, very closely united, and we are being brought to the realization of the fact that the discipline which clinical psychiatrists (with the exception of Bleuler) rejected is now being taken up by all the younger students, who realize that a wealth of empirical material is brought to light by psychoanalysis and how necessary this material is to psychiatry.

2. *Pleasure in sleep and the disturbed capacity for sleep.* A translation of this article appeared in the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, Vol. 3, 1923, p. 30, and an abstract by Dr. Smith Ely Jelliffe was published in the *PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW*, Vol. XI, April, 1924, p. 205. In brief Eisler shows by the analysis of a number of cases that there is a connection between sleeplessness and oral fixation or repression of the oral phase, the sleeplessness being the expression of the unconscious oral libido which is denied satisfaction.

3. *On the technique of child analysis.* Translated in full in the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* and abstracted in the *PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW*, Vol. XI, 1924, p. 87. Von Hellmuth sums up the knowledge obtained from her analysis of neuroses in children: "Almost always in these cases we find that a bad disposition or a harmful experience has been rendered worse in effect by mistakes in education. Too much strictness, on the one hand, and too much leniency on the other, with nearly always a lack of consistency in the training, are at the root of these evils, from which both parents and children suffer. If the parents themselves were analyzed it is probable that fewer children would stand in need of analysis."

(Vol. VII, No. 3, 1921.)

1. Further Elaboration of the "Active Technique" in Psychoanalysis.
S. FERENCZI.
2. On the Psychoanalysis of Organic Conditions. G. GRODDECK.
3. Plato: A Forerunner of Psychoanalysis. O. PFISTER.
4. Metapsychological Reflection. F. ALEXANDER.
5. From the Analysis of a Patient with cramp of the Spinal Accessory.
J. WESTERMAN-HOLSTIJN.
6. The Course of the Libido Conflict in a case of Schizophrenia.
H. NUNBERG.

1. *Further Elaboration of the "active technique" in psychoanalysis.* This article is a continuation of another article by Ferenczi on technique, an abstract of which appeared in this journal, Vol. XI, page 467. In the present article the author, who has now had more experience with "active

therapy" gives an account of cases in which intervention was used with good results and of others in which it failed, as well as an explanation of his theory in regard to this mode of treatment. He disclaims any desire to deviate essentially from Freud's fundamental rules of free association; his aim being merely to place the patient in a better situation to make these associations. The outstanding feature of psychoanalysis as to-day used is held to be the attitude of passiveness, says Ferenczi, the patient is warned to dispense with all critique and the physician is admonished to refrain from interference in the establishment of the transference which is supposed to take place spontaneously. It is true that when the time arrives for the dissolution of the transference, there follows a sort of active interference in the education of the patient's ego, which Freud does not hesitate to call "suggestion"; but in all this the patient remains passive, the physician requiring nothing further from him than punctuality at the sessions, emphasizing that the patient must make all decisions for himself. In the sense in which the author uses "active technique" it does not mean so much interference on the part of the physician, but on the contrary an activity on the part of the patient in carrying out certain prohibitions or commands.

In one case of anxiety hysteria (the first in which he made use of his method) Ferenczi forced the patient to venture into the situation which, on account of her phobia, she had been avoiding. The immediate result was an intensification of the anxiety, but in giving way to the emotion, the resistance to unconscious material broke down and this material became accessible to memory and analysis. Another of his patients Ferenczi forced to carry out certain unpleasant activities and to desist from pleasurable ones (as for instance stimulation of the genitalia, stereotypies, tic-like spasms) with the result that the analysis was accelerated by the new material thus brought to light. In a case of phobias and compulsive fears he induced the patient, a young girl who was a skillful musician, to play the piano notwithstanding the extreme stage fright with which she was seized whenever she attempted it. By this means an onanistic phantasy was discovered which was undoubtedly connected with a feeling of shame and also with the anxiety which troubled her when she attempted to play, all of which was in turn connected with an anal erotic foundation.

Ferenczi sums up the theoretical explanation of the success of active therapy: the activity as here described causes an increase of resistance by irritating the sensitive ego, in analogy with "irritation cures" which are used in medicine for certain torpid or chronic ailments. For example in a chronic mucous catarrh which has proved refractory to all treatment, an acute exacerbation is produced by artificial means with the result that latent foci of infection are revealed and at the same time defense forces are awakened which are useful in the direction of cure.

The efficacy of the active technique may also be explained from the standpoint of psychic economy; when the patient ceases to engage in pleasurable activities, or launches forth in unpleasant ones, new conditions arise, for the most part an increase in attention, and thus distant or deeply repressed elements are set in agitation, and their derivatives find their way to consciousness in the form of ideas which can be interpreted.

Still another element contributes to the good results of this method of activity—a "social" element. The fact is well known and has been again recently set forth in a very emphatic manner by a Hungarian sociologist that a "confession" has a much more profound effect than a simple acknowledgment of one's faults to one's self, and that analysis by another is more effective than self analysis. This efficacy is still further intensified if the patient is forced, not merely to acknowledge the general impulse, but to carry it out before the physician.

When the physician sets the patient the task of consciously mastering these impulses he probably subjects the whole mental and emotional process to revision, and a readjustment of that which was only inadequately adjusted by repression becomes possible.

That the affects accompanying the motor activities forced upon the patient give rise to secondary reminiscences is probably in part owing to the reciprocity between affect and idea which has been emphasized by Freud in the "Interpretation of Dreams"; the evocation of the memories, as in the catharsis, may give rise to an affect, but, vice-versa, an action required of the patient and the affect thus produced in him may bring to light repressed ideas associated with these affects or actions. Of course the physician must have some clue as to what affect or action is seeking reproduction. It is even possible that in this way certain unconscious pathogenic contents of the psyche, which belong to the very earliest moments of infancy, before the development of speech, to the period of incoordinated movements and magic gestures, may be reproduced, lived through again, "repeated" in Freud's sense. Active technique plays the rôle of an "agent provocateur"; the commands and prohibitions tend to bring about repetitions of former situations which must then be interpreted or reconstructed to memories. "It is a triumph of therapy" says Freud, "if it succeeds in restoring to memory what the patient wishes to carry out in action." Active technique has for its main purpose the discovery through action of certain latent tendencies and endeavors to accomplish this result more rapidly than was formerly possible.

Ferenczi explains that little can be said in general as to what the indications for the use of active therapy are, except that it is to be regarded only as a recourse in an emergency and should be employed as little as possible and that it is always counterindicated at the beginning of an analysis, before the transference has been established. As soon as the motive for the modification of the technique has been overcome

the psychoanalyst should return immediately to the passive receptive attitude. The author notes that in the analysis of mental disturbances in children there is a promising field for the application of pedagogic and other active interference, but emphasizes that such interference can be called psychoanalysis only when it is used as a means for penetrating into the depths of the unconscious and not as an end in itself. Where it is necessary to cut short the period of treatment as in the handling of groups in military life or in the polyclinics the active therapy may be used to a greater extent than in individual analysis. Ferenczi thinks that in cases of masked onanism there is special indication for this therapy, as only by the discovery of the chameleon-like forms in which satisfaction is sought and by the prohibition of these practices is it possible to bring to light the Oedipus foundation of these phantasies. In impotence too the active intervention is useful as these cures must likewise be carried out in abstinence. Other uses for this technique is in the so-called "character analysis" and in the dissolution of the transference.

The author notes the essential differences between his method and those of Bjerre, Jung, and Adler. Bjerre holds that psychoanalysis should go beyond the discovery of the pathogenic cause of the disorder and offer spiritual and ethical guidance for the patient. The therapy of Jung seeks to turn the attention of the patient from the past to the actual problems of life. Adler claims that the analyst should occupy himself, not with the analysis of the libido, but of the "nervous character." Ferenczi, however, directs his activity exclusively to special acts—against the pleasure principle—for the purpose of removing obstacles to the practical analysis. From suggestion this method differs in that an immediate improvement of the condition of the patient is not aimed at, but on the contrary, it may seek to bring about an exaggeration of the disturbances for the purpose of producing a readjustment of the psychic content with possible revelations of that content. From the abreaction of the catharsis it differs in that the release of the emotion is not the final result sought, this release being here merely a means to an end.

2. *On the psychoanalysis of organic conditions.* From year to year, Groddeck says, the domain of psychoanalysis is broadening. Organic disease, however, has in general been taboo, though here and there psychoanalysis has overstepped the bounds consecrated to the organic. He ventures upon the holy grounds and sets forth his experiences, citing a number of cases in which he found repressed complexes at the foundation of the organic symptoms.

One patient, a woman, in the course of the analysis was seized with severe hemorrhages of the lungs, which Groddeck discovered to be a form of resistance, the sequel of the discovery of her enmity toward the mother and incest wishes in regard to the father. Commenting on this phenomenon Groddeck cites Ferenczi's statement that the unconscious can

make use of organic symptoms as well as of neurotic to protect repressed material, but objects to the qualification "transitory" which Ferenczi gives to these symptoms, and affirms from his experience that they may also be chronic in nature. Details in this case of hemorrhage showed that events connected with the incest complex determined the time the organic manifestation began, its place and duration, and Groddeck was convinced that Freud's principle can be used to explain and treat true organic diseases and that the unconscious itself decides whether it shall make use of neurotic or organic means to prevent the repressed elements from becoming conscious.

Another case cited by Groddeck in support of his view is that of a laborer who suffered at intervals from a hemorrhage of the retina. Through the analysis it was discovered that this affection was connected with childhood memories of blasphemy and more remotely with the Oedipus complex.

Still another case was that of a woman who was suffering from a swelling of the left breast, which her brother, a celebrated cancer specialist, had diagnosed as cancer. Groddeck showed—beside the error of the diagnosis, proved by the disappearance of the swelling,—the fact that it was connected with memories of a copy of Titian's *Flora* which had hung over her parents' bed, and more deeply with what occurred at the time of her mother's second confinement and with the nursing of a younger sister with whom she was bound by strong libidinous ties. Over this path was discovered the homosexual foundation of the organic disturbance.

Another case with similar significance was the maldevelopment of one breast. After a long period of psychoanalytic treatment symmetry of development was attained.

As an example of fixation, infantilism is referred to.

Examples of regression are familiar—in the cessation of menstruation; of wishfulfilment—in false pregnancies. Loss of teeth and falling out of the hair are often connected with regression (castration and birth phantasies invariably play a part here). Indeed, every illness is a regression to childhood or infancy or even to the prenatal period where there is complete dependence on the mother.

The countless diseases of women are forms of wishfulfilment. The examinations and manipulations permit the realization of repressed exhibitionistic and other libidinous wishes. Groddeck calls attention in this connection to the fact that it is the unconscious which has developed gynecology, with all its advantages and disadvantages—a department of medicine that a hundred years ago was almost unknown.

The two guiding factors of psychoanalysis, the two which are decisive as far as results are concerned—transference and resistance—have long been understood, that is to the extent that it was possible formerly to understand them. Physicians have long felt the vexation which arises

from resistance and have sought to overcome it by sternness or by flattery, according to the individual trend. The good results of the positive transference have long been regarded by physicians as due to their own perfections. Freud's explanation of the real significance of these phenomena has rendered us more modest but more assured in making use of the transference. This is the most important practical part of his teachings, as it is one which can be made use of by physicians generally, and success in medicine depends upon the skill with which resistance and transference are handled. Resistance, says Groddeck, has the same effect in the organic as in the mental field. He limits himself to the citation of one instance which he considers conclusive: as a follower of Schwenger, it was his invariable custom to control the weight of his patients. In this way there was never any increase in weight when, in the nature of things, the patient ought to lose (or vice versa), except where there was resistance to the physician in the Freudian sense. Likewise every relapse in a disease is a sign of resistance. This resistance depends little on the character and attitude of the physician, but for the most part on the repressed elements in the psyche of the patient, elements which he refuses to recognize as belonging to himself and therefore projects on the physician.

From lack of space Groddeck mentions in detail only one form of transference: that of the condition of persons in the environment to the patient's self—a form which constitutes a sort of imitation. One example of this sort was the woman already referred to upon whom Titian's Flora made such impression; another was the case of a young woman whose breasts withered in imitation of an old woman; still another a case where the eyeball became enlarged after the patient had seen a picture of a man with one eye—a phenomenon which disappeared with solution of the complex, reappeared and again disappeared under the same influence. Cases where eczema develops when this affection is beheld in another are not uncommon, and pregnancy is often imitated by amenorrhea with swelling of the abdomen and breasts.

Groddeck promises a further communication on this important subject.

3. *Plato as a forerunner of psychoanalysis.* Translated in the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, Vol. 3 (1923), p. 169, and abstracted by Dr. Smith Ely Jelliffe in the *PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW*, Vol. 9 (1924), p. 213. By means of apt citations Pfister shows that those Freudian principles which have been so often rejected as offensive and which have gained credence with such great difficulty and are still attacked in many quarters, find their antecedent in the speculations of Plato, whose understanding of human nature has been acknowledged throughout the ages as one of the keenest.

4. *Metapsychological observations.* In this paper, which was read before the Berlin Psychiatric Society, Alexander endeavors to trace the

connection between the psychological facts discovered by psychoanalysis and biological principles. He prefaces his treatise, however, by disclaiming any attempt to abandon the view of a strictly psychological causality for psychic events, his purpose being merely to show the necessity of remembering that psychic processes are the functioning of a biological machine, a circumstance kept well in mind by Freud, who saw in the biological economy of the organism the culminating idea which lends meaning and completeness to his topical and dynamic viewpoints. Examining the primitive workings of consciousness, Alexander finds that the dynamic act of the system which forms the foundation of consciousness in its later complex development is an inhibition opposed to the satisfaction of the individual appetites. This inhibition he then finds identical with repression as recognized in psychoanalysis—both having as purpose the obviation of impulses not fitted for expression in the external world, that is to say impulses the satisfaction of which would ultimately be accompanied by greater pain for the individual than their non-satisfaction. Hence this activity of consciousness, as inhibitive of pain, follows in accordance with the pleasure principle; Human consciousness, Alexander says (following Freud) is essentially a group organ—to use a crass comparison, just as it is the function of the hand to grasp the objects of the outer world, or of the organs of sense to give information concerning these objects, so it is the biological purpose of consciousness to mediate between the individual and the outer world, rendering it possible for individuals of similar biological character to dwell together in community, and the purpose of repression in consciousness is to prevent any processes not valuable for social existence from participating in consciousness, to inhibit the satisfaction of the appetites merely for the individual's pleasure, in the interest of the individual as a social being. Physiological confirmation of this view is to be found in the fact that the cortex of the cerebrum, the latest part of the brain to develop evolutionally, is essentially an inhibitive center which retards activities at spinal levels. This view is likewise in keeping with Freud's system Bw, within which or at the boundaries of which, exquisite inhibitive activities are carried on by the censor. The force then which the higher system, consciousness, brings into play is an inhibition, a repression and restriction of the exercise of the forces belonging to the deeper levels, *i.e.*, the appetites, preventing the satisfaction of these appetites, or at least reducing painful tension by diverting their energy into other channels (sublimation, or formation of pathological symptoms, etc.). This view of consciousness as belonging to group life is also consonant with the close connection which Freud finds existing between language and consciousness. Speech, the word, is the first and most important requisite for group life in the human sense, but naming is an extreme specification and means "this is not the same as some other similar thing," hence is a negation—an inhibition.

Having thus set forth the possibility that the function of consciousness is inhibitive in the ultimate interest of the pleasure principle, Alexander takes a further step with Freud—beyond the pleasure principle. The physiological concomitant of pleasure is reduction of stimulus, the effort to restore equilibrium. In its wider biological aspect this tendency to preserve a certain quantum of stimulus is generalized into a trend to equalize "vital differences," impelling to the reinstatement of earlier conditions and, as its final goal, to rest or death, to the condition of lifeless substance. This being the condition of things it would seem at first glance a contradiction in terms to speak of a tendency which is opposed to this most fundamental one, yet it seems to be the office of the sexual instinct to do this very thing, and in a biological theory we are obliged to take into consideration the opposition between the ego impulses the goal of which is death and the sexual impulse in the direction of life, which has given rise to so much controversy. It has been found that among all those cravings which lead to tension the sexual instinct occupies a special position, for the reason that the satisfaction of this instinct, while it reduces tension, at the same time counteracts the death tendency. The organism is, so to speak, betrayed, and with the aid of the satisfaction of the sexual instinct a life principle is smuggled in. For Freud the opposition takes the form of a delay in the fundamental process. Death is always the ideal condition of neutralization of stimulation—Nirvana and the tendency to find equilibrium in a primordial condition of rest is the quality of every craving, appetite, and instinct—of the sexual as well as of the others; only what is meant by a condition of rest is not the same. For the ego instincts the direct goal is a condition of repose, a return to lifeless substance; for the sexual striving it is toward a partial restoration of an earlier condition, toward the reuniting of differentiated substances. For Alexander also the inhibiting energy stands in general at the service of the ego-impulses and of the death principle of Freud, and opposed to these are the forces which produce tensions, craving appetites.

But he sees in these two forces two energies which are essentially different in principle and endeavors to identify them with the two opposite principles in living matter—the anabolic and catabolic. If, as is universally assumed life really consists in two opposite chemical processes, in the constant construction and destruction of substance, if there is, in fact, a periodically recurring life and death, this is in full accordance with such opposition as the trend toward tension and the one toward satisfaction and rest; that is, provided we assume that as soon as satisfaction takes place the tension reestablishes itself. The chemical reciprocity of construction and dissolution, of living and dying, would be reflected in the reciprocity of the forces causing instinct and that causing satisfaction or rest. Alexander believes that in every instinct both these tendencies are simultaneously present, though the organism

itself assents only to the latter and identifies itself therewith. Freud's view of the sexual impulse as a particularly effective manifestation of the tension producing force which prolongs the way to death in a special manner, is not affected by his theory, Alexander says; for as a reunion of substances which have somehow been differentiated it is a sort of construction. Alexander ascribes a constructive character not only to the sex impulse but to every tension producing impulse, yet at the same time recognized that the sex impulse more particularly deserves the name of "life impulse." In the asexual organisms the anabolic and catabolic forces are represented also, but with the preponderance of the catabolic, so that the way to death is short. Sexual differentiation, it would seem, is a special instrument of the constructive force to compensate for this preponderance. In any case, however, he agrees with Freud that the primal tendency toward death is the one to triumph finally. He argues further that if we have struck the truth in these speculations it would not be necessary to place the sexual instinct at the very beginning of animal life nor to distinguish it in principle which precedes differentiation into sexes.

The author believes that this is not very different from what Freud means when he says that the forces and processes which are observed in the higher forms of life as sexual are discoverable also in the asexual processes, though their identity is not at once obvious. In these first forms of life reproduction seems merely a sort of growth, but the sexual instinct may likewise be regarded as a special manifestation of this same anabolic force.

Alexander sets forth evidence to show that all forces causing tension, whether in the form of instincts or sudden emotions to stimuli, arise from one source, *i.e.*, from without, the only difference being that the instincts are enduring effects of some first force. These thoughts says Alexander lead to Freud's theory of the origination of living matter from lifeless, in view of the fact that the anabolic processes of life, that is to say life itself, is only possible at the cost of outer energy and first arises as the result of influences exercised by an external source of energy—the probable source of energy being the sun. The second phase of the life process, the catabolic, is a destruction of the living molecule, a dissolution into simpler combinations, poorer in energy, in the course of which stored chemical energy is released in the form of heat. This process is sustained by the system "organism." The whole cycle of processes obeys the most general law of nature, that of entropy as applied by Boltzmann, through which Arrhenius arrived at a similar view of life and death.

5. *From the Analysis of a Patient with Cramp of the Spinal Accessory.* This article was abstracted by Dr. Smith Ely Jelliffe and the abstract appeared in the *PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW*, Vol. 11, 1924, p. 210.

6. *The course of the libido conflict in a case of schizophrenia.* In

the case described the catatonic state represented the climax in the development of the disease. After the loss of the libido there was, on the one hand, an effort to regain the object and on the other an effort to attain organ satisfaction. The process developed in two parallel series—both of them reactions to the withdrawal within of the libido which by accumulation of tension in the organs and by the loss of the object which was thus sustained gave rise to painful feelings. Both reactions pressed toward attainment of satisfaction, that is to the removal of the painful sensations. The series belong to the somatic elements, that is in the form of cravings, were elaborated intellectually with the aid of those psychic tendencies which were still preserved, these latter being directed for the most part toward the regaining of the object. The sensations and emotions perceived in parts of the patient's own body were subjected to manifold elaborations and were then taken possession of as objects of the external world. In this manner the delusional system was built up. Nunberg seeks to trace step by step the efforts of the patient to regain the object, which were successful first in phantasy and later to a certain extent in the outer world, which he was able to do more easily as the patient's conflicts were, during the whole analysis, centered about the physician, being thus comparable to the transference conflicts in the neuroses.

During his very first visit, while he was still in a state of catatonic excitement, the patient made homosexual advances to the physician, for example inviting injections and in other more or less symbolic ways, thus showing that the case was not one of those in which there is a total dissolution of the ego. The patient first reached out for the object by means of speech which was an equivalent of real love, and was not, Nunberg was convinced, merely an abreaction. Unable thus to reach his goal the patient sought organ satisfaction, manifested in anal, aggressive, and cannibalistic trends, and aided by narcissistic identifications, he developed an extreme craving for food, waited all day for his cousin or sister to bring it and then devoured it greedily. He challenged the physician to fight with him, so that he might conquer or be conquered (ambivalence). The patient smoked cigarettes which Nunberg offered him, but showed that in accepting and smoking them he was following cannibalistic trends and was symbolizing the reception of the physician's body into his own, as then it was possible to invest the object (now part of the ego) with libido. At this point of narcissistic identification the patient became more introverted and symptoms which had been present in the acute attack again came to the fore, namely, transitivity, from the loss of the boundaries of the ego; and delusions of injury, of being influenced, based on transitivity, but nevertheless indicating a restoration of the ego boundaries in that the aggressive tendencies of the patient which had been projected were received masochistically, and were at least felt as coming from without.

The patient finally arrived at a state where he identified the physician with the father, turning to him for guidance and instruction. Under this "suggestion" he made advance toward a cure by means of repression. Freud says that from the side of the ego the cause of repression is the construction of the ego-ideal. Nunberg thinks that from the standpoint of the construction of the ideal the course in this disease may be regarded as a quest for the ego-ideal indicative of what takes place normally. He briefly traces this course: When the libido was partially lost the patient was confronted by an "object," which aroused in him a homosexual reaction. At first he sought to gain possession of it by speech and later by aggressive manifestations. But because an opposite impulse immediately arose in him he was unable to reach his goal. Finally he did gain possession of the object—by means of narcissistic identification; the object became one with him. In consequence of this identification there was, for a time, loss of the object as such, and, besides, loss of the ego-boundaries, of orientation, etc., and the choking of the libido in the organs became greater. This resulted in his placing the object at a distance, fitted out with his own aggressive and sadistic impulses, to which he now reacted in a masochistic manner, interpreting his own projections as insults and injuries directed against himself. When the organ stimulation subsided the object ceased to exist in an aggressive and sadistic form. The patient identified the physician with the father and assumed an attitude of passivity and dependence. Thus it is seen that the patient in his quest of an object arrived as far as a fixation on the father (represented by the physician). This fixation prevented an entire release of the libido but after the patient had found an object a part of the infantile narcissistic ideal was given up in the process of readjustment to the milieu and there was partial correction in the direction of reality and of entire restoration of the ego.

(Vol. VII, No. 4.)

1. Transference and Object Choice. v. HATTINGBERG.
2. Manifestations of the Female Castration Complex. KARL ABRAHAM.

1. *Transference and Choice of an Object. Their significance for the theory of the instincts.* The theory of the instincts has been greatly illuminated by Freud's researches and for this reason v. Hattingberg has brought together a series of facts under the head of transference and choice of object in order to show just what has been contributed by psychoanalysis to our knowledge of the emotions, believing that these factors are not always given due weight in dynamic psychology.

Transference can be best understood, he says, from a description of the manner in which the concept arose. Psychoanalysts noticed that, in the

course of treatment, patients invariably assume certain attitudes toward the physician, in the sense that the patient develops a sort of sympathy or feeling of love. It was impossible to explain these feelings as due to the psychoanalysis, and it was therefore clear that they must originate elsewhere. This thought found expression in the name "transference" which indicated that a feeling was carried over in the form of a new application from an earlier and more primitive situation. This view was further confirmed by the discovery that these transferred feelings were not always positive *i.e.*, feelings of love and sympathy, but that they sometimes took the form of hate; it was found in short, that affects of all kinds were torn loose from their moorings and reflected to the physician.

Through these experiences it came to light: 1. Emotions and affects are transferred, that is under certain conditions they are connected with objects merely because these objects happen to occupy the foreground of consciousness, forming an associative connection, apparently merely for the purpose of living out the feeling pressing for expression in the patient. 2. That there is an innate necessity of establishing a connection between certain feelings and an object.

All this is in contradiction to the naïve understanding of the situation. The man in the street says that a person is hated because he is a disgusting fellow, that is the situation is rationalized (Jones). Psychoanalysis on the contrary, does not delimit the separate feelings as given naïvely by consciousness, but regards the affect as a whole and as identical with instinct. In order to understand the psychoanalytic viewpoint it is necessary to abandon the differentiation of the conscious and unconscious as constituting two entirely different spheres. Whether a thing is conscious or unconscious has nothing to do with its reality as a psychic element. The same is found to hold true of psychical and physical processes. If one takes a neutral ground between conscious and unconscious and between psychic and physical, and if these same principles are applied to affects also, then the psychological problems over which there has been so much strife are reduced to naught. We do not cry because we are sad, nor are we sad because we cry, and both the James-Lange and the scholastic formula lose their meaning. Instead of making one process the effect of the other, we regard the affective situation as a typical whole, a constellation or complex, a syndrome of functions and changes in function, which includes conscious processes with a series of other processes—vasomotor, visceral, innersecretory, and motor, but with recognizable order in the series. And it is just the conscious element which our psychoanalytic experiences teach us may be wholly absent. The affect is therefore a typical attitude and a typical change in the total constellation, which indeed is not always simultaneously activated in all its elements.

The factors in which the author is here more particularly interested are instinct and object choice. Freud, in his sexual theory, he says, shows

us that the infantile affect is without object and that the instinct undergoes various changes before finally becoming attached to a person of the opposite sex; all evidence of a development of instinct irrespective of object. Similar facts may be gleaned from the observation of animal life. Douglas Spalding, followed by L. Morgan shows that chickens follow the hen because they are so constituted as to desire to follow some object and will run after any moving object that happens to be in the environment, revealing that the instinct is at first general and inexactly oriented, and can find satisfaction with any object, only gradually becoming centered on the one which is biologically significant.

Psychoanalysis has traced development in these directions and has found that the balance of weight rests, with singular consistency, in the individual. The point of reference, then, is the individual himself, or, more exactly, the conditions of the individual, of which two are of greatest importance, an incipient condition, the craving; and a final condition, satisfaction. Between these two conditions belongs the instinctive behavior, a series of actions, in lower animals typical and occurring with automatic regularity, but as the scale of animal life ascends, becoming more and more variable. In this whole cycle psychoanalysis sees a dynamic manifestation—a force. This concept of power is one of the oldest tools of which thought has made use, but it has, nevertheless, little content beyond that of indicating a "something" which gives rise to change; so that when we consider instincts as forces they are brought into relation with nothing that reveals their true nature to our understanding. The value of the dynamic view consists in that it is the idea under which the greatest number of psychic phenomena may be most consistently gathered together. Regarded as forces, then, the instincts may be looked upon as something fluid, as in flux, and there is no more appropriate image for life than the stream of life—where every thing takes place in rhythmic waves. The difficulty with the image of fluidity begins, however, when the attempt is made to account for the differences in the instincts—for their diversity. We may avoid this difficulty in part, if, instead of assuming a separate energy for each instinct, we regard the differences as due to changes in one and the same fluid force, which sometimes flows more quickly, sometimes more slowly, is free flowing or dammed back, is directed forward or backward. But we are still at a loss to explain the more specific distinctions unless we regard this force as tending toward different objects, as investing different ideas. Then if we wish to characterize the diversity of the forms of the libido by these different investments, they must be considered as essentially belonging together, and this right we have renounced in view of the facts connected with the transference and choice of an object, where it was found that the instinct turns to the most various objects and invests the most various ideas, a view confirmed also by the daily experience of the

analyst, who finds that in the flow of the mental life it is not the affects and cravings which are set in motion by the ideas, but contrariwise; forcing us to assume that the instincts and affects decide the direction in which the cycles of action shall unfold, and that they must themselves, therefore, have a definite direction, which is characteristic for each. These directions we immediately see, cannot be covered by the image of a single flowing force, nor can they be adequately explained by a topical view, and the simplest and most natural explanation seems to be to assume for each instinct a final condition of satisfaction which is characteristic for that instinct.

If these considerations are conclusive, the author continues, then the dynamic explanation is nothing more than a convenient image which our language is unable to dispense with, and it is not possible to form a complete and consistent theory from this concept; historical proof of the inadequacy of the concept is the failure of Schopenhauer's dynamic view of the instincts, and also Bergson's, which is closely allied.

Speculations are offered as to the relation of transference to "suggestion," in the light of increasing psychoanalytic experience. In the author's opinion, in which he follows Ferenczi, suggestion is not a dissociation brought about by the hypnotist, but depends on repressed infantile tendencies in the person hypnotized, which are released by suggestion, the processes being a manifestation of libidinous impulses, for the most part arising from the child-father complex, which, by transference enters into the physician-patient relation. If this view be adopted, he says, it would render possible an explanation of many facts which are not satisfactorily accounted for otherwise, and one is even inclined to assume a special "instinct of suggestibility," that is a tendency to yield completely, to become passive.

In closing, Hattingberg refers hopefully to the contributions of psychoanalysis to the knowledge of the instincts, one of its greatest services having been to throw light upon that sphere of our psychic life where all true psychology must begin.

2. *Manifestations of the Female Castration Complex.* Reviewed by Dr. Smith Ely Jelliffe, *PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW*, Vol. 11, p. 201 (1924).

BOOK REVIEWS

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Knight Dunlap, Ph.D. Williams and Wilkins Company, Baltimore, 1925. Pp. 261.

THE LAWS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Florian Znaniecki, Ph.D. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1925. Pp. 320.

Professor Dunlap starts off his account of the development of social psychology by stating that the book is not intended to be comprehensive or absolutely systematic—facts which the reader would surmise while glancing over the second qualification which reads “the treatment is conservative in that it makes no use of ‘unconscious mental processes,’ the ‘unconscious mind’ or other popular substitutes for scientific principles. Psychology is fully competent to explain all mental processes, social as well as individual, without recourse to mysticism or pseudo-psychology.” This last phrase undoubtedly refers to analytic psychoogy in the Freudian sense toward which the author is antagonistic to the extent that he uses such terms as “non-conscious” instead of unconscious for identical mechanisms, has used the word “desire” eighteen times on one page in order to avoid the Freudian “wish,” and has stubbed his toe several times on his own bricks in attempting to avoid the concept of the unconscious in discussing the individual mind in the field of social psychology. Here unconscious reactions are both admitted and denied within rather narrow confines.

The chapters on sex differences, marriage and the family and on religious organization are very interestingly presented and contain a wealth of information on these and associated topics. The descriptive portions particularly contain much food for thought, but when ultimate causes come in for consideration, many still mooted questions are settled dogmatically after the fashion of the older orthodox psychology.

It seems to the reviewer that the most valuable portion of the book from the standpoint of stimulating constructive thought is the last half which deals with civic and marital organization, conditions of social progress including social inheritance, genetics, training, modification of germ cells and eugenics, and the general principles of social organization, and social control. Here the layman will find much of interest. The last chapter consists of a short account of the principles and rules of propaganda.

A somewhat more complicated treatise on the subject, and which the average layman may never hope to wade through, is the production of the Polish Professor Dr. Znaniecki of the Sociological Institute of the

University of Poznan. He discusses the problem of scientific laws in modern social psychology and attempts to remove the arguments against the possibility of scientific laws in psychology in general. Concerning the ambitions of social psychology he remarks that "the skepticism which often makes the general psychologist doubtful about the fundamental issues of his science has seldom if ever daunted the representatives of social psychology. They seldom hesitate in formulating sweeping laws concerning human behavior in society and indeed as we shall find presently the number and variety of logical forms which their laws assume are quite surprising particularly in view of the relatively brief history of their endeavors. Is this merely a typical expression of the exaggerated self-confidence which every new science manifests in its youthful days and with which probably every worker in the field of sociology has been at some time justly or unjustly reproached?" In reviewing the sociopsychological literature the author discovered several distinct types of formulated laws among which are described and discussed the static laws established by Comte; empirical uniformities of facts; the laws of evolution, a specific variety of which are those which have sometimes been called psychogenic by analogy with Haeckel's biogenetic law; the laws of finality; the laws of motivation; the laws of suggestive social interaction and quantitative laws. Regarding the last topic the writer states that "Sociologists and social psychologists have often looked with envy at the splendid instrument which physical sciences possess in mathematics. Their envy found additional justification in the philosophical doctrine which has been current since the days of Descartes and according to which quantitative formulation is the essential condition of scientific exactness there being no real science of qualities." The obvious difficulties which all attempts to formulate quantitative laws in sociology have met account for the limited number of these laws in socio-psychological literature, but after all this should not be looked upon as an impediment since the goal of physical science and of social psychology is not the same, and to the author there is no impediment here to prevent social psychology from reaching scientific exactness as far as its study of real causal relations is concerned.

His definition of personality is worth quoting in full. "At any particular moment of his life a man's personality contains not only his body, not only a limited set of biological instincts, but the entire incalculable wealth of his memories and all the volitional and emotional dispositions stirred and developed in contact with nature, with his fellows and with the innumerable material and immaterial objects and relations which constitute his cultural milieu—language, literature, art, religion, science, law, economy. At any moment any of these memories and dispositions may become actual and determine his present behavior in a way which cannot be explained or foreseen unless all about him is known."

In general the whole subject matter of the book is aimed toward the formulation of thirteen socio-psychological laws which are (a) the law of stabilization in that an individual begins to wish for stability if his search for new experiences seems to bring more and more undesirable consequences, (b) the law of mobilization—the desire for a new experience, (c) the law of negative change, (d) the law of positive change, (e) the law of social repression (social repression produces psychological revolt), (f) the law of social sublimation—social sublimation produces psychological conformism, (g) the laws of idealization, (h) the law of sensualization, (i) the law of social generalization (j) the law of inhibition—the present volition becomes inhibited and changes into an emotion, (k) the law of rationalization, (l) the law of social subjectivation and finally (m) the law of social objectivation—the evolution of tendencies into cultural interests.

This learned and systematic discussion of a subject which is very complex when considered in all of its relations to other sciences is concluded with a faint but just hope that experimental and pathological psychology will accept the suggestions formulated and thus be on the way to a true cultural science.

LEWIS.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A MUSICAL PRODIGY. By G. Révész. Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1925. Pp. 180.

This book, "the first of its kind," is a study by the director of the Psychological Laboratory at Amsterdam, of the young Hungarian pianist, Erwin Nyiregyházi. The author tells us in the introductory chapter that "on his first meeting with this remarkable child he had a strong impression that he was in the presence of a most interesting case, and he therefore profited by the occasion . . . to carry out a systematic investigation of an infant prodigy." His purpose, he says further, was "to discover the extent of his mental capacity and endowment, and, in connection with this, to establish what influences determined the development of his musical talent." The former he carried out by the use of various tests of mental capacity, notably the Binet, supplemented by questions and conversations designed to bring out the boy's mental abilities, and by an analysis of the elementary acoustic and musical faculties; the latter he seems to have attempted by a careful inquiry into the child's family history and his development during infancy, in addition to first-hand observation from his seventh to his thirteenth year.

By the use of intelligence tests the author succeeded in establishing Erwin's mental development as at least three years in advance of his age. But he pertinently remarks that these means of measuring the intelligence, especially of gifted children, are very inadequate because they do not display what he considers most remarkable in his case, *i.e.* the *brilliance*

of his intellect. We may remark parenthetically that the technique of mental measurement has made immeasurable advancement since the year when this study was concluded, 1914. Révész considered the intelligence of his subject "beyond comparison with that of normally developed children." In support of this he adduces the boy's comments on music and musicians, which do indeed show a keenness of observation and a maturity of judgment that are truly remarkable. He objects, however, to calling the child precocious, preferring to reserve that term for children who develop adult qualities and adult ways of looking at life, and in whom the spontaneous, childlike qualities are lacking. Erwin, in spite of the early development of his talent, was a "child in the full sense of the word; a clever, gay, friendly, charming boy." In the investigation of his acoustic and musical faculties and musical memory, tests which could be numerically recorded were made, and controls were used in the sense of comparative tests upon other musicians.

By careful investigation the author learned that the boy's paternal grandfather and both parents were musical, and that he himself exhibited an interest in music before the close of his first year. His speech was somewhat retarded, though no clear history of its development could be obtained. It was clear, however, that he sang correctly melodies which he heard for some time before he spoke readily. When he was three he was discovered to have absolute pitch; about this time he began to play upon the piano everything he had heard. When three and a half he was composing little melodies with accompaniments. In his sixth year he began the regular study of music at the Academy in Budapest. He composed at this time such things as a barcarole, a serenata, a wedding march and a funeral march. The author records that from his sixth to his twelfth year, while under his observation, the boy's life took a normal course. His chief interest was music, but he gradually developed an enormous thirst for knowledge of all sorts, so that he employed every means possible to him to acquire it, and his interests, instead of being confined to music, were varied.

The author is fully alive to the importance of early associations. He says we must not lose sight of the "importance of education, of surroundings, of the intelligence of his parents, and in general of the intellectual level of those persons who have stood in immediate relationship to the child, and have had an influence on his intellectual development." In spite of this we are told almost nothing of Erwin's home life or the personal contacts of his earliest years. The parents' hopes were centered in him, and the father planned to secure for him the best training possible. But the father died early, just when we are not told. The family were comfortably well-to-do and the child's musical education did not suffer, being taken in hand by friends. His home, the author says, was not musical and could give him no musical help or artistic inspiration; and

he attributes a slowing down in the boy's creative activities at the age of seven partly to this fact. Several chapters are devoted to Erwin's musical development, and his compositions from the earliest years are analyzed in some detail, while a number of them are reproduced in the appendix.

The author is himself apparently a musician, and has followed the boy's musical development with care and enthusiasm. He has drawn for us an exceedingly interesting portrait of a gifted child, interspersed with discussions on musical talent in general, the judgment of children's productions, and the difficulty of getting at the child's emotional life. But we leave the book with considerable dissatisfaction, feeling that he has not fulfilled the promise that he made to "establish what influences determined the development of the boy's musical talent." Of the deeper currents of his life, his relationship with his parents and his younger brother, also musically gifted, the personality of his teachers, his emotional development aside from his musical life, we know nothing. From what we are told in the book, it would appear that Erwin's musical genius was a clear-running stream fed continuously from inner fountains; we would like to know more of the outer circumstances that permitted and even fostered this unremitting flow. As it is, the book has much of value in it for the psychologist, and well deserves the title of pioneer in its field.

WINIFRED RICHMOND.

DER KÜNSTLER. By Emil Utitz. Published by Ferdinand Enke, Stuttgart, 1925. Pp. 64.

This small sized monograph on the artist and his productions is composed of four separate discourses which however are organized in a manner that they blend into one another in understandable unity. These essays collected in booklet form represent four problems which have been extended and deepened through additional facts and new considerations beyond that already accomplished in the author's former large work "Grundlegung der Allgemeinen Kunstwissenschaft," the second edition of which appeared in 1920. He has also collected and published considerable characterological material much of which resulted from personal investigations in his "Jahrbuch der Charakterologie" and again systematically in a work called "Charakterologie."

Both the first and the last discourses in this booklet, "The Problem of General Art Theory" and the "Character of Artists" respectively were delivered before various societies and published in the "Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft," the second "The Creations of Artists" was delivered before the local Berlin Kantgesellschaft in 1924 and the third "Art and Mental Disease" was read in Prague, German Urania, in 1924 and published in the "Deutscher Medizinische Wochenschrift."

These essays deal principally with the behavior of artists and the

character of their productions largely from the viewpoint of the descriptive level; however, the essay on art and mental disorder may be of some interest to the psychiatrist since the author here emphasizes the pathologic factors in the genesis of much of this activity and confirms the ideas of others that expressionistic art may be a symptom of mental disorder, but without being very specific or detailed in developing this concept. He also points out many analogies to primitive and archaic art, the correspondencies between the art productions of children and of schizophrenics, the predominance of phantastic trends and of chaotic expressions in distorted settings.

On the whole the booklet seems to be a fair concise summary and review of much that has been said before and incorporates the ideas of several contemporaries, so it may be read with profit both by the art student and the psychopathologist.

LEWIS.

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE PSYCHIC DISORDER OF GENERAL PARESIS. By Stefan Hollós and S. Ferenczi. English translation by Gertrude M. Barnes and Günther Keil. Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company, 1925. Monograph Series No. 42. Pp. 48.

This unique approach to the psychic problems of general paresis is prefaced by a short but meaty discussion of the ideas of Nissl, Kretschmer, Bayle, Baillarger, Voisin, Meynert, Kraft-Ebing, Anton, Kaufmann, Kraepelin, Mendel, Charcot, Käcke, Dreyfus, Hoche, Jaspers, Ewald and many others concerning the relationship between lesions, constitutional factors and psychic developments characterizing the disorder.

The observations of Hollós of paretic patients disclose both regressive and compensatory features. As in other psychoses the numbers preferred and perseverated by different patients in their megalomaniac delusions have definite meanings, and their significance may be traced to its origin, loss of potency is compensated for by grandiose sexual ideas of procreation and size of genitalia, preformed phantasies are utilized to advantage, the critical faculty suffers infantile regressions, the passage of time is suspended and memory for the initial lesion is often repressed together with all insight into their condition.

Many mannerisms, expressions and ideas of paretic patients are explained by analogies from the rites and customs of primitive peoples, and in fact Hollós has shown that the classical psychoanalytic interpretations are applicable throughout; however, the theoretical considerations offered by Ferenczi are of particular interest. He refers to the mental symptoms of paresis as a "Cerebral Pathoneurosis" and these manifestations correspond to the "psychical dominance over the narcissistic libido dynamics mobilized through cerebral lesions." Above all other organs of the body, the brain maintains an especially high narcissistic possession of

libido or valuation, and on the basis of this and associated functions and phenomena he formulates the hypothesis that "the meta-luetic brain infection by attacking the central organs of the ego function provokes not only 'symptoms of defect' but also disturbs as a trauma would do, the equilibrium in the housekeeping of the narcissistic libido which then makes itself felt in symptoms of parietic mental disorder." Among the numerous mechanisms discussed are the early symptoms (neurasthenic) of withdrawal of libidinous interest from the sexual object, the painful (hypochondria) storing up of narcissistic libido in the various organs of the body, "convulsive object possession" through overcompensation, the mourning for the loss of the Ego-ideal in depressed types, the hallucinatory wish processes, and the manic-delusional phases as regressions of the narcissistic libido to the comfortable levels of Ego development.

"General paresis seen from the psychoanalytic viewpoint is really regressive paresis," from which there may arise rebirth phenomena; correlated on the physical side in that brain tissue destruction may mean libido impoverishment and restitution processes, increase of libido. The regressions both physical and mental are overcompensated for in Ego hypertrophy; the sickly, paralyzed body becomes a giant of strength inventing everlasting life for all mankind, the impotency situation is met by a return to infantile extragenital sexual theories to perform miracles of creation, and the loss in intellectual values is compensated for through archaic, oral and anal mechanisms as well as through delusional systems of possessing great knowledge.

This little monograph is a marvel of its type as it is not only an organized departure from the established ideas concerning the meaning of the psychic symptoms of paresis, but it suggests paths of thought which may lead to a better understanding of the so-called "organic reaction types" of mental disorder where there has always been a tendency to take the psychological manifestations for granted or as something to require a different interpretation than the psychic symptoms of "functional" psychoses and psychoneuroses. These well known psychiatrists have made a valuable offering which few workers in this field can afford to miss reading, and it should serve to stimulate additional investigation of this character.

LEWIS.

MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW. A Study in Medico-Sociological Jurisprudence. By S. Sheldon Glueck, LL.M., Ph.D. Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1925. Pp. xxii + 693. Price \$7.00 net.

The presses of the publishers grind on and on. Unlike the mills of the gods, they grind rapidly, but like them, the product is ordinarily somewhat small. Now and then, however, there appears in the tidal wave of printed matter, like a case of Scotch in a welter of driftwood, something

really valuable. Now and then comes a book and the audience to which it is addressed, rubs its hands and cries, "Ah, here is something that wanted doing!"

Mr. Glueck's present volume is such a one. For lo! these many years there has been an increasing need for a crystallization of the problems presented whenever the question of mental disorder is brought into jurisprudence. Unfortunately, like the East and West, the lawyer and the psychiatrist have never met on common ground. The former is too often the slave of precedent; too often he is incapable of realizing that the law is not immutable; that it grows gradually, its shape conforming—however vaguely at times—to the social imperative. Beating his head on the musty altars erected to the old-time gods, Coke, Blackstone and Littleton, he fails to note the new stars rising in the East, he fails to hear the dictum that a criminal is not a person who commits a crime, but the end-product of a billion years of phylogeny plus the effects of a highly complicated social state.

On the other hand, the psychiatrist is likely to have become impatient with legal procedure. He has had the experience of having his efforts to throw light upon a difficult case nullified by contentious attorneys. He has seen a group of supposedly intelligent men gathered together to pass upon a social problem—a learned judge, a forceful district attorney, a shrewd counsel for defense and twelve men supposedly fairly representative of civilized society. He has seen this ponderous and expensive machinery perform for several days and weeks and finally produce a solution which he knows is totally ineffective if not monstrously unjust. Small wonder that he comes to feel that the courts cannot use and do not want his special knowledge.

Only here and there in occasional articles has attention been called to this problem. One book, White's "Insanity and the Criminal Law" has pointed out to the legal profession wherein the present laws are ineffectual. Dr. White wrote from the viewpoint of the psychiatrist and humanist, one who had had vast experience of the courts as an expert witness, but who did not pretend to a technical legal knowledge.

Now comes Mr. Glueck, writing also as a humanist and moreover as a fully equipped lawyer. And—*rara avis*—he appears to be a lawyer with a psychiatric point of view! Perhaps there is some significance in the fact that his brother, Bernard Glueck, is a psychiatrist, and one who has identified himself with sociological and juridical problems.

At any rate, Mr. Sheldon Glueck has rolled up his sleeves and set to work. And what a mass of material he has accumulated! Here, once for all, are the data which future investigators will need. The legal mind revels in detail. And, true to type, Mr. Glueck has gotten together literally everything on the subject.

He has reviewed very thoroughly the history of insanity as a defense

for crime, giving the earliest decisions and definitions known, as well as the modern instances. He has pointed out the variations in point of view of the lawyer and the physician, as well as the conflicting and confusing dicta of diverse courts. He has clearly indicated what so few lawyers seem to grasp, that is, the folly of that legal point of view which regards mental disorder as a delusion or an irresistible impulse, or as any other symptom.

In his appendix he has brought together digests of the laws governing insanity and criminal irresponsibility in all of the states, as well as a list of statutes cited and a very complete bibliography. In short, Glueck has amassed a wealth of material. Future writers will find that a great deal of their work has been done for them.

In his discussions of antiquated legal points of view and present-day anomalies, Glueck is shrewd and penetrating. He realizes, as few lawyers do, the muddle in which the situation is. When he comes, however, to specific remedies, he is less sound.

It is perhaps too much to expect that a complete remedy for a situation as intricate as this one should spring, Minerva-like, from any brain. Certainly it is too much to expect that there will be any radical or immediate change in forensic psychiatry. There are, however, signs of the times. It is proposed occasionally now in a murder trial—to the horror, it may be said, of any right-minded and properly sadistic district attorney—that psychiatrists representing both the prosecution and defense get together and discuss the psychology of the accused and formulate a recommendation for the social problem he presents. Psychiatrists are now attached to many courts and it is not uncommon for an exhibitionist or an arsonist, instead of being flogged or pilloried, to be sent to a hospital. Juvenile courts have come into existence with psychologists and psychiatrists.

In short, the social offender is no longer a puppet who is tossed hither and thither in the legal game according to the skill of the players. He is, even as you and I, a human being. Perhaps in time he will be examined instead of hounded, analyzed instead of prosecuted, and treated instead of punished.

LIND.

STUDIES IN PSYCHIATRY, VOL. II. (Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series No. 41.) By Members of the New York Psychiatric Society. Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company, Washington and New York, 1925. Pp. 233.

This illustrated monograph is a compilation of twelve papers selected from eighty-four contributions, read before the New York Psychiatric Society from time to time since its origin in 1903. The selections have apparently been made with a view to cover as wide a field of psycho-

pathology and of neuropathology as possible and at the same time to present those constructive ideas which have made or are now making permanent impressions upon our practical psychiatric problems and methods of thinking.

The list of authors of these collected papers includes Dr. Adolph Meyer who has dealt in his characteristically thorough way with the concepts of psychobiology and has presented a theory of integration tending to do away with the "medically useless contrast of mental and physical," particularly suited for student assimilation; Dr. C. Macfie Campbell, who has contributed three papers on the psychologic mechanism in force in convulsive phenomena, in some instances of manic-depressive excitement and in a particular case of childhood conflicts, and L. Pierce Clark who also has three offerings; on psychopathic children from the standpoint of reconstruction; therapeutic considerations of periodic mental depressions with clinical data offered to show the value of a modified psychanalytic approach to these particularly difficult problems in selected cases, and a psychologic investigation of thieving in juvenile delinquents where the determinants of this trait in several cases are excellently worked out and interestingly presented.

The problem of therapeutic handling of mental disorders in general hospitals was discussed by the late Dr. P. C. Knapp, whose presentation of this situation is unique and contains much sound advice as well as many stimulating thoughts. Certain relations between the Civil Courts and mental medical affairs are commented upon by Dr. M. C. Ashley, who has presented a case at some length, in a manner serving to bring into relief some of the oft mooted points in medico-legal experience. Dr. Charles I. Lambert's contribution to the knowledge of the clinical and anatomical features of Alzheimer's disease which was read in 1914 has since that time been considered a very valuable addition to the literature of this rare condition. The article presents several cases of the Alzheimer syndrome and allied conditions with clinical and anatomic features and is profusely illustrated by gross and photomicrographic plates of the neuropathologic aspect of the disorder.

The monograph is completed by two entertainingly written articles by Dr. Smith Ely Jelliffe; the first being an account of his post war "Neuropsychiatric Pilgrimage" during which many famous shrines and notable contributors to neurology and psychiatry in the various countries of Europe were visited. Dr. Jelliffe in his unique and delightful way has evaluated, described and illustrated their past and present contributions and activities in a manner serving to correlate in the mind of the reader a vast amount of historical and modern scientific doings. A liberal portion of this contribution is given to Dutch neuropsychiatry and its representative workers; a much needed account of such interest and importance that it must be read to be appreciated. Many illustrations of

these noted men and their laboratories are distributed through the text. The final chapter by the same author deals with the comparatively new concept of "Paleopsychology," an outline of the origin and evolution of symbolic functions, which is illustrated by schematic figures intended to show energy patterns (capture, transformation, release), life plan, and race perpetuation patterns, and those of object choice. This section is crowded with thought provoking material elucidating the so-called "archaic unconscious," tends on the whole to emphasize that there is a paleopsychology as well as a paleopathology to consider in the study of human behavior, and thus it is a well fitting "tail" (I almost wrote "Crown") to this group of Contributions, the presentation of this involved subject being unusually clear and concise.

However briefly the above contributions have been reviewed (most of them merely mentioned) they all contain, not only facts and ideas of interest to all who are in this field of the medical profession, but much of permanent value.

LEWIS.

HYSTERIA. By Ernst Kretschmer. Authorized English Translation by Oswald H. Boltz. Nervous and Mental Monograph Series No. 44. Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company, New York and Washington, 1926. Pp. 120.

This treatise on hysteria is an investigation into the problem from a psychological and neurophysiological viewpoint of the complexes involved, rather than a clinical account of the symptoms, diagnosis and treatment, therefore in the introductory chapter the author outlines his biological concept of hysteria as a deep rooted form of psychogenic reaction, and indicates the need for a "more accurate description of the hysterical type as opposed to other psychogenic reaction types."

It is repeatedly emphasized that the hysterical reaction types have many features related to the animal instincts and group themselves about the impulsive trends of life; the condition springing from two main sources (1) the instinct of self-preservation—expressed in fright and anxiety symptoms in dangerous situations, and (2) from the emotions and conflicts in connection with sexual life, but the author apparently does not wholly agree with the Freudian school as to specific psychogenesis since he states "The sexual impulse only comprises one large half of these relations; the other, just as important, main group is formed by the hysterical fright and anxiety reactions!"

Individual experiences such as futile love affairs, quarrels, jealousy, undesired marriage, fear of pregnancy and disturbances of sexual intercourse; and constitutional foundations as physical weakness, genital malformations—weakened sexual impulse, general childishness and a powerful psychic fixation on the mother are among the mentioned exciting

causes of hysteria, and since everyone carries within him the old instinctive forms of reaction ("tantrum-violent-motor reaction," "sham death reflexes," etc.) to stress situations, all are capable of developing hysteria regardless of how well these older forms of behavior are covered up by more recent characterological layers of culture. Kretschmer discusses at some length the psychophysical dynamics of "hysterical habit formation," Bleuler's "chance apparatus" in hysteria, the laws concerned with voluntary reinforcements of reflexes, and subjective psychological states. In terms of reflex action the hysterical process "may be divided biologically into three phases. The first or stage of the acute or affective reflex which with the second phase of voluntary reinforcement of the reflex as a connecting link passes by degrees into the third stage of chronic impression of the reflex upon the mind." The mechanisms of psychic overexcitation of affective gain, and of psychic contagion are also included.

At the beginning of the hysterical formation the situation is ushered in by an experience producing some normal biological fatigue or reflex phenomenon; then through some motive, this condition *e.g.* tremor, is consciously and deliberately exaggerated; finally, however, it becomes automatic or is no longer controlled by the individual and so crystallizes into a more or less permanent reaction. When the condition is beyond the conscious control of the patient he may consciously yearn for a cure, but unconsciously resists with a tremendous force. According to Kretschmer this man has two wills—"He has one that seeks recovery—it is honestly meant and really present but superficial and powerless, and a second will that resists recovery—it is extremely elastic and rules supreme over the motility of the body." Therapeutic success may cause a patient to lose his compensation; on the other hand there must be some attraction in the prospect of again becoming a normal human being subject to successes and pleasures. The "hypobulic" will is antagonistic to the purposive will and is connected with the reflex apparatus. "Wherever the hypobulic will has dissociated from the purposive will and has spasmodically dovetailed with an easily excitable reflex apparatus, there arose a hysterical syndrome and wherever this false contact was loosened and the hypobulic will once more united with the purposive function into a complete united will there was cured a case of hysteria."

The "hypobulic" type of will is so termed because it is the phylogenetic and ontogenetic lower stage of the purposive will. "The catatonic symptom complex contains the hypobulic type driven to its most extreme length. By that I naturally would not like to say that catatonic negativism is identical with the hysterical or the childish or the animalistic negativism."

Throughout the book the mechanisms of reflex and "will" are emphasized while the phenomena of repression and of the unconscious as such

in the Freudian sense are rarely mentioned, but are occasionally mildly criticized or politely set aside. However, when Freudian doctrines are replaced by other concepts the difference does not seem to be a fundamental one, but lies largely in a change of terminology. From a certain point of view this monograph is a distinct contribution to the literature on hysteria, a disorder which in spite of a multitude of luministic studies into its nature, still interests and intrigues us with the same force experienced by the psychiatrists of yesterday, therefore, we should welcome any elaborations of theoretic or practical importance, whether they do or do not minutely conform to our own psychological concepts.

LEWIS.

PSYCHOLOGIE DES SÄUGLINGS. By Von Dr. Siegfried Bernfeld. Julius Springer, Vienna, 1925. Pp. 272.

An attempt to fill a great need has here been made in the form of a well written monograph which concerns itself with psychologic knowledge of the newly born. The subject matter has been presented in five parts. The first part undertakes the discussion of birth and "psycho-physical" problems including the special importance of the psychological effect of different types of care of the suckling child, the sleep, crying, and sucking phenomena, and the amount of so-called "knowledge" in the newly born. Considerable attention has also been given to the physical structure, motor mechanisms, reflex action, and sensory possibilities which are ready for activity at the time of birth; and later in the work the author compares these findings with those further developments encountered in the same structures of the four-year-old child.

The second part describes the early progress of the child in a new world beset with difficulties and particular emphasis is placed upon the importance of both the oral and auditory zones in shaping the character and behavior of the child. Here also are presented some interesting ideas on instinct groupings including the psychologic significance of laughter, weeping and of several varieties of fear situations. This section is concluded with comments on the perceptive possibilities in children, enlarging on childhood types of attention and early powers of observation.

In the third part there is a full discussion of the instinct of possession with its different forms of expression taking into account the development of the sitting, creeping, climbing, standing, walking and learning processes as well as the evolution of the hands, the instinctive components of possession, and the libido elements in the act of grasping.

The fourth division of the subject starts with the general topic of dreams and repressions and proceeds with evolutions of the birth trauma theory, the psychology of the weaning period, and the rôle played by dentition, biting and masturbation.

The fifth part deals with the suckling and his world in the sense of

relationship between the suckling and the external universe including the cognitive, affective and instinctive regulations of the personality, where the significance of weaning is again emphasized. In this section the author has schematically arranged an interesting synopsis of the evolution of the child's personality showing the relations and dynamic connections between fear, flight, anger, triumph, self-confidence, repression, and desire, and the narcissistic situation, also the connections between scorn, sleep, resistance and combat, and the narcissistic situation, and finally the contributions of the above mentioned trends to primitive fright states and particularly to angst.

A glance at the bibliography comprising works from 89 authors informs one in this instance of the scope and nature of the monograph which has been written from a dynamic viewpoint with considerations and discussions of the opinions of Darwin, Freud, Rank, Ferenczi, Abraham, Hug-Hellmuth, Schilder, Stern, Kempf, Watson, and a host of other contributors, who have covered as many different phases of the subject. The subject index is quite serviceable.

LEWIS.

FRIGIDITY IN WOMAN IN RELATION TO HER LOVE LIFE. By Dr. Wilhelm Stekel. Translated by Dr. James S. Van Teslaar. Volumes I and II. Published by Boni & Liveright. New York, 1926. Price \$9.00.

Stekel continues to produce at an astounding rate, and these two volumes on Frigidity in Woman are another example of his tremendous literary activities. To the reviewer they seem to be among the most suggestive of his works that have thus far appeared in English, perhaps because they are an attempt to throw light upon that mysterious zone,—the love life of woman.

The two volumes under consideration impress the reviewer, as do most of Stekel's writings, in two major ways. In the first place, the author sticks in a most commendable way to case material which he cites at great length, and too he sticks to this material from the single point of view of therapy. In other words, his volumes are essentially clinical and therapeutic and as such can only be commended. Secondly, there are throughout the work running comments upon the significance of symptoms and here and there rather didactic and clear-cut conclusions as to the meanings of certain types of symptoms. These latter, whether one is disposed to agree with him or not, plus the great amount of clinical material which is detailed, are provocative in the highest degree of helpful thinking along the lines of the problems under discussion. Furthermore, Dr. Stekel is doing in this series of works a thing which is much needed in the field of psychoanalysis, namely he is extensively documenting specific problems,—in this case Frigidity in Woman, instead of writing discrete essays about various topics. Psychoanalytic literature has become very exten-

sive in recent years, reports of case material are appearing with greater and greater frequency, and the various problems which it presents are discussed from all angles. It is exceedingly helpful to have a single one of these problems selected and documented in this fashion.

Dr. Stekel has very interesting chapters in this work on Love at First Sight, Individual Love Requisites, Psychology of the Frigid Woman, The Will to Unpleasure, Imaginary Love, the Struggle of the Sexes, and presents a final chapter in which he sums up the whole question and presents a picture of the love life of woman in relation to present-day problems which is full of suggestive material. He makes much of the struggle for dominance as between the two sexes and takes into serious consideration the ethical and religious background of the woman and her spiritual needs, relating these as factors in the bewildering complex culture of the present day to which she has to adjust and in which the love story with its multitudinous requirements must be worked out. Pointing out as he does the increasing difficulties of the love life in finding satisfactory solutions, he has really made a contribution to the present day psychology of woman which ought to be taken into consideration in the evaluation and understanding of the various social movements which have attained such prominence in recent years.

WHITE.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF IMMIGRANT CHILDREN AT ELLIS ISLAND.

By Bertha M. Boody, Ph.D. The Williams & Wilkins Co. Baltimore, 1926. Pp. 163. Price \$4.00.

This study by the former Dean of Radcliffe College, serial no. 3 of the Mental Measurement Monographs, is in refreshing contrast to the many arid books on the various aspects of mental testing that continue to come from the press. Dr. Boody has done her work thoroughly and gives us reviews of immigration laws and "reviews of certain articles and statistics" from the time that Edward Young made his "Special Report on Immigration" in 1871 down to the immigration reports of 1923. But she has used this material so skillfully that we forget we are reading dry statistics and find them really fascinating. In addition there is a chapter on "Review of the Procedure at Ellis Island" which is remarkable for its sympathetic insight into the problems of both the immigrant and the immigration official. The report of Dr. Boody's own work with immigrant children occupies the last fifty pages of the book.

For two months in the summer of 1922 and again in 1923 the author had, as she says, "the privilege" of being every day at Ellis Island. "To gain some knowledge of two things seemed (to her) specially important." First "the kind of human material that the countries of the world were sending to the United States. The second was the kind of human material that the United States was accepting. It was of interest

to know how the selection was made, and under what physical and emotional conditions. It was of interest to know what standards could be set and lived up to, and also if there were standards which could not be set, others which though set, could not be lived up to. It had seemed that while any study of the immigration question must be based on a first hand understanding of the actual conditions of admission, a study on the psychological side without such knowledge would be without one of the most important factors."

It is this sympathetic grasp of the physical and emotional conditions under which the newly arrived immigrant must meet his tests of fitness to enter the country that makes this study at once so interesting and so different from the usual studies of mentality.

In the "reviews of certain articles and statistics" the first chapter deals largely with studies of race differences and the second with the work that has actually been done with immigrants, on the mental side. In the former the author emphasizes a number of points that have usually been overlooked by critics and reviewers. Brigham himself, for instance, whose "Study of American Intelligence" set forth the doctrine of "Nordic" superiority, is found to be fully alive to the fallacy in judging a whole population by a group of individuals, and though he believes he has shown that "decline in Nordic blood has kept pace with the decline in intelligence" he admits that his figures are based upon country of birth and that no statistics of race are available.

In the discussion of the work that has actually been done, the most important studies are reviewed in some detail, and many interesting illustrations given of the difficulties arising from lack of language, even though interpreters are used, the lack of understanding of racial norms, and the condition of emotional upheaval in which the immigrant usually arrives. Mental testing under these conditions becomes a very different thing from the asking of set questions and judging the replies by the handbook and a stop watch, as is still conceived to be the only correct procedure in some quarters. It calls for a broad knowledge of human behavior, for a quick, keen sensing not just of wrong answers but of what may be causing wrong answers, and an ability to rapidly establish a *rapprochement* with the subject, which is of the greatest importance in getting at his mental processes, as well as influencing his entire subsequent adjustment. From a perusal of this chapter it is evident that there has been steady progress not only in technique of application but in tests and examinations devised to catch the mentally diseased and deficient as they enter our ports. The fewer numbers arriving under the recent immigration laws have permitted more intensive examinations with a corresponding increase in detection of the mentally unfit. But that a great deal remains to be done is evident when we consider the numbers of aliens

who are each year deported after having once been admitted as mentally and physically fit.

Dr. Boody's own work was done upon children in the school which is maintained upon the island for children who are detained for various reasons. About twenty-five different nationalities were represented and the work done was both group and individual. The first year the work was primarily for the purpose of trying out tests, to find those that were really non-language and that might lend themselves to quick, comprehensive, general use. The second year a number of tests were omitted, and the results for those used are combined with those of the first year. Comprehensive tables are given for each test, showing race or nationality, age, sex, type of errors, and so on. In her study of these results Dr. Boody finds plenty of individual differences but no consistent differences that could be laid at the door of race or nationality as such. Nor do the curves of the scores differ in any marked degree from the curves shown in studies of unselected groups of American children. In conclusion the author is convinced that it is the individual immigrant and not his race that should be our chief concern.

From her work with these groups of children she concludes that non-language and performance tests are just at the beginning of their usefulness, and hopes to see an extension of the psychological work in connection with the Medical Division at Ellis Island.

W. RICHMOND.

ESSAYS IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY. By William A. White. Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series No. 43. Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company, New York and Washington, 1925. Pp. 140.

The monograph consists of eleven essays: I, Existing Tendencies, Recent Developments and Correlations in the Field of Psychopathology; II, The Comparative Method in Psychiatry (Psychopathology); III, The Human Organism as an Energy System; IV, Individuality and Introversion; V, Primitive Mentality and the Racial Unconscious; VI, Two Deflecting Traditions; VII, The Significance of Psychopathology for General Somatic Pathology; VIII, Psychoanalytic Parallels; IX, Primitive Mentality; X, The Adlerian Concept of the Neuroses, and XI, Physical Biology; all of which have been published elsewhere in the various medical and psychological periodicals, and while the titles indicate a great diversity of topics and a wide field of endeavor the contents are closely related and emanate from a certain fundamental point of view, which may be called the functional attitude toward the old metaphysical mind and body problem. Such metaphysical abstractions concerning these two aspects of function may be successfully dispensed with if the organism is considered in its proper rôle as a unity of biological function.

At the present time it may be said that this trend of thought is characteristic of the American school of psychiatrists. Moreover the author rightly insists that this is the only attitude of mind on the part of the investigator which will tend to resolve the intricacies of behavior in general and of mental disorder in particular.

This collection of essays develops many fundamental viewpoints in an interesting way, and particularly proposes to emphasize the integrative attitude of approach to complex human problems, in that the human organism is not an entity to be entirely separated from others of his kind nor from his environment, but he must be considered as a certain concentration of energy, or perhaps as the center of certain forces which have arisen in the environment and which will eventually blend with it again. Moreover man as a transformer of energy cannot function as a closed system, but must be an open one constantly capturing or deriving energy from several known and perhaps some as yet unknown sources in the environment. The author in this way approaches the problem of behavior in terms of energy rather than in terms of organ systems or after the fashion of the timeworn neural integration concepts.

Taken as a group these essays are particularly interesting for the following reasons: (1) In that they offer a logical method of approach to the personality which is understandable to both the internist and psychiatrist, a common ground for discussions and research; (2) in that the many years of experience of the author allows him to review the progress of psychopathology through some thirty-odd years of its gains, failures and vicissitudes; (3) in that they review and evaluate the current trends of thought in psychobiology, and (4) their framework is built up of the various phases of the psychoanalytic method as developed by Freud and his followers. In fact the rôle of Freud and his co-workers in rescuing psychiatry from stagnation, and opening up its secrets for investigation must never be lost sight of.

Since several of these essays were originally written for audiences of physicians whose interests were other than psychiatric and serve to explain away many misunderstandings in concepts, terminology, etc., for this reason if for no other the monograph deserves a wide reading by the medical and psychological professions.

LEWIS.

PSYCHOLOGY AND HISTORY. By Harry Elmer Barnes, Professor of Sociology, Smith College. New York. The Century Co, 1925.

This volume of 196 pages is a reprinting as a separate work, of the chapter "Some Phases of the Significance of Psychology in the Equipment of the Historian," from Professor Barnes recent work, *New History and the Social Studies*. His aim in placing this as a separate volume is, in the words of the editor "to serve the needs of the psychologist and

the psychiatrist who might be interested in the subject-matter of this special section and yet, might not be concerned with the other chapters."

The excellence of the work is due to the logical consistency with which the writer holds to the energetic quality of the individual as the differential which determines dynamically the trends of history. He makes discerning use of the illumination thrown on the springs of human conduct by Freud's analytic method and succeeds in outlining an interpretation of history on the understanding of individuals, instead of looking at the past as a series of epochs dominated by static ideals. He resolves the absolute values into forms of expression of emotions in individual personalities.

This interesting book is divided into two chapters, one entitled the Psychological Approach and the other Historical Interpretations. In this day of psychological interpretations of motives and results it is a timely work and will materially aid those who are seeking such information.

Professor Barnes is a profound scholar and educator and gives convincing evidence, in his elucidation of the various movements that promote human progress, of a broad comprehension of human thought and human motives.

Particularly interesting is his application of the new psychology to the interpretation of character traits and personality analyses of many of the American men in public life; as well as his reviews of interpretative biographies which have appeared recently. He also notes the enlightening influence of this point of view on some of the great revolutionary movements of the world and seeks to extend it to the understanding of religious phenomena and those historical events which have taken place as results of religious beliefs—including the establishment of our own government under Puritan influences.

MARY O'MALLEY.

PSYCHOLOGY FOR NURSES. By Mary Chadwick. Published by William Heinemann Ltd., 20 Bedford Street, London, W. C. 2.

This little book is intended to acquaint the general nurse with some of the mental mechanisms that determine her own behavior as well as that of those with whom she comes in contact in the discharge of her professional duties. With exceptions humiliatingly few in number the medical profession has been slow in appreciating the nature, extent or importance of the mental forces operative in physical illness. If the expositions set forth in this book receive the recognition they deserve from the readers to whom it is addressed the practitioner will do well to take inventory of his ideas concerning mental dynamics lest the nurse come to have a more appreciative understanding of those forces which unrevealed by microscope or roentgenogram subtly operate for health or disease. It is a

satisfaction to note the emphasis with which the opinion is expressed in this book that mind and body are inseparable and that disturbance in one is accompanied by derangement in the other.

The discussion as to the unconscious motives which led to the choice of nursing as a profession as well as the chapter on the types of personality to be met in the training school should enable the nurse to approach her duties with a clearer understanding of herself and of her associates. She will find revealed here, too, with shrewd insight those things in her own personality that have given rise to both prepossession and prejudice in her relations to her patients. The importance and *modus operandi* of psychological factors in the etiology and symptomatology of physical illness are clearly outlined in two chapters entitled "Illness a Regression" and "Influence of the Phantasy-Life." Chapters on the problems of children, of women and of men point out the origin and development of the difficulties confronting those groups as well as the unhappiness and disturbances to which they may lead.

The importance of the family situation in determining the individual's pattern and problems is beyond dispute yet one wonders if the author has not exaggerated somewhat the extent to which by identification that situation is repeated in life. It is believed that if some of the concepts stressed by Jung and by Adler had received consideration a desirably broader view would have been added. Altogether, however, Miss Chadwick has exercised wise discrimination in the selection and application of those aspects of the newer psychology that particularly concern the nurse. Few people observe human behavior so stripped of disguise as does the nurse, who should find this book most helpful in understanding the motives and processes which lead to final expression in the form of conduct.

NOYES.

NOTICE.—All business communications should be addressed to The Psychoanalytic Review, 3617 Tenth Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

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